In the Cyprus issue beware of mediators
Dr. George Voskopoulos
July 08, 2008
The Cyprus issue has been a blatant case of invasion and occupation of a sovereign country. The international community failed to intervene, despite numerous UN Secu-rity Council Resolutions to reconstitute the status quo ante. On the contrary, it proved very active in the case of Kuwait, thus making clear that double standards are a fea-ture of international politics and a fact, that according to a leading British academic, refer to the law of the jungle.
Mediators have long tried to provide a resolution framework. Some of them appeared to be honest brokers of a sensible solution, while others made proposals based on their preferences. Actually this is one aspect of conflict resolution theory taught at universi-ties across the world.
The American side has been a stern proponent of a resolution that above all serves American interests. These may be epitomized in Washington´s effort to facilitate Turkish EU membership. Under this spectrum the Cyprus issue constitutes the main hurdle to Ankara´s European course. The State Department has long realized that and this explains its active involvement in the conflict resolution process.
The recent visit in Cyprus of Daniel Fried, U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, has illustrated the interest of the current American administration to resolve the issue. The problem with Mr. Fried´s involvement is that ever since he took office he made a number of statements that were not evaluated positively by Greeks and Greek-Cypriots. This attitude is bound to affect the evalua-tive judgements made by a number of his interlocutors.
The Greek side that represents the legal government of the divided island welcomed his mediating effort, yet, it pointed out that the desired solution should reflect the pri-orities and interests of the Cypriots themselves. A second issue that Greek-Cypriots set is the involvement of all the Security Council Members in the conflict resolution process. To this day only the UK and the US have taken initiatives to assist the two communities find a mutually accepted solution.
The reaction to Mr. Fried´s initiative practically showed that American involvement is rather a hindrance not a facilitating factor to the resolution process. Indicative are the responses of a number of Greek-Cypriot officials and party leaders who pointed out that the State Department should put pressure on Ankara not Nicosia [1]. Archbishop of Cyprus stated emphatically that what is desired is a just solution, not any solution.
In the recent past American officials focused their policies on removing former Presi-dent T. Papadopoulos from office, while pointing out that "we would do everything we could to ameliorate the effects on Turkish Cypriots, which would include an ex-amination of all the policies related to their unfair isolation" [2]. Evidently in the case of the Cyprus invasion that was the only blatant case of injustice done.
The same intimidating statements were made a few days earlier when State Depart-ment spokesman Richard Boucher looked at the Anan Plan under a monolithic, strictly positivist prism stating that "there's no plan B waiting in the works. There's no separate diplomatic course…the goal is to have this plan accepted, because there's nothing else….it is the only plan…it is the final plan." [3]
Hindsight has shown that Turkey had always wished the active involvement of the US since Washington´s mediating efforts clearly reflect Ankara´s priorities. That was the case with Turkish effort to involve C. Powell into the mediating process in 2004. [4]
The late Anan Plan may operate as a guide only to the resolution process but its inef-ficiencies and dysfunctionalities were rather evident. These may be epitomized in a number of issues vital to the sustainment of the desired bi-zonal, bi-communal federa-tion but also the way the violation of international law is "rewarded". The black holes of the Anan Plan may provide the focus of the acceptable compromises to be made by the Greek-Cypriots. First, the Greek-Cypriots, as victims of the invasion are expected to take the financial burden of the proposed resolution. Second, practically and in a sense constitutionally, Cyprus becomes a protectorate, a state of limited sovereignty (see Article 6). Third the Anan Plan provides again the opportunity to third parties to "intervene" across Cyprus. Fourth, the Plan constitutes a violation of EU law, an ex-ception to the European acquit. Finally, it is still unknown what is going to happen if the proposed "solution" fails.
In any case the resolution process should involve the UN Security Council Members and should be formulated without a time ceiling. These are matters of priority, ur-gency and above all unbiased mediation to be taken into serious consideration by President Christofias, who rightly refuses adjucation, since it leads to loss of control over the outcome.
Mediators tend to scrutinize issues through their own perceptual lenses. As a result, "whenever it is necessary to identify an aggressor, states tend to do so through the perceptual lenses of their own self interest". The Anan Plan intentionally undermines the Greek-Cypriot side a fact that relates to the mediators´ long-established policies. This was thoroughly analysed by J. Kranidiotis decades ago[5]. As he pointed out, "the proposals put forward by the UK and the US had set two main targets. The first was to establish a link of immediate dependence of Cyprus on guarantor powers and the mutilation of the island´s independence. In this way the proposals aimed at un-dermining the powers of the Cypriot government and turn it into a mere Greek-Cypriot administration. In this way they meant to establish a regime of co-sovereignty shared by the guarantor powers".
A settlement of the Cyprus issue should primarily be based on the fact that Cyprus is a EU member state, thus guarantor powers constitute only a potential threat to its sur-vival as it happened in the past. Moreover, if any American involvement is to be evaluated from a zero basis it should be expressed after the new administration in Washington comes to power.
1] See Greek daily Eleftherotypia, 8-7-2008
2] See "Greek Cypriots May Pay Price if They Thwart UN Plan" Reuters and Wash-ington Post, April 15, 2004
3] See "White House Warns Against Cyprus Delay", The Associated Press and Washington Post, April 12, 2004
4] See "Powell sees 'a moment' for a deal on Cyprus" International Herald Tribune, January 30, 2004.
5] See J. Kranidiotis, The Cyprus Issue 1960-1974, Themelio publishers, Athens, 1984, pp. 69-70 (in Greek).
Mediators have long tried to provide a resolution framework. Some of them appeared to be honest brokers of a sensible solution, while others made proposals based on their preferences. Actually this is one aspect of conflict resolution theory taught at universi-ties across the world.
The American side has been a stern proponent of a resolution that above all serves American interests. These may be epitomized in Washington´s effort to facilitate Turkish EU membership. Under this spectrum the Cyprus issue constitutes the main hurdle to Ankara´s European course. The State Department has long realized that and this explains its active involvement in the conflict resolution process.
The recent visit in Cyprus of Daniel Fried, U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, has illustrated the interest of the current American administration to resolve the issue. The problem with Mr. Fried´s involvement is that ever since he took office he made a number of statements that were not evaluated positively by Greeks and Greek-Cypriots. This attitude is bound to affect the evalua-tive judgements made by a number of his interlocutors.
The Greek side that represents the legal government of the divided island welcomed his mediating effort, yet, it pointed out that the desired solution should reflect the pri-orities and interests of the Cypriots themselves. A second issue that Greek-Cypriots set is the involvement of all the Security Council Members in the conflict resolution process. To this day only the UK and the US have taken initiatives to assist the two communities find a mutually accepted solution.
The reaction to Mr. Fried´s initiative practically showed that American involvement is rather a hindrance not a facilitating factor to the resolution process. Indicative are the responses of a number of Greek-Cypriot officials and party leaders who pointed out that the State Department should put pressure on Ankara not Nicosia [1]. Archbishop of Cyprus stated emphatically that what is desired is a just solution, not any solution.
In the recent past American officials focused their policies on removing former Presi-dent T. Papadopoulos from office, while pointing out that "we would do everything we could to ameliorate the effects on Turkish Cypriots, which would include an ex-amination of all the policies related to their unfair isolation" [2]. Evidently in the case of the Cyprus invasion that was the only blatant case of injustice done.
The same intimidating statements were made a few days earlier when State Depart-ment spokesman Richard Boucher looked at the Anan Plan under a monolithic, strictly positivist prism stating that "there's no plan B waiting in the works. There's no separate diplomatic course…the goal is to have this plan accepted, because there's nothing else….it is the only plan…it is the final plan." [3]
Hindsight has shown that Turkey had always wished the active involvement of the US since Washington´s mediating efforts clearly reflect Ankara´s priorities. That was the case with Turkish effort to involve C. Powell into the mediating process in 2004. [4]
The late Anan Plan may operate as a guide only to the resolution process but its inef-ficiencies and dysfunctionalities were rather evident. These may be epitomized in a number of issues vital to the sustainment of the desired bi-zonal, bi-communal federa-tion but also the way the violation of international law is "rewarded". The black holes of the Anan Plan may provide the focus of the acceptable compromises to be made by the Greek-Cypriots. First, the Greek-Cypriots, as victims of the invasion are expected to take the financial burden of the proposed resolution. Second, practically and in a sense constitutionally, Cyprus becomes a protectorate, a state of limited sovereignty (see Article 6). Third the Anan Plan provides again the opportunity to third parties to "intervene" across Cyprus. Fourth, the Plan constitutes a violation of EU law, an ex-ception to the European acquit. Finally, it is still unknown what is going to happen if the proposed "solution" fails.
In any case the resolution process should involve the UN Security Council Members and should be formulated without a time ceiling. These are matters of priority, ur-gency and above all unbiased mediation to be taken into serious consideration by President Christofias, who rightly refuses adjucation, since it leads to loss of control over the outcome.
Mediators tend to scrutinize issues through their own perceptual lenses. As a result, "whenever it is necessary to identify an aggressor, states tend to do so through the perceptual lenses of their own self interest". The Anan Plan intentionally undermines the Greek-Cypriot side a fact that relates to the mediators´ long-established policies. This was thoroughly analysed by J. Kranidiotis decades ago[5]. As he pointed out, "the proposals put forward by the UK and the US had set two main targets. The first was to establish a link of immediate dependence of Cyprus on guarantor powers and the mutilation of the island´s independence. In this way the proposals aimed at un-dermining the powers of the Cypriot government and turn it into a mere Greek-Cypriot administration. In this way they meant to establish a regime of co-sovereignty shared by the guarantor powers".
A settlement of the Cyprus issue should primarily be based on the fact that Cyprus is a EU member state, thus guarantor powers constitute only a potential threat to its sur-vival as it happened in the past. Moreover, if any American involvement is to be evaluated from a zero basis it should be expressed after the new administration in Washington comes to power.
1] See Greek daily Eleftherotypia, 8-7-2008
2] See "Greek Cypriots May Pay Price if They Thwart UN Plan" Reuters and Wash-ington Post, April 15, 2004
3] See "White House Warns Against Cyprus Delay", The Associated Press and Washington Post, April 12, 2004
4] See "Powell sees 'a moment' for a deal on Cyprus" International Herald Tribune, January 30, 2004.
5] See J. Kranidiotis, The Cyprus Issue 1960-1974, Themelio publishers, Athens, 1984, pp. 69-70 (in Greek).
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