William St. Clair on 19th century Greece and the Modern Greeks - Part 7
Risto Stefov
December 08, 2008
Modern Greeks for the last century or so have been spreading untruths about themselves and now generations later have forgotten who they really are.
This series of articles is a means of letting the Greeks know who they are. And for those who ask, "Why am I doing this?" I am doing this because nowadays Greeks have forgotten who they are and where they come from and have become so brazen that they dare to attack others like the Macedonians and question their identity without giving it a second thought as to the damage they are doing.
When people deny other peoples´ ethnic identity they deny their right to exist and as such those people have no choice but to fight back. But unlike the Greeks who fight with half-truths and untruths Macedonians have the truth on their side.
What follows are excerpts from William St. Clair´s book "That Greece Might Still be Free, The Philhellenes in the War of Independence" who speaks the truth about 19th century Greece and the Modern Greeks.
"Virtually no foreigner understood the motives and complexities of Greek politics. Romantics and dreamers cannot therefore be blamed too much for falling into the illusion of seeing in the Greeks the features which they wanted to see. But among all the manifestations of philhellenism it is difficult to imagine a less promising means of regenerating Greece than to divide it up and hand it over to the warlords." (p. 172)
"By his first ceremonial appearance at Missolonghi in his scarlet uniform Byron had indicated that he saw his role in Greece as a military one. Before he had left the Ionian Islands he had even set about hiring a private army." (p. 173)
"The Albanian Suliotes had been spared by the Turks after Mavrocordato´s disastrous expedition into Epirus in 1822 on condition that they went into exile. Byron now engaged to pay them to return to Greece to fight again. Soon he had a force of several hundred wild undisciplined Albanians on his pay roll at Missolonghi although, as was pointed out, only a proportion were genuine Suliotes, the others being unashamedly mercenaries pursuing the only trade for which their nation has ever been distinguished." (p. 173)
"Byron would go riding in the plain outside Missolonghi at the head of this motley army, no doubt imagining himself as a future conquering hero. The rest of the day he spent in a kind of military headquarters which he had set up in a house near the shore, holding long inconclusive conferences about military plans. The room was festooned with all kinds of weapons to give the proper atmosphere." (p. 173)
"Stanhope also brought to England a Turkish boy of about nine or ten years old who was found prowling naked among the ruins of Argos, ´kicked or fondled as caprice dictated´ until he was rescued by a Philhellene. His parents and family and the whole Turkish community had, as Stanhope put it, fallen ´victims to the fury of the enfranchised Greeks´. The boy, Mustapha Ali, was sent to the Lancastrian School in Lambeth where he was said to have earned his card of merit every day. He was dressed in Turkish dress complete with pistols and turban, although he hated to be called Turk and hated his name. He was said to have been ´very fond of dancing which he performs in a manner resembling that of the Ancient Greeks, deviating only by firing off his pistols while he twirls´." (p. 189)
"The area of Greece between Athens and Livadia seemed to be the most promising field for his activities. Unlike most of Greece, this part gave the appearance of being under an efficient government, well-policed, with reasonably fair local administration and access to justice. It was ruled as a personal domain by one of the most famous chieftains of Greece, Odysseus Androutses. Odysseus had picked up his proud classical name whole a boy in the Ionian Islands." (p. 189)
"Like so many apparent classical survivals and revivals in Greece it was an importation from the West, and yet, as if to emphasize the myth of philhellenism, he had an uncanny resemblance to one version of the Odysseus of antiquity. He was not the long-enduring, resourceful Odysseus of Homer, but the lying, cheating, double-dealer of later legend." (p. 190)
"Odysseus´ commitment to the cause of Greek independence was never more than half-hearted. His hero was Ali Pasha and he seems to have tried consciously to model his own career on Ali´s. Like Ali he was cruel, unscrupulous, and despotic in asserting his personal authority over his region. He did not much care whether he acknowledged Turkish suzerainty or not and he cared nothing at all for the euphuistic declarations about the regeneration of Greece." (p. 190)
"In 1821 and 1822 he [Odysseus] actively co-operated with the Turks against the other Greeks when it suited him and he had on one occasion arranged the murder of two prominent Greeks on a mission to him from the Greek Government." (p. 190)
"Like his mentor, Ali Pasha, Odysseus´s policy for survival and aggrandizement was to suppress ruthlessly all opposition within and at the same time to accommodate quickly to the changing forces outside. Whether the outside forces were his fellow revolutionaries among the Greeks or his former colleagues among the Turks, Odysseus was ready to adapt. At the time when the British Philhellenes were active in Greece Odysseus was determined to ensure that he would be favoured when the money from the loan started to arrive. He decided to treat the British Philhellenes with courtesy." (p. 190)
"Within a few days of meeting Odysseus for the first time Stanhope was completely won over. There are few more incongruous episodes in the history of philhellenism than this encounter between the unshakeable optimist and the cynical warlord. ´I have been constantly with Odysseus,´ Stanhope wrote from Athens. ´He was a very strong mind, a good heart, and is brave as his sword; he is a doing man; he governs with a strong arm and is the only man in Greece that can preserve order.´" (p. 190)
"As a doing man himself, Stanhope was at once drawn to this rare phenomenon, an effective Greek. Soon he had convinced himself not only that Odysseus was a brave patriot but that he was a paragon of Benthamite liberalism. Stanhope, who had nothing but contempt for the romanticism of the militarists, of the archaizers, and of the Byronists, was caught by a romanticism of his own. On his first two days in Athens he had been taken to witness a scene that would have warmed the heart of any liberal idealist. As he wrote to Bowring: ´The Modern Greeks could understand a Greek assuming the name of Odysseus. But how many, one wonders, were so familiar with the history of the transmission of the classics that they could understand why some Europeans insisted on calling him Ulysses?´" (p. 190)
"From Odysseus´ point of view the policy was a complete success. His reputation for being the bravest and best of the Greeks spread far and wide through Europe. In Greece all the Philhellenes who shared Stanhope´s beliefs naturally wanted to serve Odysseus. Other Philhellenes whose interest was simply to indulge their Byronic romanticism now found a justification for their apparently absurd preference." (p. 193)
"The attractive, but scarcely credible theory, that the barbarous mountain chieftains with their oriental dress and oriental habits were the ´true Greeks´ received a curious reinforcement. Not only was Odysseus a ´true Greek´ but a champion of constitutional liberty as well." (p. 193)
"In the spring of 1824 Stanhope rushed about Greece trying to use his influence and to persuade Byron to use his influence to arrange a congress of the Greek leaders. The likelihood of success was never great. Mavrocordato and his friends at Missolonghi knew Odysseus better than Stanhope. With the death of Byron in April all hope of reconciliation passed." (p. 193)
"But with the death of Byron Stanhope was now the sole agent of the London Greek Committee in Greece. This allowed him to make his last mistake. At Missolonghi there still lay the guns and gunpowder that had been sent out in the Ann, the armaments which had been donated by Gordon when his proposal to send an artillery brigade to Greece was overruled. These stores were now the only things of any value that remained from all the efforts of the London Greek Committee. To the consternation of Parry, who had shared many a laugh with Byron at the expense of the absurd Colonel, Stanhope now ordered that the gunpowder and guns should be handed over to Odysseus. With great difficulty the order was executed and the guns were hauled across Greece. Odysseus had no intention of using them against the Turks. He took them to a cave in Mount Parnassus where he had built a fortified redoubt from which he could conveniently control his little empire in Eastern Greece. The most lasting practical result of all the efforts of the British Benthamites was to reinforce the power of a cruel warlord." (p. 193)
"The British Government had originally turned a blind eye to Colonel Stanhope, an officer in the British army (on half-pay) going to Greece. At the time they thought his activities would promote British interests. By early 1824, fortified by extensive intelligence from the intercepted mails in the Ionian Islands, they had changed their minds. To have such a vociferous republican liberal at large in Greece, Canning decided, far from advancing British interests, did damage to the monarchical principle. When Stanhope visited Zante in May 1824 he was handed a letter from the British army authorities in London ordering him to return home without delay. Since he depended on his army pension for his income he decided to obey." (p. 193)
"The island party had some claim to be regarded as the legitimate Government–in so far as such terms have validity in a revolutionary situation–as the direct successor of the Government proclaimed at Epidaurus in 1822. The rich Hydriote ship-owner, Conduriottis, held the title of President of Greece. He was an Albanian, unable to speak Greek. And so the leaders of both armies in the war came–as did many of the fighting men–from that violent illiterate race who had not yet learned to prefer nationalism to other loyalties." (p. 228)
"The chief aim of Conduriottis´ Government was to assert its authority over Colocotrones and in particular to compel him to hand over Nauplia which his men had held since its fall. The Government brought armed men from Roumeli and by the spring of 1824 Colocotrones´ son Panos was under siege at Nauplia. At the same time fighting between rival chieftains had broken out in Western Greece." (p. 228)
"This was the situation at the end of June 1824 when, in quick succession, two pieces of news arrived which immediately transformed the politics of Greece. First of all it was learned that L40,000 worth of English gold intended for Greece had arrived at Zante. Then, soon afterwards, came the terrifying stories of the destruction of Casos and Psara. When the news of Psara reached Zante, Samuel Barff decided to send the money immediately to the Greek Government despite the prohibition of its export by the Ionian Government." (p. 228)
"In war, so it has often been said, three things are required above all else, money, money, and more money. This had been the view of all intelligent observers of the Greek scene. Demetrius Hypsilantes had apparently failed because of lack of money to command national loyalty; the Regiment Baleste had failed for lack of money to pay and recruit its men; the German Legion had failed through lack of money to buy food; the Byron Brigade had failed when the poet paymaster died. Most important of all, successive attempts at imposing national unity on Greece had failed because the so-called governments had never had enough money to break local and personal loyalties buttressed by money. Now for the first time in the history of the war, money was available." (p. 228)
"To any outsider used to Western European methods of thought there could be no doubt about the right policy in these circumstances. Greece lay under the imminent threat of invasion by a large, disciplined, well-tried army. The first priority must surely be to put aside the internal political divisions and unite against the common enemy. The British gold, judiciously dispensed, would act as the cement to keep the various groups together.
This policy was in fact attempted and eventually it can be said to have succeeded but only at enormous cost after two civil wars." (p. 228)
In spite of Greece´s artificiality today one can proudly call him or herself a "Hellene" with a 4,000 year old heritage, with roots extending back to the classical Greeks of 2,000 years ago but a real and genuine Macedonian cannot call him or herself a Macedonian because according to modern Greek logic "Macedonia is Greek" and "there is no such thing as a Macedonian"!
Many thanks to TrueMacedonian for his contribution to this article.
Source:
St. Clair, William. That Greece Might Still be Free, The Philhellenes in the War of Independence. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
To be Continued
You can contact the author at rstefov@hotmail.com
This series of articles is a means of letting the Greeks know who they are. And for those who ask, "Why am I doing this?" I am doing this because nowadays Greeks have forgotten who they are and where they come from and have become so brazen that they dare to attack others like the Macedonians and question their identity without giving it a second thought as to the damage they are doing.
When people deny other peoples´ ethnic identity they deny their right to exist and as such those people have no choice but to fight back. But unlike the Greeks who fight with half-truths and untruths Macedonians have the truth on their side.
What follows are excerpts from William St. Clair´s book "That Greece Might Still be Free, The Philhellenes in the War of Independence" who speaks the truth about 19th century Greece and the Modern Greeks.
"Virtually no foreigner understood the motives and complexities of Greek politics. Romantics and dreamers cannot therefore be blamed too much for falling into the illusion of seeing in the Greeks the features which they wanted to see. But among all the manifestations of philhellenism it is difficult to imagine a less promising means of regenerating Greece than to divide it up and hand it over to the warlords." (p. 172)
"By his first ceremonial appearance at Missolonghi in his scarlet uniform Byron had indicated that he saw his role in Greece as a military one. Before he had left the Ionian Islands he had even set about hiring a private army." (p. 173)
"The Albanian Suliotes had been spared by the Turks after Mavrocordato´s disastrous expedition into Epirus in 1822 on condition that they went into exile. Byron now engaged to pay them to return to Greece to fight again. Soon he had a force of several hundred wild undisciplined Albanians on his pay roll at Missolonghi although, as was pointed out, only a proportion were genuine Suliotes, the others being unashamedly mercenaries pursuing the only trade for which their nation has ever been distinguished." (p. 173)
"Byron would go riding in the plain outside Missolonghi at the head of this motley army, no doubt imagining himself as a future conquering hero. The rest of the day he spent in a kind of military headquarters which he had set up in a house near the shore, holding long inconclusive conferences about military plans. The room was festooned with all kinds of weapons to give the proper atmosphere." (p. 173)
"Stanhope also brought to England a Turkish boy of about nine or ten years old who was found prowling naked among the ruins of Argos, ´kicked or fondled as caprice dictated´ until he was rescued by a Philhellene. His parents and family and the whole Turkish community had, as Stanhope put it, fallen ´victims to the fury of the enfranchised Greeks´. The boy, Mustapha Ali, was sent to the Lancastrian School in Lambeth where he was said to have earned his card of merit every day. He was dressed in Turkish dress complete with pistols and turban, although he hated to be called Turk and hated his name. He was said to have been ´very fond of dancing which he performs in a manner resembling that of the Ancient Greeks, deviating only by firing off his pistols while he twirls´." (p. 189)
"The area of Greece between Athens and Livadia seemed to be the most promising field for his activities. Unlike most of Greece, this part gave the appearance of being under an efficient government, well-policed, with reasonably fair local administration and access to justice. It was ruled as a personal domain by one of the most famous chieftains of Greece, Odysseus Androutses. Odysseus had picked up his proud classical name whole a boy in the Ionian Islands." (p. 189)
"Like so many apparent classical survivals and revivals in Greece it was an importation from the West, and yet, as if to emphasize the myth of philhellenism, he had an uncanny resemblance to one version of the Odysseus of antiquity. He was not the long-enduring, resourceful Odysseus of Homer, but the lying, cheating, double-dealer of later legend." (p. 190)
"Odysseus´ commitment to the cause of Greek independence was never more than half-hearted. His hero was Ali Pasha and he seems to have tried consciously to model his own career on Ali´s. Like Ali he was cruel, unscrupulous, and despotic in asserting his personal authority over his region. He did not much care whether he acknowledged Turkish suzerainty or not and he cared nothing at all for the euphuistic declarations about the regeneration of Greece." (p. 190)
"In 1821 and 1822 he [Odysseus] actively co-operated with the Turks against the other Greeks when it suited him and he had on one occasion arranged the murder of two prominent Greeks on a mission to him from the Greek Government." (p. 190)
"Like his mentor, Ali Pasha, Odysseus´s policy for survival and aggrandizement was to suppress ruthlessly all opposition within and at the same time to accommodate quickly to the changing forces outside. Whether the outside forces were his fellow revolutionaries among the Greeks or his former colleagues among the Turks, Odysseus was ready to adapt. At the time when the British Philhellenes were active in Greece Odysseus was determined to ensure that he would be favoured when the money from the loan started to arrive. He decided to treat the British Philhellenes with courtesy." (p. 190)
"Within a few days of meeting Odysseus for the first time Stanhope was completely won over. There are few more incongruous episodes in the history of philhellenism than this encounter between the unshakeable optimist and the cynical warlord. ´I have been constantly with Odysseus,´ Stanhope wrote from Athens. ´He was a very strong mind, a good heart, and is brave as his sword; he is a doing man; he governs with a strong arm and is the only man in Greece that can preserve order.´" (p. 190)
"As a doing man himself, Stanhope was at once drawn to this rare phenomenon, an effective Greek. Soon he had convinced himself not only that Odysseus was a brave patriot but that he was a paragon of Benthamite liberalism. Stanhope, who had nothing but contempt for the romanticism of the militarists, of the archaizers, and of the Byronists, was caught by a romanticism of his own. On his first two days in Athens he had been taken to witness a scene that would have warmed the heart of any liberal idealist. As he wrote to Bowring: ´The Modern Greeks could understand a Greek assuming the name of Odysseus. But how many, one wonders, were so familiar with the history of the transmission of the classics that they could understand why some Europeans insisted on calling him Ulysses?´" (p. 190)
"From Odysseus´ point of view the policy was a complete success. His reputation for being the bravest and best of the Greeks spread far and wide through Europe. In Greece all the Philhellenes who shared Stanhope´s beliefs naturally wanted to serve Odysseus. Other Philhellenes whose interest was simply to indulge their Byronic romanticism now found a justification for their apparently absurd preference." (p. 193)
"The attractive, but scarcely credible theory, that the barbarous mountain chieftains with their oriental dress and oriental habits were the ´true Greeks´ received a curious reinforcement. Not only was Odysseus a ´true Greek´ but a champion of constitutional liberty as well." (p. 193)
"In the spring of 1824 Stanhope rushed about Greece trying to use his influence and to persuade Byron to use his influence to arrange a congress of the Greek leaders. The likelihood of success was never great. Mavrocordato and his friends at Missolonghi knew Odysseus better than Stanhope. With the death of Byron in April all hope of reconciliation passed." (p. 193)
"But with the death of Byron Stanhope was now the sole agent of the London Greek Committee in Greece. This allowed him to make his last mistake. At Missolonghi there still lay the guns and gunpowder that had been sent out in the Ann, the armaments which had been donated by Gordon when his proposal to send an artillery brigade to Greece was overruled. These stores were now the only things of any value that remained from all the efforts of the London Greek Committee. To the consternation of Parry, who had shared many a laugh with Byron at the expense of the absurd Colonel, Stanhope now ordered that the gunpowder and guns should be handed over to Odysseus. With great difficulty the order was executed and the guns were hauled across Greece. Odysseus had no intention of using them against the Turks. He took them to a cave in Mount Parnassus where he had built a fortified redoubt from which he could conveniently control his little empire in Eastern Greece. The most lasting practical result of all the efforts of the British Benthamites was to reinforce the power of a cruel warlord." (p. 193)
"The British Government had originally turned a blind eye to Colonel Stanhope, an officer in the British army (on half-pay) going to Greece. At the time they thought his activities would promote British interests. By early 1824, fortified by extensive intelligence from the intercepted mails in the Ionian Islands, they had changed their minds. To have such a vociferous republican liberal at large in Greece, Canning decided, far from advancing British interests, did damage to the monarchical principle. When Stanhope visited Zante in May 1824 he was handed a letter from the British army authorities in London ordering him to return home without delay. Since he depended on his army pension for his income he decided to obey." (p. 193)
"The island party had some claim to be regarded as the legitimate Government–in so far as such terms have validity in a revolutionary situation–as the direct successor of the Government proclaimed at Epidaurus in 1822. The rich Hydriote ship-owner, Conduriottis, held the title of President of Greece. He was an Albanian, unable to speak Greek. And so the leaders of both armies in the war came–as did many of the fighting men–from that violent illiterate race who had not yet learned to prefer nationalism to other loyalties." (p. 228)
"The chief aim of Conduriottis´ Government was to assert its authority over Colocotrones and in particular to compel him to hand over Nauplia which his men had held since its fall. The Government brought armed men from Roumeli and by the spring of 1824 Colocotrones´ son Panos was under siege at Nauplia. At the same time fighting between rival chieftains had broken out in Western Greece." (p. 228)
"This was the situation at the end of June 1824 when, in quick succession, two pieces of news arrived which immediately transformed the politics of Greece. First of all it was learned that L40,000 worth of English gold intended for Greece had arrived at Zante. Then, soon afterwards, came the terrifying stories of the destruction of Casos and Psara. When the news of Psara reached Zante, Samuel Barff decided to send the money immediately to the Greek Government despite the prohibition of its export by the Ionian Government." (p. 228)
"In war, so it has often been said, three things are required above all else, money, money, and more money. This had been the view of all intelligent observers of the Greek scene. Demetrius Hypsilantes had apparently failed because of lack of money to command national loyalty; the Regiment Baleste had failed for lack of money to pay and recruit its men; the German Legion had failed through lack of money to buy food; the Byron Brigade had failed when the poet paymaster died. Most important of all, successive attempts at imposing national unity on Greece had failed because the so-called governments had never had enough money to break local and personal loyalties buttressed by money. Now for the first time in the history of the war, money was available." (p. 228)
"To any outsider used to Western European methods of thought there could be no doubt about the right policy in these circumstances. Greece lay under the imminent threat of invasion by a large, disciplined, well-tried army. The first priority must surely be to put aside the internal political divisions and unite against the common enemy. The British gold, judiciously dispensed, would act as the cement to keep the various groups together.
This policy was in fact attempted and eventually it can be said to have succeeded but only at enormous cost after two civil wars." (p. 228)
In spite of Greece´s artificiality today one can proudly call him or herself a "Hellene" with a 4,000 year old heritage, with roots extending back to the classical Greeks of 2,000 years ago but a real and genuine Macedonian cannot call him or herself a Macedonian because according to modern Greek logic "Macedonia is Greek" and "there is no such thing as a Macedonian"!
Many thanks to TrueMacedonian for his contribution to this article.
Source:
St. Clair, William. That Greece Might Still be Free, The Philhellenes in the War of Independence. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
To be Continued
You can contact the author at rstefov@hotmail.com
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