The decrease in violence in Iraq has been achieved by the Iraqi´s

The Iraqi´s are primarily responsible for the recent 2007-2008 decrease in national violence, not the small U.S. surge. The violence would have decreased even faster without the U.S. surge.

In a recent Iraq survey, (ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK Poll - ABCNEWS.com) Iraqi´s who see security as having improved were asked who deserves the most credit. 26% said the National government, 18% said the Iraqi Police force, 13 % said the Iraqi Army and only 4% said the U.S.

THE MAJOR REASONS FOR THE DECREASE IN IRAQI VIOLENCE:

1. The Iraqi government´s operation ´Fardh al Qannoon´ to secure Baghdad, began in Feb 2007 and continued through Nov 2007. This operation was carried out by the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police with minimal U.S. participation, even though the vast majority of U.S. surge troops were stationed in Baghdad after June 2007.

2. The formation of the ´Awakening Groups´ in Anbar Province beginning in June 2007. These neighborhood security forces were developed with U.S. money and equipment, but with almost no U.S. participation, even though 4000 of the U.S. surge troops were sent to Anbar.

3. The ceasefire ordered by cleric Muqtada al-Sadr for his militia, the Mahdi Army. The Iranian government has encouraged the Shiites in southern Iraq to stand-down. Iran wants peace in Iraq because they know that the Shiites are already in control of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army.

4. The 2006 plan advocated by General George William Casey Jr. and Lt. General Peter W. Chiarelli to pull back the majority of U.S. troops away from the day-to-day combat confrontations and concentrate them in the major U.S. bases. This plan called for the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police to take over the major combat operations. This is actually a reduction in U.S. participation and is the opposite of escalation (surge). The June 2007 U.S. surge actually resulted in more U.S. troops being sent to Iraq, but less troops actually carrying out combat missions. The way forward is to continue the strategy of General Casey and Lt. General Chiarelli. This is the only military decision in five years by the U.S. that has reduced violence in Iraq.

5. The steady yearly increase in the capability and size of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police forces. More unemployed Iraqi´s are becoming soldiers and police in all of the Iraqi armies and militias.

6. The increasing recognition by the Iraqi´s (both the moderates and extremists) that a reduction in violence may result in a reduction of U.S. troops and an end to the unwanted occupation.

7. The 12 foot high cement walls erected around Sadr City in Baghdad. This segregated, isolated part of the city is guarded by Iraqi and U.S. soldiers. This martial law has reduced violence in this poorer area of three million (mostly Shiite) citizens.

8. The surge in all of the Iraqi armies and Iraqi militias. This steady increase is due to both a common opposition to the U.S. occupation and a high unemployment rate.

The Iraqi Army now has 180,000 troops, expected to reach 275,000 by 2010.

The ´Awakening Groups´ have approximately 80,000 soldiers.

The Mahdi Army has approximately 60,000 militia soldiers.

The Badr Corps (Organization) has from 10,000 to 50,000 soldiers.

The Peshmerga Army has approximately 70,000 soldiers.

Almost every political group in Iraq has it´s own militia and they have almost all been steadily growing in numbers of troops and military equipment (the bulk of it from the U.S.). Millions of U.S. dollars have been disappearing into the Iraqi government and much of this money is being secretly used to fund political-military militias. The Islamic Dawa Party led by Nouri al-Maliki has no militia.

9. The Iraqi general public weariness and frustration with the prolonged war. Many Iraqi´s who initially supported the 2003 invasion expected it to be a brief war, like the 1991 Gulf War. The Iraqi public is now anxious to end this never-ending war and return to a normal life. The general reduction in violence is largely due to this general Iraqi desire for peace.

The June 2007 small U.S. surge has had little effect on the reduction of violence in Iraq, primarily because since the beginning of 2007, U.S. troops have reduced their participation in day-to-day combat operations. The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police have had better success in reducing violence because they are recognized by the Iraqi people as fellow Iraqi´s and not foreign occupiers. Most Iraqi´s consider the U.S. to be the major cause of violence in the first place.

The U.S. has had to spend billions of dollars during the last five years to rebuild the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police because of the foolish U.S. decision to disband them in 2003. Now, the Iraqi government, the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police are evolving into a strong military regime. The strong Iraqi Army has reduced the violence, but there have been no significant democratic institutions developed (which takes decades) and there has been almost no political progress toward sectarian compromise.

The good news is that the violence in Iraq is decreasing. The bad news is that the Iraqi government is evolving into a military regime and not into a democracy. Centuries of military government rule cannot be changed overnight. This should be no surprise.

There are many actions taken by the Iraqi government, army and police and other non-government militias and citizens during 2007 and 2008 that have reduced the violence in Iraq. Many of these actions, like segregation, have reduced confrontation between the Iraqi´s and the U.S. military. Several of these measures coincided with the June 2007 small U.S. troop surge which was almost solely concentrated in Baghdad primarily as a backup to the Iraqi Army and to defend the Green Zone (central government compound).

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE CURRENT ARMIES IN IRAQ:

1. The national IRAQI ARMY of Nouri al-Maliki has increased to approximately 180,000 troops. This is expected to increase to 275,000 by 2010. This increase in Iraqi troops is much larger than the small U.S. troop increase. The Iraqi Army and Iraqi police have achieved significant improvements in capabilities, equipment and public relations during the past two years and have been responsible for most peacekeeping achievements with small U.S. assistance.

Iraqi Army military operations in 2007-2008 include:

In February 2007 the Iraqi government began the operation ´Fardh al Qannon´ which had the primary objective of reducing violence in Baghdad. This began four months before the small U.S. surge in June. (Bush announced the surge plan in January 2007, but the troops weren´t in place until June). This Iraqi government operation continued until November 2008 at which time the Baghdad violence had decreased dramatically. From June to November the small U.S. surge primarily assisted the Iraqi Army in this mission. Only about 4000 U.S. surge troops were assigned out of Baghdad (in Anbar Province). The decrease in violence in Baghdad was almost totally achieved by the Iraqi government, the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police forces. The 12 foot high cement walls around Sadr City were not erected until April 2008. These walls utilized Iraqi and American military forces as sentries to control and isolate the city´s three million (mostly Shiites) residents. This segregation helped to reduce the violence in this part of Baghdad.

March 25, 2008 - Iraqi Army mission in Basra (described below); April-June 2008 - two brigades of Iraq Army move into Sadr City; May 2008 - Iraqi Army Operation in Mosul; June 2008 - Iraq Army moves into southern Maysan province; July 29, 2008 - Iraqi campaign in Diyala province between Baghdad and Iran border to search for insurgents. Iraqi troops outnumbered assisting U.S. troops 5 to 1.

2. The U.S. ARMY with approximately 144,000 troops. The 2007 U.S. surge was originally announced to be about 20,000. (The U.S. had approximately 132,000 troops in January 2007 which increased to 168,000 by September 2008. The surge troops began operation in June). In many military operations in 2007-2008 by the Iraqi Army, the U.S. has simply assisted as a backup, tactical advisors or to provide air support. While the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq increased in 2007, the actual number of U.S. troops that participated in security operations actually decreased. During this period (2007), if the U.S. had actually increased military participation, the violence would have continued escalating at the same high rate that it did in 2006. Fortunately, the Generals made better decisions than the Bush administration. (The Generals decreased U.S. troop participation while Bush wanted to increase U.S. troop participation).

During the past year, the quality of U.S. military equipment for U.S. soldiers has been somewhat improved. This increased quality of body armor and vehicle design provided better protection (that should have been supplied from the beginning of the war) which has resulted in a decrease in U.S. fatalities. Also the policy of decreasing the day-to-day military confrontation with insurgents has reduced the number of U.S. fatalities, but the number of injured soldiers remains high.

In 2006, before the U.S. surge in 2007, General George William Casey Jr. and Lt. General Peter W. Chiarelli (outgoing commander) both recommended that U.S. troops be pulled out of major cities and consolidated at a few major bases. They suggested that the day-to-day combat operations be turned over to the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police forces. (This is actually a redeployment, but it is a redeployment inside Iraq instead of actually leaving Iraq. The resulting decrease in violence as a result of this strategy is a very strong argument for complete redeployment of all U.S. forces out of the entire nation).

This is the honorable way for the U.S. to disengage from this long war. It has made progress during the past two years wherever it has been enacted. This reduction in violence is a very strong indication that the majority of violence during the past five years was not directed at the Iraqi government (which didn´t exist from 2003 until 2005) but was solely directed at the U.S. occupying forces. Removing the U.S. occupying forces results in reducing violence. This is the way forward.

Step one (Disengage) is to continue redeploying the U.S. troops out of the major cities and back to the major military bases and allow the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police forces to assume responsibility for all security operations.

Step two (Downsize) is to begin decreasing the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq by attrition. When the present troops finish their tour of duty, they should not be replaced.

Step three (Depart) from Iraq. As each U.S. military base reduces the number of troops, these bases should be turned over to the growing Iraqi Army.

During the 2007-2008 period, the U.S. has reduced it´s participation in military conflict (leaving those operations to the Iraqi Army) and focusing on the security of major military bases (there are over 100 U.S. military bases in Iraq.

Bush has been spending billions of taxpayer dollars constructing permanent military bases all over Iraq. Bush wants 58 ´enduring´ military bases. (´Enduring´ is a euphemism for ´permanent´). These bases should all be turned over to the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi´s will continue to be antagonist and hostile to the U.S. as long as the U.S. continues to militarily occupy their sovereign nation.

3. The ´AWAKENING GROUPS´ are the Sunni Arab militia in Anbar Province with approximately 80,000 fighters. This number is expected to continue increasing until it soon reaches 100,000. These groups are funded by the U.S. and the opposition by these militias to the Iraqi Army and the northern Kurds, will likely eventually produce more military conflicts, unless there are future significant political compromises. During the past year, these neighborhood militias have been almost totally responsible for reducing violence in Anbar Province (which the U.S. had failed to do). In 2006, the U.S. commander in Iraq said that the U.S. could do little militarily to reduce the political and social problems in Anbar Province. This increased neighborhood security by the Iraqis began in June 2007, at the same time as the U.S. surge began. This area previously had the highest rate of violence in Iraq. The June 2007 surge only resulted in about 4000 additional U.S. soldiers in Anbar which is an area of about 53,380 sq miles. The present peaceful conditions in Anbar has been achieved by the Iraqi´s in Anbar (with U.S. money) and not by the U.S. troops.

4. The Muqtada al-Sadr´s MAHDI ARMY with approximately 60,000 militia. Al-Sadr has reduced the violence in the south by declaring a temporary cease fire, but this could end if no political agreements are reached in the coming Iraqi elections. The March 2008 attack by the Iraq Army in Basra failed to disarm them even though many leaders were arrested and labeled as criminals. The Mahdi Army and many other Iraqi militias have reduced military confrontations since the 2006 U.S. elections and are simply waiting to see what political and military changes the U.S. administration is planning in the near future. The Iraqi´s are aware that the majority of Americans want to end the war soon. Reducing violence by all groups may actually speed up the U.S. withdrawal. If the U.S. fails to set any timetable for withdrawal, the violence may resume.

5. The Kurdish PESHMERGA ARMY in northern Iraq with approximately 70,000 soldiers. These soldiers control the northern semi-autonomous area and have had little conflict with the U.S. Army. Conflicts in the north are primarily between the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs over control of the northern oil resources and continuing border conflicts with Turkey and Iran. Not one single American soldier has been killed by the Peshmerga Army. The defense of the northern cities against extremists has been primarily due to these Kurdish soldiers, not the U.S. military).

6. The BADR CORPS (recently changed their name to Badr Organization). The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) commands military forces called Badr Corps, which consists of (estimated 10,000 to 50,000) former Iraqi officers, soldiers and Iraqi refugees who formerly fled the country. The Badr Corps consists of Infantry, Armored, Artillery, Anti Aircraft and Commando units. They are based in southern Iraq around Karbala. They are the armed wing of Iraq´s largest Shiite party (SCIRI which is part of the United Iraqi Alliance-UIA, which essentially controls Iraqi Parliament). (The Badr Corps was formed in 1980 and was formerly known as the Badr Brigade).

AL-MALIKI, THE IRAQI ARMY, THE IRAQI POLICE AND THE FUTURE:

The increasing size and capabilities and military equipment of the Iraqi Army emboldened al-Maliki on March 25, 2008, to assault the Mahdi Army in the southern city of Basra. Many Iraqi´s opposed al-Maliki´s decision to use the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police forces against the Mahdi Army because both are primarily composed of Shiites. About 1300 Shiite Iraqi soldiers and police refused to fight against other Shiites. There were about 1000 casualties in six days of fighting. The Iraqi Army failed to disband the Mahdi Army, but when they began to run out of ammunition, a ceasefire was declared on March 31. Even though it was not a decisive victory, this military action did give many people the impression that the national Iraqi Army was becoming stronger and more capable of national defense. It also demonstrated that al-Maliki was not afraid to act independently of the U.S. military, who were uninformed of his action in Basra beforehand. This action, together with the construction of concrete walls around Sadr City, probably resulted in al-Sadr´s decision to continue a temporary cease fire and to work for political compromise. This has reduced violence in southern Iraq and Baghdad. Some of the Mahdi Army´s more extremist renegade groups have continued to commit acts of violence.

The growing strength of the Iraqi Army is beginning to result in the al-Maliki government´s use of military force against other groups or political parties. This could be an ominous trend if it continues. The attack by the Iraqi Army against the Mahdi Army in Basra, pitted Shiites against Shiites (of two different political parties). (Al-Sadr´s militia is not unusual in Iraq, almost all political parties have a militia). Al-Sadr had declared a ceasefire before the March attack in an attempt to prepare for the upcoming elections and to work for political advancement without violence. Many think that the attack in Basra was unnecessary and was only done by al-Maliki to weaken the political strength of al-Sadr before the national election. If al-Maliki is unwilling to have political compromise with other Shiite political parties, how can he ever hope to have political compromise with the Sunni Arabs or the Kurds or any of the other groups?

While the Iraq Army and al-Sadr Army are both predominantly Shiite, the major disagreements between al-Malaki and al-Sadr, is over the continued occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and the disagreement as to what extent the Iraqi government should be Islamic or secular. Al-Sadr wants a more Islamic government and Bush wants a more secular government. (Al-Maliki is trying to please both the U.S. and the Islamic clerics). If the U.S. would redeploy from Iraq, these two Shiite armies could possibly join together to become a much larger national Iraqi Army of approximately 300,000 soldiers. This military unification might also include the Badr Corps (Shiite). This stronger national army would better be able to control the smaller number of insurgents without any U.S. Army participation. In fact, the departure of the occupying U.S. Army would probably be welcomed by the majority of Iraqi´s. (They have expressed this in many polls. Contrary to Bush´s dire prediction that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would lead to chaos and civil war, it would instead probably lead to more unification, national celebration and dancing in the streets). If the U.S. troops would redeploy, the Iraqi´s could turn more of their attention to settling their own political-religious-economic disagreements. This is what the Democrats in the U.S. Congress have been advocating since the 2006 U.S. elections. The U.S. troop withdrawal would remove one of the major disagreement between al-Maliki and al-Sadr and most of the other (over 50) Iraqi political parties. It´s time for the U.S. to admit that only Iraq can solve their own internal problems, not the U.S. military.

Even if the Mahdi Shiite Army were to unite with the Iraqi Shiite Army, there will still most likely be serious conflicts between Iraqi Army and the growing ´Awakening Groups´ of Sunni Arabs and the Peshmerga Army in the north. The challenge to al-Maliki (and any future leader) is whether he can settle these conflicts politically or simply resort to military action and martial law. If a very strong Iraqi military government continues to evolve, it will most likely remain a military dominated government for decades to come because of the internal threat posed by so many Iraqi military groups.

The Sunni Arabs may eventually reach a political compromise with the al-Maliki government to share in the political processes and to share in the oil revenue. However the northern Kurds are more interested in establishing an independent nation than remaining part of Iraq. This might be possible if it only concerned Iraq. But since Kurdistan was arbitrarily divided up after the World War (by European nations), many Kurds are also in Turkey and Iran. If the Iraqi Kurds declared independence, this would also probably result in a civil war in both Turkey and Iran. Both of these other Kurdish populations would likely want to be part of an independent Kurdistan (the way it was before it was divided up). This could result in a civil war simultaneously in all three countries. This problem probably will not be solved for decades. Kurdistan independence has been stated to be the major potential problem for all three of these nations (Iraq, Iran and Turkey). This is a political problem which cannot be solved by the U.S. military.

The small surge of 20,000 U.S. troops was insignificant compared to the increased sizes and activities of the combined Iraqi Army, Iraqi police, neighborhood militias, Kurd and Sunni Arab citizen groups which together total over 390,000 armed soldiers, and this doesn´t include the thousands of local armed militia of tribal groups who are policing their own neighborhoods. Many areas have been forced to establish their own security forces since the U.S. unwisely dissolved the Iraqi Army and police forces in 2003.

During the past two years, the decrease in national violence has primarily been due to the increasingly effective military operations by the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police. However this has not been accompanied by any significant religious-political-economic cooperation by the 50 or more Iraqi political-religious parties.

The military strategy of escalation (surge) may sometimes reduce the fighting and produce peace or it may sometimes simply escalate the war (as it did in the Vietnam War in the 1960´s). The outcome of this action may depend on many other complicated factors, as it has in Iraq. Because a military escalation may produce two opposite outcomes explains why some Americans supported it and some opposed it. Some thought that it would decrease the violence and some thought that it would increase the violence.

It´s obvious that the U.S. administration continues to credit and congratulate themselves with the decrease in violence (in 2007-2008) because they want to use that self proclaimed achievement as an excuse to continue the occupation (solely for economic reasons). The U.S. doesn´t want to admit that they are no longer needed to maintain the peace. Iraq can have permanent peace if they want it or they can have civil war if they want it. Iraq is a sovereign nation with a democratically elected government. It´s totally their own responsibility to determine their own future without any advice or supervision by the U.S. Iraq is not a colony, territory or a protectorate of the U.S. The U.S. has no legal reason to be occupying Iraq. The Iraqi Parliament (voted 144 to 131 to end the U.S. occupation) and the Iraqi people are now asking the U.S. to leave their country and let them solve their own problems. This is no more than any sovereign nation demands.

Many Americans (especially the Bush administration) boast that the small U.S. surge in Iraq has been successful. There is no doubt that the small temporary U.S. surge did contribute a small bump to the reduction of violence in Baghdad. (Martial law always decreases violence to some degree). But the increased number of U.S. troops was small compared to the increased number of troops in the other Iraqi armies and militias. In addition to the surge of troops by the other armies in Iraq, there are about a half dozen other factors which have also contributed to the reduction in violence nationwide.

OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO DECREASED VIOLENCE:

1. After five years of war, about four million Iraqi´s have left the country and become refugees in neighboring nations. This steady decrease in population size has undoubtedly reduced the violence.

2. After five years of war and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi casualties, almost all Iraqi citizens are tired of the violence and simply want peace. Many Iraqi´s are simply staying home because of the street danger and because they are unemployed.

3. Sadr City with over 3 million people, has been turned into a virtual isolation zone with 12 foot high cement walls built around the city in April 2008. These walls are guarded 24 hours a day by U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. These massive concrete walls are also being erected in other Baghdad neighborhoods. Some Iraqi´s have complained that the walls make them feel isolated and that the walls are inhumane. This segregation has no doubt reduced violence in this area. Martial law is not lasting peace. Martial law is not freedom. Martial law is not democracy, it´s a military dictatorship.

4. After five years of ethnic cleansing by both Sunni and Shiites extremists, in neighborhoods and cities, most areas are now segregated. This has reduced violence within these areas. Segregated peace is not lasting peace. The Kurds are isolated in the north. The Sunni Arabs are isolated in Anbar province. Sadr City (Shiite) is isolated like a besieged military zone. The Green Zone (central government) is isolated and fortified like a medieval castle. The majority of Iraqi´s are moderates and don´t want to be forced to live in segregated communities.

When a city or a nation becomes segregated, like Iraq currently is, it is for the people of those cities and nations to decide what future they want. They must choose for themselves whether they want to have political-religious-economic compromise and work out their differences peacefully or have a civil war and settle those differences by violence. For many centuries, the political-religious differences in the Middle East have been settled primarily by military confrontation.

Unfortunately, the new Iraqi government has had no previous experience in political-religious-economic compromising. Without that experience, they may simply resort to the use of military force to settle any type of future disputes. This choice will determine whether a more democratic Iraqi government develops, or whether another military regime rises to power.

(It should be acknowledged that there are over 100 nations in the world that declare themselves to be democratic. And yet these nations all have different kinds of democratic governments. There are many types and degrees of democracy. Each nation and culture creates it´s own unique institutions. Iraq must develop it´s own conception of what it considers to be a democracy. In an Islamic nation, this will undoubtedly be different than the more secular democracies existing in many western nations. These should be Iraqi decisions, not American decisions).

5. In the western Anbar Province, the U.S. is currently spending about $24 million taxpayer dollars a month paying the ´Awakening Groups´ to police their own neighborhoods ($300 per Iraqi soldier). These cash bribes, military training and military equipment given to these former Sunni Arab insurgents, who were recently attacking U.S. soldiers, has contributed significantly to the reduction of violence in that western area. These well-armed citizen militias, now about 80,000, could soon reach 100,000 soldiers. These predominantly Sunni Arab forces may secretly contain thousands of Sunni extremists like al Qaeda. There is no way for the U.S. military to separate them from the moderate majority of Sunni´s who are opposed to religious extremism. There is little loyalty between these Awakening Groups and Iraq´s predominantly Shiite Iraqi Army. Thousands of new Sunni Arab volunteers are joining the Awakening Groups every month (many simply join because they are unemployed) and their strength and military capabilities are steadily increasing. Many in the U.S. military and Iraqi government fear that they will soon be uncontrollable. The weapons and training that the U.S. military is now providing them may soon be turned against the U.S. occupiers and the Iraq government. For the U.S. to simultaneously arm and train the Sunni Arabs in Anbar and also arm and train the Shiite Iraqi national Army in Baghdad, makes no sense whatsoever. This is only creating a potential future civil war.

Whenever the U.S. decides to stop making these monthly cash payments (bribes) to the Awakening Groups, these former insurgents may resume their former sectarian violence. Is the U.S. going to continue making cash payments to them forever? $24 million a month? This is U.S. taxpayer´s money that is greatly needed in the collapsing U.S. economy. Why should the U.S. taxpayer´s continue paying $24 million a month to these former Sunni Arab insurgents to police their own neighborhoods? The Iraqi government is expected to have over $70 billion in oil revenues this year. Why doesn´t the Iraqi government simply hire these neighborhood militias to be a regular Iraqi police force in Anbar? Why doesn´t the Iraqi government start paying them monthly salaries instead of the U.S. taxpayers? Why doesn´t the Iraq government hire all of the militias to be police forces? (This is actually happening in many areas and is helping to reduce violence).

6. Some of the recent reduction in Iraqi violence has been produced by the standing-down of the Shiite militia of Muqtada al-Sadr. This has been the primary reason for the reduction in violence in sections of Baghdad and southern Iraq. This standing-down of the Mahdi Army has been encouraged by Iran. Iran actually wants peace in Iraq because the Shiites already control the Iraqi government, which is what the Iranians have wanted for decades. The Iranians were always opposed to Hussein and wanted him removed. Al-Sadr´s Shiite Mahdi army is still opposed to the occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and still opposed to Nouri al-Maliki´s cooperation with the U.S. Neither al-Maliki nor al-Sadr want a permanent U.S. occupation of Iraq and neither want the U.S. oil companies to have major control over Iraqi oil. The U.S. has tried to push the Iraqi government to completely privatize the oil industry. This has always been the primary goal of the U.S. occupation.

OIL, MILITARISM, RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY:

(IRAQI CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 109: "Oil is defined as the property of all Iraqi people and is to be managed by the Federal government in conjunction with regional and provincial governments.")

In June 2008, the Iraqi government decided to offer 35 long term oil contracts to foreign companies, by competitive bidding. (But the government remains primarily opposed to foreign ownership).

The Iraqi sectarian conflicts are as much about oil as they are about religion and politics. The U.S. has no interest in Iraqi politics or Iraqi religion. The U.S. is only interested in Iraqi oil. Bush has refused to leave Iraq, until the government grants concessions to the U.S. oil companies. The Al-Maliki government has been pressured by the Bush administration into giving short term oil contracts to five U.S. and European companies: ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, Shell and BP on a noncompetitive basis. These have been delayed by U.S. Congress because of the (Bush) State Department involvement in the contracting process. The Bush administration continues to have secret negotiations with the Iraqi government without informing the U.S. Congress of the details.

Whenever a nation has numerous large opposing armies and militias, social control and law and order will eventually be determined by whichever army is the strongest. This may result in a military dominated government and martial law. In such military governments military coups are very common. No matter what the U.S. does in Iraq and no matter who is the Iraqi president or prime minister, an overnight military coup can instantly return the nation to a military dictatorship. The U.S. knows this and this is one of the reasons that the U.S. wants to maintain permanent (called ´enduring´) military bases in Iraq. (The second reason is to control and protect the oil resources).

Democracies take centuries to develop (200 years in our own nation). It takes centuries to build the necessary institutions and public support which are required for any democracy to survive (this recognizes that there are many types of democracies). This can´t be established overnight. But military coups can be established overnight. They don´t require any institutions or public support, they only require aggressive military power. All nations should be encouraged to support and develop some type of democracy, but it can´t be forced on them overnight by an outside nation. Whatever happens in Iraq depends on the Iraqi people and the choices made by the al-Maliki government.

The goal of the 2007 U.S. surge was to first reduce violence (which it has slightly helped to achieve) and secondly, and more importantly, to allow the Iraqi government time to demonstrate their willingness to establish a more democratic power-sharing, revenue-sharing government. (Western style secular democracy in an Islamic nation was always an unrealistic dream by the U.S.). The unwillingness of both the Sunni and Kurds to work with the Shiites has so far essentially failed. (This is understandable and it was predictable, due to many centuries of sectarian religious conflict. Political parties may compromise, but religions can never compromise). An eventual political compromise in Iraq is not impossible, but it would be extremely difficult. Primarily because many Islamic leaders cannot separate religion from politics. Any political compromise is complicated by religious sectarianism and regional economic goals (of over 50 political-religious parties). The Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army are now dominated by the Shiites, and probably will remain so, permanently. The Shiite dominance of the Iraqi government is the fundamental characteristic of the present Shiite Islamic Republic. Iraqi unification of religion and politics is something that the U.S. administration has never been able to understand. (The U.S. democratic political system separates religion and politics, but the Iraqi political system unites religion and politics). The Iraqi government and the Iraqi people have never wanted the kind of secular democracy that many western nations have developed. The Iraqi concept of democracy is strictly Islamic in nature. The Iraqi´s do not want a government that contradicts or opposes Islam. They do not want a government that is unreligious. (Most Iraqi people consider secular to be unreligious. The word for ´secular´ in some Arabic dialects means atheist).

(IRAQI CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 2: "Islam is the official religion of the state and is a basic source of legislation. No law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam").

This Iraqi religious concept of government and the Iraqi concept of democracy will not change, no matter how long the U.S. continues to occupy Iraq. The U.S. cannot impose a western secular constitution on a religious Islamic nation. The U.S. should not expect that a nation like Iraq, which is so fundamentally different from the U.S., to have the same type of democracy that the more secular and pluralistic U.S. has evolved.

Bush and Cheney continue to tell the American people, that they have succeeded in establishing a western style democracy in Iraq. This is another totally false claim by the Bush administration. The Iraqi government is an Islamic Republic. It is not a western style secular democracy. The Iraq Constitution states clearly, that all branches of the government must defer to Islam. The majority of elected and appointed politicians in the executive, legislative and judicial branches will continue to be Shiites, because they are the majority. Iraq is a sovereign nation and has every legitimate right to choose whatever type of government that it wants whether it is secular or religious. The U.S. is not the Decider on the issue of Iraqi religion or Iraqi politics or Iraqi economic policies

Iraq is a seriously divided nation and may remain so for decades. Each segregated area is well-armed and independently minded with different sectarian goals. The Iraqi people can have peace and prosperity whenever they are willing to work together. Iraq has great (oil) wealth and they can build a great and peaceful and prosperous nation if they make good choices. After the tiresome and destructive past five years, many moderate Iraqi´s are willing to compromise, simply to stop the violence and return to normal everyday life. But many fundamentalists and extremists are not willing to compromise on politics, religion or economics.

A special report issued July 30, 2008 by the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, said that because of the present high price of oil, Iraq would have oil revenues for 2008 of over $70 billion and that U.S. taxpayers should stop spending billions for Iraqi reconstruction. (Congress has authorized $4.2 billion for 2008). He said the Iraqi´s can now afford to pay for their own reconstruction. (from LA Times, July 30, 2008). The U.S. taxpayers are currently spending $440 million per day on Iraq.

The U.S. should not remain in Iraq forever and the sooner the U.S. leaves, the sooner the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government can decide their own future. This is not naïve or idealistic. What is naïve is the U.S. belief that the U.S. knows what´s best for Iraq. The tragic U.S. failures of the past five years have demonstrated the fallacy of this kind of ideological thinking. By 2010, the Iraqi Army is expected to be 275,000 strong. The Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police no longer need any U.S. occupying army to help maintain the peace. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has suggested that 2010 would be a good time to end the U.S. occupation. The majority of Americans and the majority of Iraqi´s agree.

Regardless of who is responsible for the decrease in violence in Iraq, the whole world hopes that it continues.