Russian Nationalism, Post-Soviet Political Discourse, and the New Fascist Danger

Sources of Current Russian Nationalism

The roots of Russia´s currently rising nationalism are threefold: pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet. The idea of Moscow as the "Third Rome," i.e. of a special Russian mission in world history, goes back several centuries. Russian nationalism had been – contrary to what many in the West believed – an important element of Soviet ideology ever since the 1930s. Like in the early 19th century when Moscow´s so-called Slavophiles applied German nativist thought to Russian conditions, ideas of various Russian nationalist movements today are often imported from the West. A factor also accounting for Russia´s recent nationalist resurgence is the mode of thinking learned in Soviet schools and universities – a Manichean world-view which sharply distinguishes between "us" and "them." Although the basic definitions of "us" and "them" have changed, a number of Soviet stereotypes, for instance, about the US have survived glasnost until today.

A New Sensitization Towards Right-Wing Extremism?

In view of escalating violent attacks and other actions against foreigners, the debate on Russian fascism is currently experiencing a new high in the Russian media. There was a similar debate in the mid-1990s, when the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the "intransigent opposition," a state of near-civil war in Moscow, the ascent of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the appearance of neo-Nazi parties, and the first Chechen war, gave rise to the notion of a "Weimar Russia." Even though this construct has made only rare appearances in commentaries in recent years, the current media debate is also marked by increasing alarmism.

It is to be welcomed that the increasing right-wing extremist tendencies within the party landscape and youth culture, which had been largely ignored for many years, are now at least partially acknowledged by the Russian public, and countermeasures are being debated. Even the Russian judiciary which has been known for its pro-nationalist bias is beginning to submit to the pressure of public opinion (or the presidential administration), and now applies the Russian penal code´s section on xenophobic crimes more frequently than was the case during the 1990s. Other promising developments include the sharp reactions of state officials to a xenophobic campaign advertisement aired by the "Rodina" alliance ahead of elections for the Moscow municipal parliament in 2005, and recent measures against the often deadly skinhead attacks on immigrants and visiting students. Official statements on such issues occasionally refer to the "anti-fascist" heritage of the Soviet Union and to the Russian people´s alleged special deep-rooted aversion against fascism.

Ambiguous Reactions

Despite such encouraging signs, the Kremlin-controlled mass media have an altogether ambivalent stance toward right-wing extremist tendencies. Although manifest anti-Semitism and violent racism are now heavily criticized and visibly stigmatized, other xenophobic patterns remain present in reporting on foreign news and political commentaries. In addition to the traditional anti-Western, anti-Baltic, anti-Gypsy and anti-Polish reflexes, this is increasingly true for prejudices against Ukrainians and Caucasians, recently, especially, against Georgians. Unquestionably, though, it is the US that holds first place among the "enemies of Russia," as projected by Russian state-controlled mass media. The primitive and profound anti-Americanism seen, for example, in prime time political television shows like Odnako ("However", hosted by Mikhail Leontiev), Realnaia politika ("Real Politics", hosted by Gleb Pavlovsky), or Post scriptum (hosted by Alexei Pushkov) is raised to the level of a dualistic paradigm for interpreting international affairs, where the US is made responsible for the majority of mishaps and failures in recent Russian, and, indeed, global history. In these accounts, US society mutates into the negative Other of Russian civilization.

Curiously, Germany – the country that has caused Russia the most harm in recent history – is often excepted from this paranoid perception of the external world and stylized as a collective friend of Russia, probably not least because of Putin´s personal preferences (a distorted view that has, however, been stoked by the unorthodox approach to Russia of former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder).

It is also important to note that, despite the increasing censure of certain right-wing extremist tendencies, the representatives of ultra-nationalist political groups regarded as close to President Putin have been excepted from the Kremlin´s campaigns against the radically nationalist camp. This is true in particular for Zhirinovsky´s so-called Liberal Democratic Party, although many statements made by Zhirinovsky and his entourage equally stir xenophobic hatred among the population. For example, in his notorious 1993 pamphlet The Last Leap toward the South, Zhirinovsky, a Turkologist by training, blames the peoples of "the South" (i.e. Muslim Asia) as being responsible for most of Russia´s past and current problems, and explicitly proposes to make Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan part of the Russian empire. Nevertheless, Putin, in 2006, personally awarded the "Order of Merit for the Fatherland" (fourth degree) to Zhirinovsky – a man who in September 1995 had physically attacked a female MP, Yevgenia Tishkovskaya, in the State Duma in front of TV cameras.

The major determinant for such a strategy of the authorities is that the Kremlin´s political technologists have discovered it as a tool suitable to reconfigure political discourse in general. In the Kremlin´s new political reality, Putin and his entourage are not competing with alternative programs or parties. The current regime´s opponents are not socialists, liberals or other Russian political movements. Instead, the Russian leadership is juxtaposed to Chechen terrorists, Estonian fascists, Georgian russophobes, Ukrainian neo-Nazis, American imperialists, Western conspirators, and, in general, to various non-Russians who desire to destroy, divide or, at least, humiliate Russia. In this atmosphere of paranoia, it is only logical that those opposing Putin´s course are not acknowledged to constitute legitimate (not to speak of useful) political opposition. Instead, they are represented as a "fifth column" of the West, as traitors who are, in Putin´s words, skulking around foreign embassies like jackals.

This has made politics an easy game for the Kremlin: If the government is busy to defend the country´s pride and integrity, one cannot expect that all niceties of mass media independence, pluralistic public debate, or fair party competition can be observed. Instead of debating what is best for the country, political discussants are searching for a plausible pretext to label the opposite side an enemy of Russia.

Aberrations of the Intelligentsia

Besides such tendencies in the broader public, there are similarly contradictory developments in the discourse of the elites and political pundits. On the one hand, the political leadership is promoting integration of Russia into Western organizations such as the G8 and the World Trade Organization. On the other hand, the discourse among political experts, as well as intellectual life in general, are characterized by the spread of an anti-Western consensus often described as "Eurasian," the essence of which is the assertion that Russia is "different" from, or indeed, by its nature, the opposite of the US.

Moreover, the radical, often neo-fascist wing of Russian nationalism, naturally, has been rising together with the movement as a whole. To be sure, both the Kremlin and mainstream public discourse demonstratively condemn manifest expressions of racism. Yet, the extremists - whether active in the neo-Nazi skinhead movement or publishing in high-brow conspirological journals - are part and parcel of the xenophobic hysteria that much of Russian society has recently gotten into. For instance, the Russian book market is experiencing a glut of vituperative political lampoons whose main features include pathological anti-Americanism, absurd conspiracy theories, apocalyptic visions of the future, and bizarre fantasies of national rebirth. Among the more or less widely read authors of such concoctions are Sergei Kurginyan, Igor Shafarevich, Oleg Platonov, Maxim Kalashnikov (a.k.a. Vladimir Kucherenko), and Sergei Kara-Murza.

A main difference between Russian and Western forms of nationalism is that, in the contemporary West, the intellectual and political mainstream of a given country usually more or less clearly distances itself from that country´s – sometimes, also rather strong – nationalist movement. While the Russian mainstream is quick to condemn racist violence, its relationship to the world view standing behind such violence is, in contrast, more ambivalent. Thus, authors who, in the West, would be regarded as being far beyond the pale of permissible discourse, such as the ultra-nationalist publicist Aleksandr Prokhanov, are esteemed participants in political and intellectual debates at prime-time TV shows. The bizarre, pseudo-scientific ideas of the late neo-racist theoretician Lev Gumilev are required reading in Russia´s middle and higher schools. Gumilev teaches that world history is defined by the rise and fall of ethnic groups that are natural units driven, moreover, by biological impulses and under the influence of cosmic emissions.

Probably the best-known writer and commentator of this kind is Aleksandr Dugin (b. 1962), who holds a doctorate in political science from an obscure Russian provincial institute, and is the founder, chief ideologue, and chairman of the so-called International "Eurasian Movement," whose Supreme Council boasts among its members former Russian Federation´s Culture Minister Aleksandr Sokolov, the Vice Speaker of the Federation Council, Aleksandr Torshin, several diplomats, and similarly illustrious personages, including some marginal Western intellectuals and CIS politicians. Dugin´s increasing celebrity is remarkable considering that the chief "Neo-Eurasian" is not only among the most influential, but also one of the most brazen of the ultra-nationalist publicists. While authors such as Kurginyan or Kara-Murza are satisfied to promote a renaissance of classical Russian anti-Western sentiments in their pamphlets, and only subtly draw on Western sources, Dugin admits openly that his main ideas are based on non-Russian anti-democratic concepts such as European integral Traditionalism (René Guénon, Julius Evola, Claudio Mutti, etc.), Western geopolitics (Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, and others), the German "conservative revolution" (Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, etc.), and the francophone New Right (Alain de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Jean Thiriart).

Furthermore, during the 1990s, Dugin repeatedly hinted at his sympathy for selected aspects of Italian Fascism and National Socialism, such as the SS and its Ahnenerbe ("Ancestral Heritage") Institute, and has described the Third Reich as the most consistent incarnation of the "Third Way" that he advocates. In the chapter "Fascism – Boundless and Red" of the online version of his 1997 book Tampliery Proletariata (The Templar Knights of the Proletariat), he expressed the hope that the inconsistent application of originally correct ideas by Hitler, Mussolini, etc. would, eventually, be followed in post-Soviet Russia by the emergence of a "fascist fascism." In Dugin´s apocalyptic worldview, global history consists of a centuries-old confrontation between hierarchically organized "Eurasian" continental powers and liberal "Atlantic" naval powers. Today, this confrontation is carried out between Russia and the US as the main representatives of the two antagonistic types of civilization, and its "final battle" is approaching (notably, Dugin uses the German word Endkampf, which has fascist connotations, without a Russian translation).

One might expect Dugin, and other extremely right-wing pundits offering similar pro-fascist statements, to be subjected to the same public stigmatization that neo-Nazi parties and skinhead groups are currently experiencing. However, this has not been the case, so far. On the contrary, Dugin and others of his ilk, such as the well-known editor-in-chief of Russia´s leading ultranationalist weekly Zavtra ("Tomorrow"), Aleksandr Prochanov, are popular guests in prime-time political television shows such as Vremena ("Times", hosted by Vladimir Pozner), Tem vremenem ("In the Meantime", hosted by Aleksandr Archangelsky), Voskresni vecher´ ("Sunday Evening"), or K Baryeru ("To the Barricade", hosted by Vladimir Solovyov), and are even invited to popular talk shows like Pust govoryat ("Let Them Speak", hosted by Andrei Malakhov).

The Post-Soviet Conception of Fascism

The fact that Dugin has so far been "spared" by the Kremlin-controlled media and his political opponents is not only due to his recent celebrity as a "radical centrist" and fanatical supporter of Putin as well as his ability to win the sympathies of prominent members of the Russian legislative and executive braches. He has also managed to avoid the charge of promoting fascism by adapting his writings and public image to the distorted conception of fascism inherited from Soviet propaganda. In the post-Soviet discourse, the term "fascism" is equated with German National Socialism and its external trappings, such as the swastika or Roman salute. Occasionally, the propagandistic usage of the term "fascism" goes so far as to include all ideas regarded as "anti-Russian." It then, paradoxically, becomes a rhetorical instrument in xenophobic agitation campaigns of Russian ultra-nationalists.

The example of Dugin illustrates that, as a result of the idiosyncratic conception of generic fascism in post-Soviet Russia, it is sufficient to rhetorically dissociate oneself from the worst crimes of Nazi Germany and to refrain from blatantly copying Nazi symbols in order to avoid public stigmatization as a "fascist". This approach would, at least, explain why, on the one hand, obviously neo-Nazi groups such as the Russian National Unity of Aleksandr Barkashov or skinhead gangs are being vocally suppressed by the executive and judiciary, while on the other hand ultra-nationalist writers who, in terms of their rhetoric, are no less radical are not only tolerated, but have unhindered access to public platforms and state-controlled media, and are, sometimes, allocated an active role in PR projects of the Kremlin´s political technologists.

1984 – Déjà vu

Another factor in favor of Dugin and similar publicists is the return of the Russian leadership to quasi-Orwellian forms of organizing public discourse. Government-controlled political reporting in the mass media has become a succession of national-patriotic happenings in which international developments of any kind – whether a Russia-China summit or Russian athletes´ performance at the Olympics, the "Orange Revolution" or foreign success of a Russian fantasy movie – are exaggerated into either collective triumphs or shared humiliations of the Russian nation under its faithful leadership. The attendant superficiality and emotionality of public debates, which occasionally degenerate into bizarre shouting matches between participants of political television shows, replace serious analysis. Political commentaries are fixated on the "here and now" which, in the case of Dugin, may have contributed to that his well-known neo-fascist stance during the 1990s has been "forgotten." The mantra-like disparagement of the West that accompanies the agitational realignment of foreign news reporting increases the playing field for the propagation of anti-Western slogans which also furthers the spread of extremist ideas proposed by Dugin and theorists with similar leanings.

Outlook

Will the newfound sensitivity towards nationalist tendencies lead to a sustained return to tolerant and liberal aspects of Russia´s political tradition? Or is this new tendency no more than the latest episode in Moscow´s fluctuating media campaigns?

One can identify two contrary trends – one ideological, the other pragmatic – whose collision has restored a certain measure of controversy to the generally dull public discourse in Russia. On the one hand, the dualist worldview introduced by Putin´s entourage in the past few years – the simple, but honest Russians struggling for independence against a devious, soulless, imperialist West – fulfils an important role in legitimating the "tough" course of the resurging Russia. However, the officially approved paranoia also opens the floodgates for radical conclusions. Since the US model of society is presented as the antithesis of Russian civilization, one should not be surprised when youth gangs of violent thugs try to prevent an "Americanization" of Russian society, in their way. The damage caused by such reactions to the international image of Russia is, in turn, incompatible with the equally strong tendency towards establishing the country as a respected partner of the Western countries and as becoming a part of the "civilized world" (the preferred Russian term for the economically advanced democratic states). Extreme nationalism has already made the Russian Federation an unattractive study destination for dark-skinned international students who are regularly beaten and, sometimes, killed at Russia´s university towns. In trying to stem this tide, the government deals, however, only with the symptoms of the phenomenon. To get to the root of the problem, the whole logic of current Russian politics would need to be changed – something that a well-meaning ministerial bureaucrat can, obviously, not do.

Besides, the leadership of the Kremlin appears to be considering large-scale immigration as a way of replenishing the rapidly dwindling population of the Russian Federation, which would create new, potentially explosive, tensions. Finally, the fanatical anti-Americanism and pro-Iranian positions of Dugin as well as others are in contradiction to a number of security policy preferences of the Kremlin and its efforts to join the international coalition against terrorism as a full member. Due to these and other challenges in the coming years, the – at least partial – handover of power last month gains some importance. It will be interesting to see which of the two contradictory tendencies currently present in Russia – the nationalist anti-Western one, or the urge to become integrated into international formal and informal networks – will gain the upper hand.

A widespread fear among Russian and Western analysts observing the rise of Russian nationalism is now that the Kremlin could loose (or, perhaps, is already loosing) control of the genie it has let out of the bottle. Russian nationalism might transform from a political technology tool into a societal force of a proportion beyond the limits of manipulation by the cynical manipulators working for the Russian government. If one extrapolates Russia´s development during the last eight years into the future, we will not only witness a second Cold War. The Russian Federation might become something like a new apartheid state where foreigners and non-Slavic citizens are treated separately from white citizens of Russia by governmental and non-governmental institutions. It is in connection with this, that some observers do not hesitate to speak of a "Weimar Russia" comparing post-Soviet conditions to those in inter-war Germany. Though it is not likely (yet) that Russia will turn fascist, it seems even less probable that Russian society will become more tolerant soon.