The War for Pakistan
Greg Reeson
March 20, 2009
The United States is preparing to chart a new course in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration has already made the decision to send 17,000 more American troops to battle Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, with more likely to follow later in the year, and a thorough review of U.S. strategy in the war is nearing completion. Recent news media reports indicate that Mr. Obama is set to announce his vision for the way ahead by the end of this month. In its effort to find a workable strategy, Washington must focus its attention not on Afghanistan, but on the war being waged inside neighboring Pakistan.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, but the latter is far more critical to the relationship than the former. A stable and secure Pakistan is essential to achieving stability and security in Afghanistan, but a stable and secure Afghanistan is not required for stability and security in Pakistan. After the United States invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and fighters fled to the tribal areas on the Pakistani side of the Afghanistan – Pakistan border. In reality, the border isn´t a border at all, at least not in the traditional sense of the word. It´s more like a rugged passageway that Islamic militants have used for the past seven and a half years to move freely between the two countries, launching cross-border raids against Afghan and coalition forces trying to secure the Afghan population, increase the capacity of the government in Kabul, and rebuild the country. The United States and its allies have tried in earnest to deal with the border problem from the Afghan side, but this war will not be decided in Afghanistan. This war will be won or lost in Pakistan, and at the moment, Pakistan is up for grabs.
Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of nearly 200 million and the world´s second most populous Muslim country, is battling for its national survival against a relentless Islamic insurgency, while simultaneously dealing with severe economic troubles and political instability that are crippling a fragile government struggling with democratic principles. The news from Pakistan tells of a dire situation that is steadily getting worse. President Zardari is losing public support because his government has been unable to address Pakistan´s political, economic and security challenges, and because Zardari has begun to resort to the sort of tactics he once lambasted his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf, for employing. Zardari has ordered the arrest of opposition leaders and supporters, has banned public political rallies, has shut down media outlets, and has openly targeted his chief rival, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
The Islamic insurgency in Pakistan is gaining power and influence, and Islamabad is steadily losing control over more and more of its territory. A failure to address militant safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has allowed groups like al Qaeda, LeT, the Afghani Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban to operate with near impunity from the region. The jihadists are realizing gains not just in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan proper as well. The Pakistani military, which enjoys a great deal of independence from the central government, has been overly concerned about the possibility of war with India and has not committed the resources necessary to fight the insurgent threat.
Some analysts, like syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, say that Pakistan is already a failed state, and just hasn´t realized it yet. I don´t think we´re at that point quite yet. If the United States does not take meaningful action soon, however, a failed, nuclear-armed Pakistan will likely become a reality.
What can the United States do to help Pakistan win the war raging within its borders? First it must take aggressive steps to strengthen Pakistan´s civilian government. U.S. aid should be targeted less toward the Pakistani military and more toward increasing the capacity of civilian law enforcement and civil service institutions. Second, the United States has to help the Pakistani military reorient its focus away from war with India and toward the Islamic insurgency that threatens to bring down the government in Islamabad. Third, the United States must help the Pakistani government with both economic and political reform in FATA so that the Pakistani people can see that the U.S. is not only concerned with the extremists, but with the lives of ordinary citizens as well. Of course, given the opposition to a U.S. presence on Pakistani soil, the United States will have to go to great lengths to ensure it maintains a supporting role, granting the Pakistani government the legitimacy that comes with leading the effort to help the Pakistani people. Finally, the United States must minimize the role of Pakistan´s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) by sharing sensitive intelligence concerning the ISI with the Pakistani government and targeting those members of the intelligence service who maintain ties to extremist groups. Right now the Pakistani government is too weak to control the ISI, but the rogue agency can be effectively marginalized with the right U.S. assistance.
As the United States´ military commitment to Iraq begins to wind down, the top priority for U.S. policy makers must be the war in Pakistan. Preventing a failed Pakistani state is vital to the national security interests of the United States and to the stability of Central Asia. If the war in Pakistan is lost, the war in Afghanistan will be lost as well.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, but the latter is far more critical to the relationship than the former. A stable and secure Pakistan is essential to achieving stability and security in Afghanistan, but a stable and secure Afghanistan is not required for stability and security in Pakistan. After the United States invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and fighters fled to the tribal areas on the Pakistani side of the Afghanistan – Pakistan border. In reality, the border isn´t a border at all, at least not in the traditional sense of the word. It´s more like a rugged passageway that Islamic militants have used for the past seven and a half years to move freely between the two countries, launching cross-border raids against Afghan and coalition forces trying to secure the Afghan population, increase the capacity of the government in Kabul, and rebuild the country. The United States and its allies have tried in earnest to deal with the border problem from the Afghan side, but this war will not be decided in Afghanistan. This war will be won or lost in Pakistan, and at the moment, Pakistan is up for grabs.
Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of nearly 200 million and the world´s second most populous Muslim country, is battling for its national survival against a relentless Islamic insurgency, while simultaneously dealing with severe economic troubles and political instability that are crippling a fragile government struggling with democratic principles. The news from Pakistan tells of a dire situation that is steadily getting worse. President Zardari is losing public support because his government has been unable to address Pakistan´s political, economic and security challenges, and because Zardari has begun to resort to the sort of tactics he once lambasted his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf, for employing. Zardari has ordered the arrest of opposition leaders and supporters, has banned public political rallies, has shut down media outlets, and has openly targeted his chief rival, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
The Islamic insurgency in Pakistan is gaining power and influence, and Islamabad is steadily losing control over more and more of its territory. A failure to address militant safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has allowed groups like al Qaeda, LeT, the Afghani Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban to operate with near impunity from the region. The jihadists are realizing gains not just in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan proper as well. The Pakistani military, which enjoys a great deal of independence from the central government, has been overly concerned about the possibility of war with India and has not committed the resources necessary to fight the insurgent threat.
Some analysts, like syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, say that Pakistan is already a failed state, and just hasn´t realized it yet. I don´t think we´re at that point quite yet. If the United States does not take meaningful action soon, however, a failed, nuclear-armed Pakistan will likely become a reality.
What can the United States do to help Pakistan win the war raging within its borders? First it must take aggressive steps to strengthen Pakistan´s civilian government. U.S. aid should be targeted less toward the Pakistani military and more toward increasing the capacity of civilian law enforcement and civil service institutions. Second, the United States has to help the Pakistani military reorient its focus away from war with India and toward the Islamic insurgency that threatens to bring down the government in Islamabad. Third, the United States must help the Pakistani government with both economic and political reform in FATA so that the Pakistani people can see that the U.S. is not only concerned with the extremists, but with the lives of ordinary citizens as well. Of course, given the opposition to a U.S. presence on Pakistani soil, the United States will have to go to great lengths to ensure it maintains a supporting role, granting the Pakistani government the legitimacy that comes with leading the effort to help the Pakistani people. Finally, the United States must minimize the role of Pakistan´s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) by sharing sensitive intelligence concerning the ISI with the Pakistani government and targeting those members of the intelligence service who maintain ties to extremist groups. Right now the Pakistani government is too weak to control the ISI, but the rogue agency can be effectively marginalized with the right U.S. assistance.
As the United States´ military commitment to Iraq begins to wind down, the top priority for U.S. policy makers must be the war in Pakistan. Preventing a failed Pakistani state is vital to the national security interests of the United States and to the stability of Central Asia. If the war in Pakistan is lost, the war in Afghanistan will be lost as well.
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