Containing insurgency in Afghanistan
Rahil Yasin
March 31, 2009
LAHORE: Seven years after the Taliban government´s ouster by the Bush Administration, Afghanistan is far from becoming a stable and secure country. Karzai government has failed to bring about stability in the country and a democratic polity remains a distant dream. The insurgents are in effective control of a large territory and in areas bordering Pakistan.
The situation in parts of Afghanistan´s south and east is particularly grave because of the twin menace of violence and criminal activity. This presents a difficult challenge for the US-led troops and Afghans to turn the situation around.
Frequent attacks by the Taliban on primary Nato supply routes in Pakistan and closure of a key US airbase of Manas in Kyrgyzstan has created a difficult situation for Nato at a time when it is to have more troops in Afghanistan and control vital routes of licit and illicit cargo including the booming heroin trade.
As Kyrgyzstan ordered closure of the US base, Russia has reached an agreement with the US to permit the shipment by rail of non-lethal military cargo to be routed through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Russia´s control of a critical military supply corridor gives it crucial leverage in other disputes with the US, including Nato membership for Ukraine and Georgia and plans for a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic. These developments certainly will shape the future relationship between the two Cold War rivals.
However, the Taliban are not the only source of violence and unrest. Other groups, including Hizb-i Islami, armed criminals, drug networks as well as corrupt elements inside and outside the government, contribute to the country´s security woes.
Additionally, a record increase in opium production meets up to 40 per cent of the Taliban´s total financial needs. If the current levels of violence and poppy production are not contained, both the government and international security forces will lose further control over the country. The Taliban's growing strength in Afghanistan has compelled the US to consider longer tours of duty and even an increase in troop numbers.
Thus, President Barack Obama announced last month that he would send 17,000 more US troops to Afghanistan. The presence of more US forces may be helpful, but only if they are used to build Afghan capacity and protect the local population. One critical need is to strengthen Afghanistan´s police and army. There is currently a 70 per cent shortfall in international mentors for the police and a 30 per cent for the army. This requires a crash effort to identify, train, and support mentors. European governments, the United States, and the UN will have to devote more resources to mentoring and professionalising the Afghan government.
Afghanistan finds it hard to achieve stability in the face of civil war continuing for long. Sensing little prospects of an early return of peace, Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently called for initiating a process of reconciliation with the Taliban. He has also urged foreign forces stationed in the country to exert more efforts to bring an end to civilian casualties. Late last year, Saudi Arabia also helped bring together former Taliban officials and Afghans linked to the government for talks. But the issue is greater than extending a hand to the Taliban. There has to be a process for participation of all with transparency and the rule of law being the guideline. Hence, nation building with all factions included regardless of their tribal allegiances or political leanings is a must. In fact, all those involved should support moderate voices while those of extremism should be contained.
Pervasive corruption at all levels of the Afghan state apparatus is one of several factors fuelling the insurgency. Addressing this problem requires a serious and sustained campaign to prosecute corrupt officials through the justice system. This can include building better anti-corruption guarantors in all ministries, such as inspectors general offices, with mentoring and support from the US and other Nato states. The Ministry of Interior is a logical place to start since corruption in this ministry has undermined police reform, counter-narcotics efforts, and border security.
Too few programmes focus on resources for fortifying Afghanistan´s porous borders through which insurgents, narcotics, and other illicit goods travel with ease and often with the complicity of officials from Afghanistan and neighbouring states. Never has so greater been the need for improving Afghan-Pakistan relations and stabilising the tribal belt.
While this issue is partly beyond the remit of the assessment of international security assistance to Afghanistan, any analysis of Afghanistan´s security must include Pakistan. Indeed, while the war could well be lost inside Afghanistan, much of the command and control structures for insurgent groups lie on the Pakistan side of the border.
At present the United States is seized with the task of formulating a strategy for Afghanistan, but without a comprehensive strategy to deal with Pakistan or the Pakistan-India conflict. The United States needs to begin addressing the structural gap in Pakistan. Government institutions in the tribal areas are weak, and social and economic conditions are among the lowest in the world. Currently, international reconstruction and development assistance has focused on the Afghan side of the border. But this strategy is a half-measure. It needs to be directed towards Pakistan´s tribal areas, not just Afghanistan.
Security options remain limited without providing tangible benefit to local, disaffected communities. Without undermining the power of militant groups, however, it remains unclear who will benefit from development funds in Fata. At present, the likely beneficiaries are local religious leaders and militant leaders. Political reform may also be critical. This includes encouraging political developments, such as evaluating the Political Parties Act and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). While the Pakistani government is keen to obtain funding for development, it has been less willing to politically liberalise the tribal areas.
India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan should engage in a direct dialogue with the United States as mediator in an attempt to end the use of Afghanistan soil as a proxy Indo-Pakistani battleground. Although such a dialogue has never been tried before, building confidence and providing security guarantees would reduce tensions and help stabilise Afghanistan.
The Afghan government and the international community must provide basic services so that the Afghans themselves can take charge without relying on others. Investment in education, media, and civil society is the only way to help overcome extremism. Promoting moderate Islam is a key unifying factor. The positive role of Islam in promoting peace and reconciliation must be recognised.
Building functional state institutions and ensuring equal social and economic opportunities as well as justice are fundamental to national unity. Such an approach will help transform ethnic diversity from threat to asset. In order to prevent social unrest, political and military measures need to be complemented with substantive efforts to accelerate reconstruction, create good governance, and overcome the food crises. Donors must ensure and that allocated resources are not just appropriate but also effectively disbursed.
To bring about peace and stability in Afghanistan, it is very important that all parties become part of a political process. Afghanistan´s security issues must be faced but policies must also be framed that keep long-term institution building in mind if the Afghan state is truly to be strengthened.
The situation in parts of Afghanistan´s south and east is particularly grave because of the twin menace of violence and criminal activity. This presents a difficult challenge for the US-led troops and Afghans to turn the situation around.
Frequent attacks by the Taliban on primary Nato supply routes in Pakistan and closure of a key US airbase of Manas in Kyrgyzstan has created a difficult situation for Nato at a time when it is to have more troops in Afghanistan and control vital routes of licit and illicit cargo including the booming heroin trade.
As Kyrgyzstan ordered closure of the US base, Russia has reached an agreement with the US to permit the shipment by rail of non-lethal military cargo to be routed through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Russia´s control of a critical military supply corridor gives it crucial leverage in other disputes with the US, including Nato membership for Ukraine and Georgia and plans for a missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic. These developments certainly will shape the future relationship between the two Cold War rivals.
However, the Taliban are not the only source of violence and unrest. Other groups, including Hizb-i Islami, armed criminals, drug networks as well as corrupt elements inside and outside the government, contribute to the country´s security woes.
Additionally, a record increase in opium production meets up to 40 per cent of the Taliban´s total financial needs. If the current levels of violence and poppy production are not contained, both the government and international security forces will lose further control over the country. The Taliban's growing strength in Afghanistan has compelled the US to consider longer tours of duty and even an increase in troop numbers.
Thus, President Barack Obama announced last month that he would send 17,000 more US troops to Afghanistan. The presence of more US forces may be helpful, but only if they are used to build Afghan capacity and protect the local population. One critical need is to strengthen Afghanistan´s police and army. There is currently a 70 per cent shortfall in international mentors for the police and a 30 per cent for the army. This requires a crash effort to identify, train, and support mentors. European governments, the United States, and the UN will have to devote more resources to mentoring and professionalising the Afghan government.
Afghanistan finds it hard to achieve stability in the face of civil war continuing for long. Sensing little prospects of an early return of peace, Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently called for initiating a process of reconciliation with the Taliban. He has also urged foreign forces stationed in the country to exert more efforts to bring an end to civilian casualties. Late last year, Saudi Arabia also helped bring together former Taliban officials and Afghans linked to the government for talks. But the issue is greater than extending a hand to the Taliban. There has to be a process for participation of all with transparency and the rule of law being the guideline. Hence, nation building with all factions included regardless of their tribal allegiances or political leanings is a must. In fact, all those involved should support moderate voices while those of extremism should be contained.
Pervasive corruption at all levels of the Afghan state apparatus is one of several factors fuelling the insurgency. Addressing this problem requires a serious and sustained campaign to prosecute corrupt officials through the justice system. This can include building better anti-corruption guarantors in all ministries, such as inspectors general offices, with mentoring and support from the US and other Nato states. The Ministry of Interior is a logical place to start since corruption in this ministry has undermined police reform, counter-narcotics efforts, and border security.
Too few programmes focus on resources for fortifying Afghanistan´s porous borders through which insurgents, narcotics, and other illicit goods travel with ease and often with the complicity of officials from Afghanistan and neighbouring states. Never has so greater been the need for improving Afghan-Pakistan relations and stabilising the tribal belt.
While this issue is partly beyond the remit of the assessment of international security assistance to Afghanistan, any analysis of Afghanistan´s security must include Pakistan. Indeed, while the war could well be lost inside Afghanistan, much of the command and control structures for insurgent groups lie on the Pakistan side of the border.
At present the United States is seized with the task of formulating a strategy for Afghanistan, but without a comprehensive strategy to deal with Pakistan or the Pakistan-India conflict. The United States needs to begin addressing the structural gap in Pakistan. Government institutions in the tribal areas are weak, and social and economic conditions are among the lowest in the world. Currently, international reconstruction and development assistance has focused on the Afghan side of the border. But this strategy is a half-measure. It needs to be directed towards Pakistan´s tribal areas, not just Afghanistan.
Security options remain limited without providing tangible benefit to local, disaffected communities. Without undermining the power of militant groups, however, it remains unclear who will benefit from development funds in Fata. At present, the likely beneficiaries are local religious leaders and militant leaders. Political reform may also be critical. This includes encouraging political developments, such as evaluating the Political Parties Act and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). While the Pakistani government is keen to obtain funding for development, it has been less willing to politically liberalise the tribal areas.
India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan should engage in a direct dialogue with the United States as mediator in an attempt to end the use of Afghanistan soil as a proxy Indo-Pakistani battleground. Although such a dialogue has never been tried before, building confidence and providing security guarantees would reduce tensions and help stabilise Afghanistan.
The Afghan government and the international community must provide basic services so that the Afghans themselves can take charge without relying on others. Investment in education, media, and civil society is the only way to help overcome extremism. Promoting moderate Islam is a key unifying factor. The positive role of Islam in promoting peace and reconciliation must be recognised.
Building functional state institutions and ensuring equal social and economic opportunities as well as justice are fundamental to national unity. Such an approach will help transform ethnic diversity from threat to asset. In order to prevent social unrest, political and military measures need to be complemented with substantive efforts to accelerate reconstruction, create good governance, and overcome the food crises. Donors must ensure and that allocated resources are not just appropriate but also effectively disbursed.
To bring about peace and stability in Afghanistan, it is very important that all parties become part of a political process. Afghanistan´s security issues must be faced but policies must also be framed that keep long-term institution building in mind if the Afghan state is truly to be strengthened.
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