Serbia, Kosovo, the US and the UN
Dr. George Voskopoulos
March 18, 2008
The recent crisis in Kosovo has taken by surprise only those who are not aware of the problems south-eastern Europe has faced in the post-Cold War era. It should be ana-lyzed on different levels with a view to providing answers to specific questions refer-ring to statehood, stability and the United Nations system.
First, the unilateral declaration of independence on the part of a Serbian province, whose vast majority is populated by ethnic Albanians, sets the dilemma originally set in the early post-Cold War era of setting priorities between stability and human rights. It is obvious here that priority was given to human rights although recent history has shown that any solution that does not support territorial stability is destined either to fail or produce undesired side-effects such as the revolt of ethnic Serbs in northern Kosovo.
Once again it is obvious that out-of-system interference by powerful actors has trig-gered reactions and threatens stability and peace in the region. Kosovo has been an historic symbol for Serbs ever since the Ottoman era consequently territorial changes could not be accepted by ethnic Serbs. The violation of human rights in the region during the Milosevic era provided the desired by separatists, nationalists and former warlords ground for establishing an independent statelet that lacks basic sustainability criteria such as a democratic system of governance, lack of the rule of law and a par-liamentary system that will allow Serbs to express themselves.
The issue here refers to what this new state can add to the Balkan conundrum and what our expectations are from its leadership. First current Albanian leaders in Kos-ovo were part of the belligerents that caused turmoil in the region. It was the Ameri-can government that had labeled them terrorists in the recent past. A drastic change of mood led to a second evaluation and offered them support in becoming the acknowl-edged leaders of a state, epicenter of a number of illegal activities in the region namely drugs, weapons and human trafficking. Second, the solutions could not be ac-cepted by Belgrade because Serbs were not offered substantial carrots.
On the contrary, the country was territorially mutilated without receiving an alterna-tive. To those who have studied the region and lived there it is obvious that a weak Serbia, a wish materialized in sequences by foreign interference, is not a step towards stability and intra-Balkan cooperation. It leads Serbia to total isolation, assists nation-alism, deprives it of incentives to cooperate with the world community and drives it to political instability. Belgrade holds the key to regional stability and peace in south-eastern Europe and this was evident in the 1990s crises. It triggers once again dreams of greatness and territorial expansionism on the part of nationalists. These could be used by any powerful intruding actor who would decide to reactive south-east Euro-pean tectonic plates.
Finally, the decision to support a unilateral declaration of independence overlays the normative, regulatory role of the UN, a policy supported by those who envisage a post-UN world order based on power. Eventually it was the very same policy many condemned when they reacted to S. Milosevic regime and its tactics. In the future the decision may activate pockets of instability, although naïveté suggests that it is a sui generis case.
The Balkans once again has become the battleground of great power competition. Russia is moving in using its energy policy and its traditional ties with the Slavs, while the US is reacting by turning it into a NATO fortress.
The only sustainable solution is to advance a human right regime delinking human rights from territorial issues and border changes. The long inaugurated effort to weaken Serbia and turn it into a minor player in the region has jeopardized efforts to stabilize the Balkans and incorporate Belgrade into the euro-Atlantic core.
First, the unilateral declaration of independence on the part of a Serbian province, whose vast majority is populated by ethnic Albanians, sets the dilemma originally set in the early post-Cold War era of setting priorities between stability and human rights. It is obvious here that priority was given to human rights although recent history has shown that any solution that does not support territorial stability is destined either to fail or produce undesired side-effects such as the revolt of ethnic Serbs in northern Kosovo.
Once again it is obvious that out-of-system interference by powerful actors has trig-gered reactions and threatens stability and peace in the region. Kosovo has been an historic symbol for Serbs ever since the Ottoman era consequently territorial changes could not be accepted by ethnic Serbs. The violation of human rights in the region during the Milosevic era provided the desired by separatists, nationalists and former warlords ground for establishing an independent statelet that lacks basic sustainability criteria such as a democratic system of governance, lack of the rule of law and a par-liamentary system that will allow Serbs to express themselves.
The issue here refers to what this new state can add to the Balkan conundrum and what our expectations are from its leadership. First current Albanian leaders in Kos-ovo were part of the belligerents that caused turmoil in the region. It was the Ameri-can government that had labeled them terrorists in the recent past. A drastic change of mood led to a second evaluation and offered them support in becoming the acknowl-edged leaders of a state, epicenter of a number of illegal activities in the region namely drugs, weapons and human trafficking. Second, the solutions could not be ac-cepted by Belgrade because Serbs were not offered substantial carrots.
On the contrary, the country was territorially mutilated without receiving an alterna-tive. To those who have studied the region and lived there it is obvious that a weak Serbia, a wish materialized in sequences by foreign interference, is not a step towards stability and intra-Balkan cooperation. It leads Serbia to total isolation, assists nation-alism, deprives it of incentives to cooperate with the world community and drives it to political instability. Belgrade holds the key to regional stability and peace in south-eastern Europe and this was evident in the 1990s crises. It triggers once again dreams of greatness and territorial expansionism on the part of nationalists. These could be used by any powerful intruding actor who would decide to reactive south-east Euro-pean tectonic plates.
Finally, the decision to support a unilateral declaration of independence overlays the normative, regulatory role of the UN, a policy supported by those who envisage a post-UN world order based on power. Eventually it was the very same policy many condemned when they reacted to S. Milosevic regime and its tactics. In the future the decision may activate pockets of instability, although naïveté suggests that it is a sui generis case.
The Balkans once again has become the battleground of great power competition. Russia is moving in using its energy policy and its traditional ties with the Slavs, while the US is reacting by turning it into a NATO fortress.
The only sustainable solution is to advance a human right regime delinking human rights from territorial issues and border changes. The long inaugurated effort to weaken Serbia and turn it into a minor player in the region has jeopardized efforts to stabilize the Balkans and incorporate Belgrade into the euro-Atlantic core.
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