Somalia, the Abyssinian Invasion and Withdrawal: A Victory for Eritrea

During the two years of the failed Abyssinian intervention in Somalia and the partly invasion of the Somali South, Eritrea steadily supported the Somali National Liberation forces that only for reasons of anti-Somali hysteria of the colonial powers are called ´Islamists´ or ´opposition´.

In fact, there is no Somali ´opposition´ because there is not Somali government. The TFG was never a representative Somali government formed after free elections; it consisted in an Abyssinian fraud to which much attention was given because the Somali patriots have been deceitfully described as Somali Islamists.

As the evil interests of the colonial powers, France, England, and the pro-European part of the US establishment, coincided with the paranoid dreams of the Abyssinian terrorist regime, the Abyssinian soldiers who simply were criminal Amhara and Tigray thugs were repeatedly offered US intelligence and considerable help in terms of logistics and financial support.

All this proved to be absolutely useless, as it was expected that the only future for the criminal Amhara and Tigray Monophysitic (Tewahedo) Abyssinian gangsters would be a perfectly deserved death in the streets of Mogadishu and other Somali cities.

Eritrea predicted correctly; it would be impossible for Abyssinia to win this war.

Ashamed, the criminal Amhara and Tigray thugs gradually left the Somali territory, at a moment the final implosion and explosion of the criminal colonial state of Abyssinia (fallaciously re-baptized ´Ethiopia´) is expected to start from Ogaden.

This moment of great moral victory for Eritrea, the Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a Press Release to underscore Eritrea´s correct approach to the Somali Question. Quite rightfully!

I herewith republish the Press Release integrally.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Press Release

26.12.08

http://hornofafrica.de/index.php?id=18&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1505&tx_ttnews[backPid]=12&cHash=b201961074

Exactly two years ago, on 26 December 2006, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to topple the popular Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had succeeded in bringing a semblance of stability and order to the country, thus ending 15 years of internecine fighting and turmoil.

Foreseeing the perils of Ethiopia's reckless blunder into Somalia at that early stage, the Eritrean government sternly admonished the violation of Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Indeed, in the IGAD meetings of the Council of Ministers that were held prior to Ethiopia's impending invasion, Eritrea sought, persistently and vigorously, to cultivate a regional consensus for a comprehensive solution on the basis of the following five points:

i. External Military Intervention: Any external military intervention will further polarize the political realities of Somalia and induce greater conflagration. Ethiopia's military intervention, under whatever guise or justification, is particularly dangerous both for reasons of historical animosity and because of the events of the past few years. Ethiopia must therefore cease its intermittent military intervention and withdraw the forces that it has deployed in the past few days.

ii. Linkages with International Terrorism: The portrayal of developments in Somalia in terms of the global war on terrorism is factually untenable and politically imprudent. The overarching national cause of the Somali people should not indeed be reduced to or lumped together with this singular concern. It must be acknowledged that external support to the warlords under the rubric of fighting terrorism was a factor of complication. Some regional and local actors have also found this portrayal convenient to camouflage other ulterior motives.

iii. Lifting of Arms Embargo: A recent call by some forces for a selective lifting of the UN embargo on arms is unbalanced, misguided and fraught with dangerous consequences. Indeed, this can only imperil the political process of reconciliation and durable political arrangement in Somali. Appropriate adjustments can be contemplated when there is irreversible progress in the political arrangement giving rise to national institutions that have credible legitimacy and popular support.

iv. Political Process of National Reconciliation: The daunting problem in Somalia is essentially an internal political problem that must be solved through negotiations between Somali political forces. The role of IGAD and our partners in peace must be focused on facilitating and promoting these negotiations through appropriate forums and mechanisms.

v. Territorial Disputes: The current situation in Somalia is raising the specter of territorial claims and disputes between Somalia and its neighbors. Territorial disputes and claims can only be settled by strict adherence to the sanctity of colonial boundaries and IGAD should adopt this stance firmly and unequivocally.

Despite sincere hopes that IGAD, and the international community at large, would act with a sense of purpose and urgency along these forward-looking points, Ethiopia's illegal invasion and continued occupation of Somalia were condoned and abetted.

Two years hence, Somalia remains gripped by a humanitarian catastrophe. Thousands of Somalis have become victims of indiscriminate Ethiopian atrocities. Meanwhile, over 500,000 civilians have been internally displaced or exiled by the incessant fighting. What little stability Somalia witnessed with the advent of the UIC vanished with the invasion which ushered in mayhem and lawlessness. To add to this abysmal situation, piracy with all its intertwined causes and ramifications, has become endemic along the Somali coast. The port of Eyl, in Puntland, a staunch supporter of Ethiopian presence, has for instance become a haven and springboard for pirates.

Meanwhile, the notion of a lasting political solution continues to elude the international community. Instead, forums on Somalia are increasingly seeking palliative remedies that will only exacerbate the situation and prolong the crisis. Without a viable political process that embraces all Somali political forces, strengthening the AU peacekeepers or replacing them with blue helmets will only be an exercise in futility. Moreover, providing support for one faction while marginalizing another cannot be a tenable means towards achieving a political settlement in Somalia. All external support must not seek ulterior political motives, it must be founded on a genuine desire to strive for the common good of the Somali people. To capitulate, Somalia's worries can be solved along, the following lines:

First, it must he recognized that external military intervention, under any pretext or label, will not mitigate but only exacerbate the turmoil that has gripped Somalia.

Secondly, it must be recognized that the various schemes of balkanizing and fragmenting Somalia into fragile mini-States will continue to be a recipe for continuous conflict.

Thirdly and most importantly, Somalis must be allowed to pursue the objectives of national reconstitution through their own devices.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Asmara

26 December 2008

Note

Picture: Amhara thug's dead body in the streets of Mogadishu