Strategy and Summits
Ahmed Hany
April 15, 2009
A strategy is usually an abstract of few words that serves as a core to set missions, aims and targets and to set policies that lead to achieve them. When President Obama announced his strategy about Afghanistan, one understands that his strategy is consolidating forces while opening doors for moderate Taliban to achieve victory. His measures of victory are the stability of the central government there and the number of successful operations by his troops to achieve targets. His short term target is the number of Taliban fighters who succumb to his will to negotiate. Strategies are not secrets. He even told about the number of the troops and the time of deploying them. However secrets are the policies that his generals, diplomats and CIA persons do to achieve that.
His Afghanistan strategy is a sub-strategy of his global one to control energy and resources and their routs to keep the Pax-Americana.
When G20 met in London, the announced strategy was pumping money in the global monetary markets while setting more strict control measures on monetary institutions. This strategy satisfied summiteers and general agreement about the amount of money needed was reached.
NATO strategy could be abstracted in consolidating its global role while initiating partnerships with important geopolitical areas. The cause of existence of NATO is that it still serves the higher causes of both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to have global influence. When differences about dealing with Russia, threatened its unity, partners returned to its strategy as a reference. They frankly discussed Russian threat versus partnership and a consensus was reached by stressing that the main fronts are in Central and East Asia. This opened the door for reconciliation and cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan.
The Arab summits are the only summits that do not clear their global strategy. That is why it is too difficult to formulate a regional sub-strategy because there is no reference for missions, aims and targets. These both make partners to formulate different contradicting strategies and make others to plan roles for the region in absence of an Arab view.
Do Arabs want to be a part of the global strategies or do they want to be isolated? What are the goals of their development?
The same repeated summit statements about reconciliation and brotherhood means that summiteers are competitors not allied. Analysis of summiteers stances reveals contradicting strategies.
Syria talks much about resistance while its army does not respond to Israeli aggressions or shares in combat against Israel when it attacked Lebanon and Gaza. Politically it supports the views of Hamas and Hezbo-Allah while sending its diplomats to negotiate peace indirectly in Turkey. It wants the US to sponsor next negotiations and it wants it to be direct. It keeps a military alliance with Iran that helped the Americans to occupy Iraq. President Bashar Al Asad wanted to mediate between Iran and the West. Then the global strategy of Syria is joining the Western alliance and its regional strategy is achieving peace with Israel through playing Hamas and Hezbo-Allah cards. As this contradicts with the resistance that its leaders keep saying, then its policy is maneuvering. Unfortunately this reduces the credibility of the regime and makes the West talks directly to Iran while both playing the Syrian card.
When Western ally Qatar that has good relations with Tel Aviv, leaves the three Emirate Islands and the increasing threat of Iran in Gulf which is the Qatari main security circle, and plays destructively in files that affect the all Arab security and in particular Egypt and Saudi Arabia then its global strategy is opening the Arab system to rivals. The regional strategy is reducing the influence of the main Arab forces while depending on the Western forces to defend it against threats in the Gulf.
When summiteers support the Sudanese president Omar Bashir without referring to humanitarian crises of killed thousands and deported millions, the Arab system loses its credibility among these people and reduces its chances to play a constructive role there. Unfortunately, the strategy is supporting the president and neglecting people.
When a president calls himself the Dean of Arab leaders and the King of Kings of Africa, then his strategy is satisfying grandiosity and attracting attention. The policy is conflicting with other leaders to achieve this. The target is investing his grandiose in his country to convince his people falsely that their country is a great power.
One wonders why the summiteers did not ask the international community to boycott the new Israeli government until it agrees about all agreements from 242 UNSC resolution to Annapolis agreements. Hamas was an elected government but the Quartet insisted that it should recognize Israel and the Two-States solution before lifting sanctions. The international communities either boycott both or talk to both. When they said that their initiative would not last long they did not define time or the alternative. Would they recognize the Palestinian Authority as a state on the West Bank and Gaza and negotiating for Israeli withdrawal? Or would they call for the One-State solution? This means that the summiteers chose a wait and see strategy. Then the policy will be reaction to othersī steps. This did not work before.
The Dohaīs satirical black comedy led to two contradicting methods of reconciliation. The first uses kisses as a tool. The second depends on frank discussion to formulate a global strategy that leads to a sound regional strategy to achieve higher goals. More serious is talking about reconciliation and brotherhood while failing to address differences means that the Arab system strategy is destruction from inside.
It was a wise decision that President Mubarak did not go to Doha. It would be much better that he would not share in any all Arab summit not to be a partner in a gathering that would lead to falling of the system. The alternative is mini summits. Egypt and Saudi Arabia should go their way and many will follow soon or later. Letīs remember that they followed Sadatīs steps after fifteen years. What is more important now is that Egyptian thinkers should explore and think about post-Arab system era.
His Afghanistan strategy is a sub-strategy of his global one to control energy and resources and their routs to keep the Pax-Americana.
When G20 met in London, the announced strategy was pumping money in the global monetary markets while setting more strict control measures on monetary institutions. This strategy satisfied summiteers and general agreement about the amount of money needed was reached.
NATO strategy could be abstracted in consolidating its global role while initiating partnerships with important geopolitical areas. The cause of existence of NATO is that it still serves the higher causes of both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to have global influence. When differences about dealing with Russia, threatened its unity, partners returned to its strategy as a reference. They frankly discussed Russian threat versus partnership and a consensus was reached by stressing that the main fronts are in Central and East Asia. This opened the door for reconciliation and cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan.
The Arab summits are the only summits that do not clear their global strategy. That is why it is too difficult to formulate a regional sub-strategy because there is no reference for missions, aims and targets. These both make partners to formulate different contradicting strategies and make others to plan roles for the region in absence of an Arab view.
Do Arabs want to be a part of the global strategies or do they want to be isolated? What are the goals of their development?
The same repeated summit statements about reconciliation and brotherhood means that summiteers are competitors not allied. Analysis of summiteers stances reveals contradicting strategies.
Syria talks much about resistance while its army does not respond to Israeli aggressions or shares in combat against Israel when it attacked Lebanon and Gaza. Politically it supports the views of Hamas and Hezbo-Allah while sending its diplomats to negotiate peace indirectly in Turkey. It wants the US to sponsor next negotiations and it wants it to be direct. It keeps a military alliance with Iran that helped the Americans to occupy Iraq. President Bashar Al Asad wanted to mediate between Iran and the West. Then the global strategy of Syria is joining the Western alliance and its regional strategy is achieving peace with Israel through playing Hamas and Hezbo-Allah cards. As this contradicts with the resistance that its leaders keep saying, then its policy is maneuvering. Unfortunately this reduces the credibility of the regime and makes the West talks directly to Iran while both playing the Syrian card.
When Western ally Qatar that has good relations with Tel Aviv, leaves the three Emirate Islands and the increasing threat of Iran in Gulf which is the Qatari main security circle, and plays destructively in files that affect the all Arab security and in particular Egypt and Saudi Arabia then its global strategy is opening the Arab system to rivals. The regional strategy is reducing the influence of the main Arab forces while depending on the Western forces to defend it against threats in the Gulf.
When summiteers support the Sudanese president Omar Bashir without referring to humanitarian crises of killed thousands and deported millions, the Arab system loses its credibility among these people and reduces its chances to play a constructive role there. Unfortunately, the strategy is supporting the president and neglecting people.
When a president calls himself the Dean of Arab leaders and the King of Kings of Africa, then his strategy is satisfying grandiosity and attracting attention. The policy is conflicting with other leaders to achieve this. The target is investing his grandiose in his country to convince his people falsely that their country is a great power.
One wonders why the summiteers did not ask the international community to boycott the new Israeli government until it agrees about all agreements from 242 UNSC resolution to Annapolis agreements. Hamas was an elected government but the Quartet insisted that it should recognize Israel and the Two-States solution before lifting sanctions. The international communities either boycott both or talk to both. When they said that their initiative would not last long they did not define time or the alternative. Would they recognize the Palestinian Authority as a state on the West Bank and Gaza and negotiating for Israeli withdrawal? Or would they call for the One-State solution? This means that the summiteers chose a wait and see strategy. Then the policy will be reaction to othersī steps. This did not work before.
The Dohaīs satirical black comedy led to two contradicting methods of reconciliation. The first uses kisses as a tool. The second depends on frank discussion to formulate a global strategy that leads to a sound regional strategy to achieve higher goals. More serious is talking about reconciliation and brotherhood while failing to address differences means that the Arab system strategy is destruction from inside.
It was a wise decision that President Mubarak did not go to Doha. It would be much better that he would not share in any all Arab summit not to be a partner in a gathering that would lead to falling of the system. The alternative is mini summits. Egypt and Saudi Arabia should go their way and many will follow soon or later. Letīs remember that they followed Sadatīs steps after fifteen years. What is more important now is that Egyptian thinkers should explore and think about post-Arab system era.
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