Somalia, Breakaway ´Somaliland´, and the Contentious Senlis Council Report
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
July 29, 2008
In this article, I complete the republication with Part B (on Somaliland), the Recommendations, the Appendices, the Pictures, and the Overview. I forthcoming articles, I will take a critical standpoint, examining the various mistakes, oversights, inaccuracies, and biases of the Report, as well as the intentions and the objectives of the Senlis Council researchers who elaborated it in order to use it as catalyst for impending developments in the Horn of Africa.
I am convinced that few Somalis can suspect the enduring, vicious hatred of the English colonials against their country so that they be in a position to measure the English anti-Somali hysteria triggered by several characteristics, attitudes, mindsets and potentials of the Somali Nation and rekindled more particularly at certain moments by excellent political choices and demarches taken by Somali statesmen and politicians.
Part B: Somaliland
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somaliland/recent_history
1. Recent History of Somaliland
2. Somaliland today
Somaliland
1. Recent History of Somaliland
Colonial Period
Somaliland was declared a British protectorate in 1886 and despite popular revolt from 1899 to 1920 and a brief occupation of the protectorate by Italian troops in 1940-41, the British maintained colonial rule until 1960. British interests in Somaliland lay mainly in the strategic position of its coastline as a trading point, and they invested very little in physical or social infrastructure, leaving Somaliland with just one secondary school at independence. However, in contrast to Italian rule in south-central Somalia, where patronage and violence undermined Somali social organisation, the British system of indirect governance favoured administration through existing clan authorities. British absence reinforced a relatively cohesive traditional authority in Somaliland.
Post-colonial period
Somaliland declared independence on 26 June 1960 and was immediately recognised by thirty-five states, but just five days later on 1 July, Somaliland voluntarily united with Italian Somalia to become the Republic of Somalia. However, the north was soon neglected in favour of central government priorities, causing local resentment.
President Siad Barre´s regime (1969-1991) ruled through patronage based on weak alliances, and as Somaliland was considered strategically important, the region was politically sidelined and subject to early efforts at ´clan cleansing.´ When war broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977, a disproportionate concentration of casualties amongst north-west troops fuelled further resentment in the northern region.
Between 1969 and 1978 the Barre regime exercised significant control over Somalia´s national territory, and in much of the Republic local patrons of the regime used violence to control economic opportunities. However, while Barre´s divide and rule tactics fractured south-central Somalia (his early favourites would emerge as competing militia leaders in the early 1990s), in north-west Somalia exclusion and repression by the central government reinforced the legitimacy of alternative forms of local governance. Throughout the 1980s, clan authorities developed strong social and economic ties with the Somaliland population.
By the 1980s, the central Somali government was dependent on external sources of revenue and was pacifying rivals with aid handouts, to growing popular unrest. Several rebel movements formed. In London, frustrated Diaspora intellectuals affiliated to the Isaaq Somaliland clan established the Somali National Movement (SNM).
In Frame:
Somaliland Historical Timeline (dates and events)
The Somali National Movement operated from neighbouring Ethiopia. However, in 1988, after a Somali agreement with Ethiopia threatened their bases, SNM rebels dramatically escalated their operations Somaliland. The central government reacted with a brutal bombing campaign, intensifying hostility in the region.
The regional capital Hargeisa was near-destroyed, an estimated 50,000 people were killed, and a further half a million displaced.
When Barre fell in 1991, along with the country´s political, economic and administrative institutions and any semblance of central government, the Somali National Movement was the largest power in the north. On 18 May 1991, the SNM revoked the 1960 Act of Union, and declared Somaliland independent. No country has officially recognised its statehood.
2. Somaliland today: Political Dynamics
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somaliland/today
In contrast to the foreign programmes in the south-central region, Somaliland has been characterised by a lack of external intervention. The region has also been conspicuous for its stability and security in an otherwise violent and lawless locality. After some initial problems with banditry and a serious intra-SNM factional conflict in 1992, a National Charter was formed in 1993 and the SNM handed power to Mohammed Egal. Egal was appointed President of an administration combining modern and traditional forms of governance. The region´s business and clan groups lent legitimacy by providing vital support to the new government, which could draw on local social and economic ties formed under the corrupt Barre state.
A functioning state apparatus
Unlike Somalia, an internationally recognised state without a functioning government, Somaliland has a fully functioning central administration but no recognition. The Somaliland authorities have concentrated on achieving the milestones of an independent state, establishing security within a territory and forming a functioning administration capable of entering into relations with other states. It carried out a successful demobilisation campaign and established police forces and judicial systems in the towns. When security had been stabilised, basic service delivery and a taxation infrastructure were established, and economic growth and trade increased steadily.
Somaliland has a Constitution – ratified in a referendum in 2001 – which institutionalises the separation of central authority´s power, active opposition parties, an independent press, and in 2003, held multi-party competitive Presidential elections. The next presidential elections are due to take place in August 2008, with tight controls against vote tampering.
In Frame:
"For a long time Somaliland has been ignored. But we have been patient, because the reality on the ground is what matters: making peace, building democracy, establishing schools, generating revenue, establishing law and order, demobilising combatant militia. We did it ourselves. Eventually these achievements will be recognised."
Elder
Hargeisa, Somaliland, March 2008
In Frame:
"Somaliland is a gift to the International Community at this moment. If they recognised Somaliland they would get immense returns on that investment."
Elder
Somali businessman
Djibouti, March 2008
In return for economic and political support, Hargeisa has provided security for the business community, as well as the general population. To ensure that Somaliland remains a peaceful region while wars rage on its borders, it has spent heavily on military defence and policing at the expense of health and education programmes, for which it has been criticised by some human rights organisations. However, sustained economic growth and personal security represent an enormous achievement in the region, and are highly valued by the general population. The military and police also provide targeted employment for young males, many of whom own personal arms and have military experience, and could otherwise be a cause of insecurity.
In 2003 and 2004, a number of attacks were carried out on foreign aid workers in Somaliland, prompting fears that radical Islamist groups were operating in the region. Almost all Somalis are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi´i school and Islam is one of the few movements that can cut across clan divides and historical tensions. However, radical Islam is opposed by many, and in Somaliland, religious authorities and the general population have shown intolerance for such movements.
The government of Somaliland has been consistently hostile to radical Islamist influences, but considers its struggle against terrorists to be a domestic issue, not part of the United States´ global War on Terror. However, Somaliland also cooperates with US counter-terrorism efforts, and this cooperation has resulted in some arrests.
In Frame:
"The people at grassroots level are not supportive of extremism here. Extremists are seen as external attackers, not internal defenders. However, they do operate freely in some areas. They are involved in the economy and in schools."
Elder
Hargeisa, Somaliland, March 2008
Despite minimal local support for extremism in Somaliland, there is some concern that radical Islamism could be gaining ground. The limited budget of the government means that there is a gap in educational provision. In some areas this gap is being filled by Arab-funded madrassas teaching radical Islamist ideology. There are concerns that radical Islamism is also being imported by Somalilanders radicalised in other countries. Positive diplomatic relations with the international community and greater funding for local educational systems could counter this influence.
External relations
In 2004, former Puntland President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was appointed President of Somalia´s Transitional Federal Government. He has loudly opposed Somaliland independence, calling for a unified Somalia. Although Somalia´s Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein has recently talked about reconciliation with political opposition within south-central Somalia, he has made no similar comments about Somaliland. With Somalia´s Transitional Federal Government focused on the extreme problems in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia, there are currently no indications that it is willing to negotiate a peaceful settlement recognising Somaliland´s independence.
To date, no states have recognised Somaliland´s independence. Despite this, Somaliland´s government has adopted a pragmatic relationship with its neighbours. Economic ties and diplomatic relations with Djibouti have improved since 2003, partly due to strong clan ties (the current President of Somaliland is from the Dir clan, predominant in Djibouti).
Political engagement with Ethiopia is necessary due to the nomadic Somali populations that move across the border, bringing local land and clan conflicts with them. Ethiopia is a stronger and more powerful state, however it is landlocked; Somaliland´s Berbera port is an important trade point to which Somaliland granted Ethiopia formal access in 2000. Ethiopia has a Trade Liaison Office in Hargeisa, headed by a diplomat with the rank of Ambassador, and Somaliland also has a Liaison office in Addis Ababa.
In Frame:
"There is a fear that Ethiopia will grow in influence: we need to stabilise Somaliland so we don´t have to be so concerned about this. If Ethiopia grows in influence in Somaliland, this will provide fertile ground for the growth of Al-Shabab ´nationalism´ in Somaliland."
Elder
Hargeisa, Somaliland, March 2008
Ongoing issues of concern in Somaliland
A number of issues could derail Somaliland´s progression towards official recognition. Some of the territory´s clans remain politically marginalised, and allegations of political corruption have been raised. In addition, fears that political positioning prior to the upcoming Presidential elections could spill over into violence appear to be realised, as evidenced by the series of explosions in April 2008 in Hargeisa. However, despite these issues of concern, it is clear that Somaliland has achieved a significant level of progress and stability, particularly when measured against Somalia.
In Frame
International Crisis Group on Somaliland (excerpts)
International Stance on Somaliland
African Union: initial findings
Although the African Union (AU) has made some positive noises about the possibility of recognising Somaliland´s independence, it has done little to convert these sentiments into action, and AU member states have not taken a collective position regarding recognition. An AU fact-finding mission to Somaliland in April-May 2005 generated some apparently positive findings:
"Going by the clear presentation and articulate demands of the authorities and people of Somaliland concerning their political, social and economic history, Somaliland has been made a "pariah region" by default. The Union established in 1960 brought enormous injustice and suffering to the people of the region. The fact that the "union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified" and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland´s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history. Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of "opening a Pandora´s box." As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case."
Attempts by the government of Somaliland to have the AU re-visit the region with a mission including member state representatives were rebuffed at the AU Summits in January and July 2007. As well as Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed´s opposition to recognising Somaliland, other member states such as Egypt have expressed interest in keeping Somalia unified as a regional counterweight to Ethiopia.
Other AU states oppose Somaliland recognition on the grounds that it could set a precedent for separatist movements elsewhere on the continent. However, following the January 2008 AU meeting in Addis Ababa, the United States´ Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Jendayi Frazer, called for the AU to send another senior delegation to Somaliland.
United Nations: careful consideration
The UN Security Council insists on using quotation marks when referring to Somaliland or terming it "northern Somalia". In assessing the region´s dynamics, the March 2008 Secretary-General´s report on Somalia did not encompass a visit Somaliland. Despite this, the report determined that security in Somaliland is "fragile" and only "relatively better" than in south-central Somalia.
However aside from the border with Puntland, almost every other study on Somaliland contradicts this assertion, including reports by the United States´ Government Accountability Office, the International Crisis Group and The Senlis Council´s field research in Somaliland. The Security Council report does recognise the need for "careful consideration" of the state identity of both Somaliland and Puntland, but assumes this will occur in the context of a Somali federation.
In Frame:
"Regarding international recognition of Somaliland, if [the international community] can recognise warlords, why can´t you recognise law-abiding citizens? Why be afraid of spending money on something good when you have spent so much money on something bad?"
Human rights worker
Hargeisa, Somaliland, March 2008
European Union: supporting presidential elections
The European Union pays scant attention to Somali or Somaliland affairs. Italy is a strong advocate of unification, and few European countries have sought to make an issue out of the remote country. Nonetheless, Denmark, Sweden and particularly the UK have been supportive. In a demonstration of international contradictions regarding Somaliland, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso recently pledged European Commission support of free and fair Presidential elections there, despite the fact no formal EU recognition of the Somaliland government exists.
United States: building state capacity
The United States Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi E. Frazer´s recent testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa praised Somaliland´s achievement of "a commendable level of stability, largely without external support or assistance, which the international community must help to sustain regardless of the question of formal recognition."
Of Somaliland´s democratic processes, Assistant Secretary Frazer commented that "we are witnessing the patient, methodical emergence of representative institutions." Despite the lack of formal recognition, the United States government has channelled limited amounts of aid for capacity-building in Somaliland´s parliament and to support elections. Following Assistant Secretary Frazer´s meeting with Somaliland President Riyale, a US State Department spokesman stressed that the US was not planning to recognise Somaliland. However, he did state that, "there is a process underway that the AU is engaged in and we are going to be watching very closely that situation".
In Frame:
"If you knock back [Somaliland´s request for recognition], you´re neglecting the achievements of democracy, security and stability… there is a need for a stable presence in the region."
Mohamed, 26, from Somaliland
London, April 2008
In Frame:
"The majority of people want support for independence. Recognition is their main focus."
Journalist
Hargeisa, March 2008
In Frame:
Somaliland: A legal Case for Self-determination (points)
Somaliland Conflict Dynamics: Skirmishes with Puntland
Although no country has ever formally recognised Somaliland, the self-declared state experienced no challenges to its physical or political independence for seven years. In August 1998, the northern region of Puntland, on Somaliland´s south-eastern border, was established as an autonomous region. Like Somaliland, Puntland has enjoyed relative stability and its government provides basic services. However, the political objective of the local administration is a unified or federated Somalia. Since 1998, there has been sporadic conflict between Puntland and Somaliland over the border regions Sool and eastern Sanaag. The Puntland authority has appealed to clan loyalties in the areas, as they belong to the same Harti clan family predominant in Puntland. Troops are currently at a stand-off, but control over the border region continues to shift, and any political and economic interventions in the areas risk increasing tensions.
Senlis Council Report - Chronic Failures in the War on Terror
Recommendations
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/recommendations
In order to adorn the twilight of his presidency with a success story in his self-proclaimed ´War on Terror´, President Bush should implement a high-intensity, Fast Track policy for Somalia and Somaliland that pushes the former towards stability and rewards the latter for its significant achievements over the past decade. Fast tracking Somaliland recognition will send a shock wave to Somalia, and send a clear message that peace and prosperity can be rewarded without the need to use overpowering military force.
To date, efforts to resolve the crisis that has blighted Somalia have been half hearted and misconceived. Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa´s beacon of stability – Somaliland – continues to toil in relative anonymity, receiving little recognition for its remarkable progress towards creating a viable, stand-alone state.
Somaliland has succeeded where the TFG has failed because it possesses precisely those attributes that Somalia lacks: democratically elected institutions with domestic legitimacy, institutions that serve as a repository of nationalism and sovereignty etc. Fighting terrorism is therefore a domestic priority (it was enshrined in the constitution long before 9/11) since extremist violence threatens the institutions of statehood and the common aspiration to international recognition.
Somaliland has not abandoned 'hard' CT tasks (intelligence gathering, capture/kill etc), but its placement of these tasks within a broader, integrated national framework has been successful. The TFG will not be able to succeed at CT, despite US and Ethiopian support, unless it follows Somaliland's example.
Somalia
Efforts to stabilise Somalia are in desperate need of reinvigoration. The lack of strategic acumen present in the War on Terror-driven approach is entrenching the chaos present throughout the country, making the prospect of a rebuilt and fully functioning Somali state a Utopian vision that will never be realised.
Successfully navigating a path through the minefield that is Somali clan politics a patient and nuanced approach. For instance, it is essential that all constituent parts of the TFG feel equally rewarded by any resolution, but are not allowed to dominate or control the country as a result.
A re-engineered counter-terrorism campaign based upon Smart Power tenets should include the following Key Success Indicators, which can be separated into high-impact quick wins and long-term developmental measures.
High Impact, Quick Win
1. Deliver aid to refugees outside of Mogadishu;
2. Support the prime minister and United Nations Special Representative´s efforts at reconciliation process, including moderate elements of Islamic Courts;
3. Halt all kinetic operations in Somalia;
4. The culture of impunity in Somalia must end. Counter-productive elements of the TFG must be identified and stripped of their diplomatic rights, regardless of their seniority;
5. Transitional tasks should be identified and an action plan for their resolution established: cessation of hostilities, security arrangements, constitutional dialogue, and electoral system/process need to be addressed before longer term developmental issues are addressed.
Long Term, Developmental
1. Higher levels of engagement with the Somali people, in particular key stakeholders in civil society and moderate Islamist movements. Somalia is an ´accountability-free zone´, and this needs to be addressed. For instance, the TFG should empower a number of targeted communities to assume control over the promotion of peace in their locality;
2. Structural elements of the conflict must be addressed; natural connectors between disparate groups need to be identified and nurtured. Only efforts at resolving the underlying drivers of instability can promote a link between the ordinary Somali, a nascent government in Mogadishu, and the international community. Hence land disputes, clan grievances, unemployment, economic stagnation, and lack of equitable wealth distribution must all form part of a policy framework for Somalia;
3. An early conclusion of a cessation of hostilities should stipulate the phased withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in coordination with deployment of a UN Peace Support Operation. This force should be composed of at least 20,000 troops, contain no forces from contiguous states, and contain a significant number of Muslims from African countries;
4. The raison d´être of the international military mission in the country must be clearly articulated, and come to be viewed as a positive force for change. It must cease all activities against the state, and start to act in the interests of ordinary Somalis by delivering aid and securing stable zones for IDPs;
5. The country´s multitude of clan elders and politicians must engage with the peace process, otherwise a credible government of national unity cannot eventuate.
A road Map to Somaliland Recognition
A fast track to recognition is urgently needed for Somaliland:
1. It should be encouraged to hold a free and fair referendum on independence that adheres to internationally agreed standards – this will remove any uncertainly over the significance of its last referendum on the Constitution, held in 2001;
2. Transition to an open, multi-party system must be completed, and the balance between the executive and legislature entrenched;
3. Judiciary firmly established, with enforceable rule of law extending throughout the country;
4. Resolution to territorial dispute with Puntland, through international arbitration if necessary;
5. The capacity of Somalia to block any progressive discourse on Somaliland within the African Union entrenches organisational inertia. This de facto veto capacity must be rebalanced;
6. The United Nations should grant Somaliland the capability to make direct representations to the Security Council;
7. The US government should rebalance its aid outlays in order to reward Somaliland. Overall levels of development assistance are also woefully inadequate; US aid to Somalia overall stood at just USD 73.7 million in 2007.
Senlis Council Report - Chronic Failures in the War on Terror
Appendices
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/app
1. Glossary
2, Insurgency Propaganda
(Two night letters in Afghanistan - text and translation)
(Two night letters in Somalia - text and translation)
Translation 1
Serious Warning!!
Awil Dibitaati
Drop the work you are conducting in the neighbourhood!
Think about the problem that you are bringing to Islam and its community!
If you don´t desist, you will receive a rapid response in accordance with what Islamic Shari´a prescribes for your activities.
May God guide us!
Translation 2
Serious Warning!!
1. Abdulqadir Shiino (District Deputy Chairman)
2. Abdul Oday (Department Chairman)
3. Baadil (Department Chairman)
4. Istaahil, "Tabele" Supervisor
5. Ambaro (Deputy Department Chairman)
6. Faadhig ("Tabele" Chairman)
7. Mohamud Waalow (District Spy)
8. Mohamed Salah (Spy)
All of the people mentioned above are traitors who assist the occupiers who attacked the country, and we warn them to consider the disgraceful matters in which they are involved and the false responsibilities they hold. If they do not renounce these matters through the Radios, Newspapers or Mosques within 48 hours, we will take clear steps consistent with the Islamic Shari´a.
Furthermore anyone involved in such actions whose name does not appear here should be aware that they are also served notice by this Warning.
Those who assist the attacking Infidels are Apostates, and the sentence for the Apostate is death. You have taken actions that make it legal to spill your blood, so return to Islam if you want to save yourselves from the sword.
Glory is in Islam but hypocrites don't know it! Those who reject Islam, die in disgrace! We will forget you, die in disgrace!
Internet
The Internet is an important means of recruiting international Jihadists. In 2006 both Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri called on mujahideen "to stand with the brothers in Somalia," and in March 2007 Abu Yahya al-Libi, an Al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan called on the revival of jihad in Somalia. These calls have been widely distributed on Islamist websites.93 In 2001 Al-Qaeda established As-Sahab, a multimedia company whose aim is to encourage jihadists to join the fighting in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan.
As well as releasing Bin Laden's and Al-Zawahiri's comments and speeches, As-Sahab also produces videos of Al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. To make the materials accessible to the West these are often translated or subtitled in foreign languages, and can often be found on video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Liveleak.
A key example of Somali Jihad propaganda is the hour-long video posted in November 2006 by the Al-Fajr Information Centre titled "The Apostate Hell in Somalia." According to the SITE Institute95 the video shows operations against enemy forces and features ICU leaders, Osama Bin Laden and a female Mujahid. Pro-US warlords are branded "criminals."
Jihad knowledge transfer
As well as disseminating propaganda, Islamist websites also serve instructive purposes. Information can be found on best kidnapping tactics, the use of chemicals in guerrilla warfare and the production of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used in roadside and suicide bombs. The Al-Fajr Information Centre publishes a bi-monthly magazine "Technical Mujahid," which provides information on Jihad internet forums and tips on how future Jihadis can surf these sites securely.
3. US Designation of Al Shabab
Pictures and Profiles
Senlis Council Report - Chronic Failures in the War on Terror
Picture Report
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/photo_library
Selected pictures
Senlis Council Report - Chronic Failures in the War on Terror
Overview
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror
Chronic Failures in the War on Terror - From Afghanistan to Somalia / Report
In order to adorn the twilight of his presidency with a success story in his self-proclaimed ´War on Terror´, President Bush should implement a high-intensity, Fast Track policy for Somalia and Somaliland that pushes the former towards stability and rewards the latter for its significant achievements over the past decade. Fast tracking Somaliland recognition will send a shock wave to Somalia, and send a clear message that peace and prosperity can be rewarded without the need to use overpowering military force. To date, efforts to resolve the crisis that has blighted Somalia have been half hearted and misconceived. Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa´s beacon of stability – Somaliland – continues to toil in relative anonymity, receiving little recognition for its remarkable progress towards creating a viable, stand-alone state.
Somaliland has succeeded where the TFG has failed because it possesses precisely those attributes that Somalia lacks: democratically elected institutions with domestic legitimacy, institutions that serve as a repository of nationalism and sovereignty etc. Fighting terrorism is therefore a domestic priority (it was enshrined in the constitution long before 9/11) since extremist violence threatens the institutions of statehood and the common aspiration to international recognition.
Note
Picture: Prime Minister Ali Sharmarke with JFK. Somalia paid dearly for its stance for Right, Justice and Equity and for its rejection of Evil, Colonialism and Iniquity.
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