A Tribal Leader Must For Winning War On Terror
Muhammad Khurshid
January 11, 2008
There are indications that the United States has finally taken a decision to launch operation against the terrorists and Taliban in the tribal areas. But one thing should be kept in mind that the United States cannot achieve success without involvement of tribesmen in the operaation. Now the question arises as to who will represent the tribesmen in making a deal? The US should select a leader from the tribal areas for making the war on terror successful. The government officials governing the tribal areas at the moment have failed in achieving the results.
Former chief secretary of NWFP Khalid Aziz discussed the situation in the tribal areas. According to him, on January 4, in a major reshuffle, the federal government accepted the resignation of Governor NWFP Lt Gen (retd) Ali Jan Mohammad Aurakzai, who will be succeeded by Owais Ghani, the current governor of Balochistan.
The reasons for General Aurakzai’s exit lie in the dynamics of the policies being pursued in the volatile tribal areas of Pakistan and the tragic death of Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto’s assassination threw off course, plans for the next political dispensation that would aid the US and Pakistan in the next phase of the war with Al Qaeda.
At the beginning of 2007, Pakistan became the focus of activity in the US, both in Congress as well as the executive branches, because of the general elections due in Pakistan. Pakistan was already a pivotal state in the War on Terror and US policymakers considered elections to be a good opportunity to shape Pakistan’s future political landscape with the help of legislators friendly to the US. Their ideal combination would have consisted of a coalition between the main political parties of the country headed by then-General Musharraf.
Once this friendly set-up was in place, commentators predicted that the ‘final battle’ with Al Qaeda would be fought in Pakistan. However, political instability in Pakistan caused by the judicial crisis, and then Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, has now delayed these plans, which must wait till after the February 18 polls.
It is important to understand how the ouster of General Aurakzai is related to the War on Terror and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
Extremists led by Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan captured hundreds of Pakistani soldiers and demanded the release from custody of their colleagues in exchange for the soldiers. Governor Aurakzai initiated negotiations with Mehsud and a deal was struck, under which thirty-two ‘terrorists’ would be released and the Pakistani soldiers would be set free.
However, when six of the negotiated thirty-two were not released, and one of the released was re-captured from DI Khan, Mehsud accused the government of going back on its word and broke contact. Two senior tribal area advisors to General Aurakzai protested when the deal was violated; both were replaced.
Fast forward to December 2007. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in Rawalpindi on December 27. The Pakistani government accused Baitullah Mehsud of masterminding the attack. Several questions were raised about the wisdom of the policies being pursued by the federal and provincial governments in the tribal areas, especially the areas under Mehsud’s control.
This also meant that General Aurakzai’s policy came under review.
General Aurakzai’s policy intended to deal with Mehsud by bringing into play various tribal rivalries against Mehsud and his followers. Under this policy, it was believed that political manipulation of tribes through agreements would lead to the enforcement of collective responsibility for terrorism, which would achieve the government’s objectives with less bloodshed than a military campaign would.
The tribal areas are governed through the Frontier Crimes Regulations. According to the principles contained in Sections 21 and 22 of the FCR, a tribe is collectively liable for the actions of its people and sub-clans. As the administrator of a tribal agency, the political agent can take punitive action against any or all members of a tribe whose member is involved in a criminal activity or is evading arrest. Therefore, the policy of enforcing such collective responsibility in the case of terrorist activities could have succeeded.
However, the federal government and its allies were looking for overnight success. And there was little support for General Aurakzai’s plan in Pakistan or the United States.
It is possible that when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated, and the government pointed to Mehsud, General Aurakzai, against his advice, received strict instructions to launch perilous military operations for the arrest of Mehsud and his followers. During these meetings, someone may have overstepped the bounds of decency and accused the General of supporting the hostiles, which may have led to his resignation.
Now that General Aurakzai has left the governorship of the province, let us take a critical look at his tenure as an administrator.
He, by and large, proved to be a good administrator of a province that was riddled with complex problems. He was against any policy that would increase collateral casualties, and the Pakistani experience vindicates his position. Bloodshed increases mobilisation against the state and provides support to the extremists, which makes administrative contact with tribes difficult. It is important to remember that tribal administration is based on personal contact. If the tribes perceive hostility, they simply cut off contact and the state’s work with the tribes comes to a stop. General Aurakzai wanted to develop these personal contacts and use the tribes themselves to neutralise terrorists.
General Aurakzai also helped put in place the FATA Sustainable Development Strategy for the next ten years worth over $2 billion dollars. He played a commendable role in negotiating through several potentially dangerous and acrimonious meetings during the Pak-Afghan Jirga last year.
However, his main failure lay in ignoring the international context of the war against terror, and particularly the situation in the tribal areas.
Decisions taken by on ground military commanders and administrators are challenged by stakeholders who are not part of the consultative process, which is unavoidable given the global nature of the conflict and its various social and political dimensions.
This challenge is intensified because there is no defined Pakistani counterinsurgency strategy. In the seven years of disturbance in the area, there have been many prescriptions for dealing with the problem, but none has been articulated into a uniform strategy, and that has resulted in policy muddles at every stage.
The tribal areas are a complex region and the solution to the problem of terrorism lies in understanding that empowering and including the local population in the decision-making process is the only way to achieve success. And the best way to include the tribes is to consult with them on such matters, which is why General Aurakzai’s approach was the right one.
With the absence of General Aurakzai, the peace-building process will become more difficult and the area will remain volatile. It seems that the last battle against Al Qaeda will be fought in the region and will have adverse consequences, and the state will become even more dysfunctional in the tribal areas.
The End
Former chief secretary of NWFP Khalid Aziz discussed the situation in the tribal areas. According to him, on January 4, in a major reshuffle, the federal government accepted the resignation of Governor NWFP Lt Gen (retd) Ali Jan Mohammad Aurakzai, who will be succeeded by Owais Ghani, the current governor of Balochistan.
The reasons for General Aurakzai’s exit lie in the dynamics of the policies being pursued in the volatile tribal areas of Pakistan and the tragic death of Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto’s assassination threw off course, plans for the next political dispensation that would aid the US and Pakistan in the next phase of the war with Al Qaeda.
At the beginning of 2007, Pakistan became the focus of activity in the US, both in Congress as well as the executive branches, because of the general elections due in Pakistan. Pakistan was already a pivotal state in the War on Terror and US policymakers considered elections to be a good opportunity to shape Pakistan’s future political landscape with the help of legislators friendly to the US. Their ideal combination would have consisted of a coalition between the main political parties of the country headed by then-General Musharraf.
Once this friendly set-up was in place, commentators predicted that the ‘final battle’ with Al Qaeda would be fought in Pakistan. However, political instability in Pakistan caused by the judicial crisis, and then Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, has now delayed these plans, which must wait till after the February 18 polls.
It is important to understand how the ouster of General Aurakzai is related to the War on Terror and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
Extremists led by Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan captured hundreds of Pakistani soldiers and demanded the release from custody of their colleagues in exchange for the soldiers. Governor Aurakzai initiated negotiations with Mehsud and a deal was struck, under which thirty-two ‘terrorists’ would be released and the Pakistani soldiers would be set free.
However, when six of the negotiated thirty-two were not released, and one of the released was re-captured from DI Khan, Mehsud accused the government of going back on its word and broke contact. Two senior tribal area advisors to General Aurakzai protested when the deal was violated; both were replaced.
Fast forward to December 2007. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in Rawalpindi on December 27. The Pakistani government accused Baitullah Mehsud of masterminding the attack. Several questions were raised about the wisdom of the policies being pursued by the federal and provincial governments in the tribal areas, especially the areas under Mehsud’s control.
This also meant that General Aurakzai’s policy came under review.
General Aurakzai’s policy intended to deal with Mehsud by bringing into play various tribal rivalries against Mehsud and his followers. Under this policy, it was believed that political manipulation of tribes through agreements would lead to the enforcement of collective responsibility for terrorism, which would achieve the government’s objectives with less bloodshed than a military campaign would.
The tribal areas are governed through the Frontier Crimes Regulations. According to the principles contained in Sections 21 and 22 of the FCR, a tribe is collectively liable for the actions of its people and sub-clans. As the administrator of a tribal agency, the political agent can take punitive action against any or all members of a tribe whose member is involved in a criminal activity or is evading arrest. Therefore, the policy of enforcing such collective responsibility in the case of terrorist activities could have succeeded.
However, the federal government and its allies were looking for overnight success. And there was little support for General Aurakzai’s plan in Pakistan or the United States.
It is possible that when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated, and the government pointed to Mehsud, General Aurakzai, against his advice, received strict instructions to launch perilous military operations for the arrest of Mehsud and his followers. During these meetings, someone may have overstepped the bounds of decency and accused the General of supporting the hostiles, which may have led to his resignation.
Now that General Aurakzai has left the governorship of the province, let us take a critical look at his tenure as an administrator.
He, by and large, proved to be a good administrator of a province that was riddled with complex problems. He was against any policy that would increase collateral casualties, and the Pakistani experience vindicates his position. Bloodshed increases mobilisation against the state and provides support to the extremists, which makes administrative contact with tribes difficult. It is important to remember that tribal administration is based on personal contact. If the tribes perceive hostility, they simply cut off contact and the state’s work with the tribes comes to a stop. General Aurakzai wanted to develop these personal contacts and use the tribes themselves to neutralise terrorists.
General Aurakzai also helped put in place the FATA Sustainable Development Strategy for the next ten years worth over $2 billion dollars. He played a commendable role in negotiating through several potentially dangerous and acrimonious meetings during the Pak-Afghan Jirga last year.
However, his main failure lay in ignoring the international context of the war against terror, and particularly the situation in the tribal areas.
Decisions taken by on ground military commanders and administrators are challenged by stakeholders who are not part of the consultative process, which is unavoidable given the global nature of the conflict and its various social and political dimensions.
This challenge is intensified because there is no defined Pakistani counterinsurgency strategy. In the seven years of disturbance in the area, there have been many prescriptions for dealing with the problem, but none has been articulated into a uniform strategy, and that has resulted in policy muddles at every stage.
The tribal areas are a complex region and the solution to the problem of terrorism lies in understanding that empowering and including the local population in the decision-making process is the only way to achieve success. And the best way to include the tribes is to consult with them on such matters, which is why General Aurakzai’s approach was the right one.
With the absence of General Aurakzai, the peace-building process will become more difficult and the area will remain volatile. It seems that the last battle against Al Qaeda will be fought in the region and will have adverse consequences, and the state will become even more dysfunctional in the tribal areas.
The End
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