Stop the Shabak Ethnic Cleansing, Put an End to Talabani – Barzani Terrorism in Northern Iraq

I focused on the recent bogus-elections which have been held in Northern Iraq recently (31 January) in two previous articles, in which I republished the largest parts of a devastating report posted in the leading Turkmen portal of the SOITM Foundation.

The report highlighted the tyrannical ways applied against the various peoples of the Northern Iraq which has been fallaciously re-baptized ´Kurdistan´. The terror imposed by the gangs of the UK – US stooges Talabani and Barzani forced half the local population to abstain and the rest to vote under Stalinist pressure.

Thus, the Turkmen, the Christian Aramaeans, the Yazidis and the Shabak were portrayed as minority in an Oil-rich territory, which is their homeland and where they form the real majority, despite the extensive ethnic cleansing already performed by the British colonials, the Iraqi pseudo-kings, the nationalist and the Baathist regimes, and after the US—led invasion, the murderous Talabani and Barzani gangs.

I state here the titles and the links to the aforementioned articles:

´North Iraqi Pseudo-Kurdish Tyranny: Epicenter of Middle East´s Worst Chaos´ (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/91583)

´Biased Elections in Iraq´s Pseudo-Kurdish Province Denounced by Yazidis and Christian Aramaeans´ (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/91675), I

With the present article, I complete the republication of the insightful report, which before presenting valuable recommendations, offers details on the intimidation and the oppression exercised on the Shabak, another - mostly unknown - ethno-religious group of Northern Iraq that demands autonomy and removal of the pseudo-Kurdish terrorists from its territory. On the Shabak and the other Northern Iraqi nations I will expand in forthcoming articles.

Shabak reports

The irregularities started during the election campaigns when the posters of the non-Kurdish lists were removed. The candidates from the non-Kurdish lists were not allowed by Kurdish authorities to enter the region to campaign for their lists. Under the pressure of the Kurdish parties, the Independent High Electoral Commission obeyed several Kurdish pressures, for example, 24,000 voters in Nineveh region were added to the voter lists before a few days before the election when the legal time had ended.

"We frequently announced that the presence of the Kurdish Peshmerga in the Nineveh plain will influence negatively the election processes because these militants are going to use threatening and all types of intimidations against the population" said al-Qaddo, member of the Shabak representative in the Iraqi parliament. He continued by saying that the distribution of the security forces in the election centers were as follows: Polices forces and a few soldiers were stationed outside the election centers and large numbers of Peshmerga and pro-Kurdish elements inside the centers. The Peshmerga and pro-Kurdish elements were frightening and threatening those who would not vote for Kurdish lists. As an example, in the Khursanbad center of the Baashiqa there were three policemen, six soldiers, and twenty four Kurdish Peshmergas.

In many instances, the observers of the political parties were not allowed to participate in counting processes, the ballot boxes of the Darawish region, for example, were taken to Baashiqa but the observers were not informed about the whereabouts of the boxes before they went to Mosul.

The Kurdish authorities worked to annul the ballot boxes in which the majority of ballots were not for Kurdish list, for example, the boxes of Khazna Tepe center, where the Shabak list win 2,400 of 3,000 votes.

Some fifty ballot boxes were brought by the deputy director of the al-Shamal center, Nawwaf Ilyas, on the days after the election claiming that these boxes were forgotten.

Despite the fact that the original Shabak candidate won 13,000 votes, and while the pro-Kurdish Shabak candidate won only 2,500, Kurdish authorities worked intensively to reverse the outcome and show that their candidate had won the majority.

The Shabaks were continuously threatened by Kurdish militants who stated that they would not allow them to enter the Shaykhan and Baashiqa regions if the pro-Kurdish Shabak list did not win.

Due to the previous actions of the Kurdish militias and continuous intimidation on opponents, the observers of the non-Kurdish lists are now living in a difficult psychological condition.

Conclusions

Elections in the north of Iraq cannot be compared with any other general elections. In any other election the competition is about who administer the country, but in the north of Iraq, and due to the secessionist policies of the Kurdish militant parties, and strange approach of the UNAMI office in Baghdad, the competition is on, who own the immense Iraqi lands?

If the aggressive desire of the Kurdish parties to contain as much as possible of the Iraqi lands is taken into consideration then the organization of an impartial election in the north of Iraq in the present situation is going to be a kind of imagination.

Events during the electoral campaigns and the incongruity of the election results expose partiality in the large areas in the north of Iraq that are controlled by the Kurdish parties supported by the Kurdish militants and the politicized security services.

Pre-elections

The huge wealth of Kurdish parties is pitted against the modest finances of the other communities, particularly the minorities. This unbalanced economical condition deviates the equation of power toward the Kurdish and pro-Kurdish lists. Some politicians were either afraid or prevented form entering their regions to wage campaigns. There were also cases were campaign tools such as posters and pamphlets of the non-Kurdish lists were removed. Accusations were also made of vote-buying with cash payments being made after voters swore to support Kurdish or pro-Kurdish lists, and voters also faced threats that they would be dismissed from their jobs. The long distances between voters voting centers combined with the absence of voter names from many voter lists deprived large number of non-governing community groups.

During elections

During the elections, there were instances of Kurdish activists frightening, threatening and pressing voters to cast their votes for the Kurdish list. There were also instances votes were transferred to the Kurdish list by election center staff who, completed unused ballots in their favor. The curfew for autos was often violated inside and between the provinces. Specific voters were transferred inside cities and from between the districts. Thousands of Kurds traveling:

from Sulaymaniya voted in Khanaqin

through Mosul dam basin to Sinjar

from Erbil to Makhmur

Post-elections

The difficult situation of the election observers from non-Kurdish political list in the areas controlled by Kurdish Peshmergas was made more difficult by actions, such as the dismissal of Assyrian staff who was founded who had not voted for the pro-Kurdish Ishtar list.1

Incongruity of the results

The turnout in the regions where the election centers were staffed mainly by Kurds and guarded by Kurdish Peshmergas proved abnormally high, and in some centers reached about 100%. In these regions the Kurdish list also won an abnormally high percentage of the votes, in some cases over 90%. When the election results of a minority group, such as the Chaldo-Assyrian, in the regions controlled by the Kurdish parties are compared with other regions, the pro-Kurdish list received many fewer votes.

Because significant electoral fraud can take place in a short time, the observation of an election center for few hours can be considered a nonsense – especially If there are four hundred international observers compared to the thousands of election centers, each of which has dozens of ballot boxes. Logically therefore, the positions of the international observers should be carefully determined. They should be located in the regions that are most vulnerable to electoral fraud. During the provincial elections however, the most vulnerable regions were devoid of international observers. The large areas that UNAMI intends to divide between the ethnic Kurdish region and the Iraqi state were empty of international observers. In the most disputed and large Nineveh plain, there were only two UNPO observers.5 In Khanaqin region, which was given by UNAMI to the Kurdish region, there were no international observers. The moral responsibility therefore rests with Staffan de Mistura who holds historical responsibility for the so-called disputed regions, particularly Khanaqin, which he granted to the Kurds without election. Mr. de Mistura should consider observing the elections in those regions before he thinks to remain in Baghdad or visit the other two provinces in the south.

Recommendations

UNAMI should consider the following before parceling the lands in the north of Iraq:

The disturbed psychological and economical condition of the non-Kurdish population in the north of Iraq which stiffs the balance of power grossly toward the Kurds.

The great demographic changes, particularly Kurdification of administration, introduced by Kurdish parties which ruled the region with an iron fist since the occupation in 2003.

The increase of the Kurdish populations in many important regions during 20th century.

That there were almost no international observers in the so-called disputed areas

Questions how UNAMI could monitor the elections in the sensitive with so few staff, especially when it is well known that the movement of the staffs of UNAMI staff is strictly limited.

The optimum choice to solve the boundary problems between the ethnic Kurdish federal region and the multiethnic Iraqi state is to generalize the Kerkuk law of 23:

The civil governmental administrations, the military, the police and the security forces should be fairly distributed between the communities in the region.

The demographical changes should be corrected.

To improve the physiological and economical condition and avoid extortions, the non-Kurdish populations should be rehabilitated.

References:

1. An Article titled "The Christians affairs attention office in Telskof dismiss several of staffs who did not vote for Ishtar list" published in the website Muntadayat Ainkawa. http://www.ankawa.com/forum/index.php/topic,266900.0.html

Note

Picture: Shabak demonstrate against the criminal Kurdish gangs of Barzani and Talabini who imposed an unprecedented terror in Northern Iraq. From: http://www.shabaknews.com/who%20are%20the%20shabak/index.html