The media and General David H. Petraeus' Progress Report to the US Congress, 10-11 September 2007.

The invasion of Iraq by the US on 20th March 2003 is without doubt the most controversial debate in the US Congress in recent years. It occupies a central position in American politics and remains the main bone of contention between Republicans and Democrats. The progress report presented by General David Petraeus to congress on September 10-11 2007 marked the climax of this debate.

The aim of this paper is to analyse media responses to this report. To realize this objective, this paper proceeds in three trajectories. Firstly, it examines the content of Petraeus’ report. Secondly, the paper discusses media criticisms of the report. Thirdly, it attempts a prognosis of the feasibility of transfer of power in Iraq. Some of the papers consulted include; The Washington Post, The International Herald Tribune, The Guardian (London), The Financial Times (London England), The New York Times, The Nation and other international media groups that place focus on the Iraq war and its implications for American politics.

The key to understanding America’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 is the upsurge of terrorism on a global scale. This growing spectre of terrorism culminated in the 11 September 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in the US. This attack convinced American policy makers that the fight against terrorism was urgent and needed full military commitment. President Bush directly accused Saddam Hussein of having links with the prime suspect of the 9/11 attacks - Osama Bin Laden.

Besides accusing Saddam of links with anti-American terrorists, Bush accused him of producing weapons of mass destruction, a claim Saddam denied. Bush pressed the UN to inspect Saddam’s weapon sites. While the weapon saga was taking a slow pace, Bush was convincing Congress to agree to his plan to invade Iraq. With the clearance from Congress, Bush and his “Coalition of the willing” launched an attack on Iraq on 20 March, 2003.

However, with the increasing unpopularity of the war, new evidence is beginning to suggest that the 9/11 attack was only a welcome relief to the Bush administration which considered Sadam as an obstacle to America’s oil interests in the Gulf. For example, the top agenda of the National Security Council’s first meeting after Bush entered the Oval Office was Iraq. That was seven months before 9/11. The next NSC meeting on February 1 was devoted exclusively to Iraq. This therefore suggests that economic considerations were overriding factors behind the war.

Before delving into the content of Petraeus’s report, one question begs for an answer. What is the rationale or raison d’être of this speech, and why now? The answer to this question lies in the bleak scenario in Iraq since the US led invasion in 2003.

It is estimated that this war is taking more time than America put in World War II, and it is straining American resources to the nerves. The war helps to fuel anti-American sentiments worldwide and represents a threat to American economic, strategic and security interests worldwide. Four and half years of ceaseless carnage and manslaughter have disproved Mr Bush’s promise of a quick victory in Iraq. Since 2003, 3,800 American lives have been lost in Iraq. Adding this figure to the number of Iraqis killed by insurgent activities, sectarian violence and coalition bombings presents the picture of a blood bath in Iraq. Such developments have helped change American public opinion from its initial optimism through uncertainty to outright opposition to the war.

Like Petraeus, Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq also presented a similar report to Congress. Both statesmen were instrumental in the ‘surge’ that started in January 2007. Crocker and Petraeus had taken over the administration of Iraq from Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad and General George Casey respectively. The ‘surge’ came against the backdrop of intense ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq. This tension was triggered by the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samara. The stated purpose of the ‘surge’ was therefore to create security in and around Baghdad to give Iraqi politicians breathing space to pursue reconciliation. Petraeus and Crocker therefore reported to Congress in their respective capacities as Military Commander and Ambassador in Iraq. The main reasons for their reporting directly to Congress was firstly, the increasing public resentment of the war, and secondly, the Democratic majority in Congress.

One of the biggest problems America faces in its Iraq policy stems from its failure to make long-term plans for post-Sadam Iraq. American policy was based on the assumption that victory would be swift, and that Iraqis would be encouraged to take over the administration of their country. “As they stand up, we will stand down,” said the optimistic Bush. Though the US succeeded in swiftly effecting a regime change, the entire policy backfired. A long-term plan for political and economic reconstruction involving the international community (especially the UN which Bush shunned in 2003) would have saved him the trouble of repeating what analysts call “the Vietnam disaster” in Iraq. As a result of this failure to plan, America faces two deadly choices in Iraq, whether to advance or retreat. Petraeus seemed to have the answer.

An Analysis of Petraeus’ report

The seemingly confident Petraeus began his speech on a spirit of independence without any influence from any quarter whatsoever. “…I wrote this testimony myself. It has not been cleared by, nor shared with anyone in the Pentagon, the White House or Congress.” He proceeded in an optimistic note, using charts, maps and graphs to illustrate his thesis of progress being made in Iraq after his 2007 surge. “The military objectives of the surge are, in large measure being met.” Such success was registered in spite of the difficulties faced by Petraeus’s forces. Some of these difficulties outlined by Petraeus were the toughness of enemy forces, the brutal summer heat, ethno-sectarian violence, various forms of corruption and the lack of adequate governmental capacity. In spite of these obstacles, Petraeus pointed out that the number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 out of the past 12 weeks thanks to his surge.

Using statistics and constantly referring to his charts, Petraeus counted the success of his surge one by one. Quoting the tribal rejection of al- Qaeda that started in Anbar province as a credit to his surge, Petraeus observed that this single factor helped produce such significant change there and later spread to a number of other locations. In addition, volunteers from al-Qaeda strongholds agreed in large numbers to join the fight against al-Qaeda. This had the effect of weakening al-Qaeda and other tribal extremists, to the advantage of the coalition.

Touching on the very sensitive issue of troop withdrawal, Petraeus agreed to a reduction of forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams next summer but he cautioned, “without jeopardising the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.”

In his report, Petraeus identified the stiff competition for power and resources as the main driving force behind sectarian conflicts in Iraq. “Its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq,” he said. He also pointed to the negative role Iran plays in Iraq. “It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of Qods Forces, seeks to turn Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force in Iraq,” remarked Patraeus. And thanks to the surge, many senior members and fighters of these insurgent groups had been captured.

Petraeus also painted a positive picture of Iraqi Security forces which was increasingly shouldering the burden of providing security for their country. The report underscored the need for a diplomatic offensive involving regional and international collaboration. He also pointed out the role of cyberspace in the struggle which had for over the years been an instrument used by insurgents in spreading radicalism.

Petraeus ended with a note of warning against any premature drawdown of US forces which in his opinion would likely have devastating consequences. The resultant chaos would obviously work to the advantage of al Qaeda, Iran and other fundamentalists.

Media criticisms of General Petraeus’ report

In addressing Congress, Petraeus’s report was ill-received by a war-weary media whose main pre-occupation lay in ending the war. The fact that Petraeus’s report went short of ending the war sparked controversy and media hostility. The main issues contained in media attacks on Petraeus were, the unreliability of his figures, his expression of optimism in what the media saw as a lost war, his reluctance to withdraw troops completely from Iraq for fear of an imminent disaster, his supposed reduction of ethno-sectarian violence and his underestimation of the capacity of insurgents. For these reasons, the media qualified Petraeus’s report as a betrayal by branding Petraeus “General Betray us.”

Even before Petraeus presented his report, anti-war lobby groups had asserted themselves. This represented a kind of “we-don’t-want to hear” pre-warning. Therefore, any “good news” which Petraeus had in store for America which was short of “immediate end” and “total withdrawal,” was seemingly unwelcome. Even while Patraeus’ testimony was in progress, the anti-war group MoveOn.org carried an Ad on the New York Times which read “General Petraeus or General Betray us.” This Ad itself created a second debate in Congress between Democrats and Republicans. It further revealed the extent to which the American public resented the war.

Though Petraeus sounded very confident on his facts and figures, the sources and reliability of these figures came under scrutiny from the media. The Washington Post identified stark contradictions between Petraeus’ figures and those of the Pentagon. “The charts are difficult to compare… and the numerical differences are still stark.” This same source cited a report by the Pentagon which said, “General Petraeus reported civilian deaths based on incidents reported by Coalition forces plus Iraqi government data. The [Pentagon] report only included incidents reported by coalition forces for civilian casualty data.”

In outlining his method of data collection, Petraeus claimed they had been confirmed by two US intelligence agencies. This however did not keep him off the hook. The Washington Post affirmed that much of his information was obtained from material compiled by a six-man team led by Macomber, an 18-year Army Veteran. “The source of the information could be a coalition force out on patrol, it could be a body.” According to the Washington Post therefore, General Petraeus’s information base was not credible enough.

Expressing bitterness at Petraeus’ report, The Financial Times (London, England) saw the report as merely a tactical success for the Bush Administration. “As tactical and ephemeral as the advances of the ‘surge’ upon which they were reporting …neither General nor Ambassador made excessive claims for the surge. They nevertheless suggested incremental improvements that might add up to success with time and persistence. This was unconvincing; moreover, some of the evidence was tendentious.”

Financial Times (London England) further refuted some of the fundamental claims made by Petraeus. These included the fall in casualty figures and the pro-coalition stance taken by Mogtada al-Sadr. On the latter’s pro-coalition stance, The Times attributed it more to his peoples’ hostility to intra-Shia fighting not the “surge.” On Petraeus’ much projected fall in “casualty figures,” The Times simply sees it as “misleading.”

After his testimony, The Washington Post concluded that “Petraeus is enmeshed in politics as the Senators he faced.” This same source reported that Petraeus direct supervisor, Admiral William Fallon was quoted to have remarked “Petraeus is dead wrong; we should begin withdrawing troops in a far speedier fashion.”

Petraeus’ assertion that the “Iraqi government is showing signs of hope” also came under attack. A formal National Intelligence estimate by the administration revealed that the Iraqi government was still strained by deep sectarian violence. Also, the Government Accountability Office (GOA), a Congressional agency recently reported that Iraq has partially achieved only 4 of 18 political and military goals. But Patraeus’ arithmetic put it at 9.

Still in this area of figures, the media answered Petraeus’s figures with figures, his facts with facts, and his optimism with pessimism. In September 2007, the Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press released a poll which indicated that 54 percent of the population believed US forces should be brought home as soon as possible, a level unchanged since July. An Associated Press SOS revealed that only 36 percent of those questioned believed the troop levels had helped stabilize Iraq. A similar CBS poll suggested the same discontent. 59 percent of citizens surveyed and 73 percent of Democrats now want an end to US military involvement in Iraq. The relevance of these polls can be seen in two ways. Firstly, they aimed at challenging Petraeus’s thesis of a successful ‘surge’. Secondly these polls reflected the dwindling support for the war both in America and Iraq. Petraeus’s report therefore intensified partisan division within Congress.

Out of America, the international media showd the same war-scepticism. In a poll commissioned by the BBC, ABC News, ARD German TV and USA, only 18 percent of those polled had confidence in US and coalition troops.78 percent opposed their presence. 69 percent said their presence made security worse. In a similar survey conducted by Opinion Research Corp. for CNN, a large majority said they opposed the war. Still along this line of dwindling support for the war, an ABC/BBC poll unveiled growing pessimism. 70 percent of Iraqis believed security had deteriorated since the surge. 60 percent believed attacks on US forces were justified. 93 percent of Sunnis (whom Petraeus claims are now pro-American), now want to see Americans dead. Only 29 percent of Iraqis now think the situation will get better. 60 percent think it the other way. 70 percent of Iraqis believe the surge has “hampered conditions for political dialogue, reconstruction and economic development.”

The list of queries levied against Petraeus by the media is long. Opposition to the war is mounting by the day. Petraeus’ report has come and gone. The remaining question is; what next? Will Congress follow Patraeus’ recommendation and withdraw troops according to a Petraeusian calendar? “Are there,” in Ambassador Crocker’s words, “alternative courses of action for our country which are superior?” These among others are some of the most difficult questions facing American policy makers. But one thing is clear, which ever way they choose will surely depend on the feasibility of the transfer of power in Iraq.

A prognosis of the feasibility of transfer of power in Iraq

Assessing the feasibility of the transfer of power in Iraq means putting many factors together. It means sifting through many possibilities to arrive at a formula that will work firstly to the good of the Iraqi people, the region and the rest of the world. This is so because the instability in Iraq has proven beyond doubt that the absence of peace in Iraq means the absence of peace in the gulf region and the wider world. Restoring peace in Iraq is by no means an easy task.

The primary responsibility of power transfer rests firstly with America. But it is in the nature of American politics to debate policy over a long time before execution. This means the transfer of power in Iraq is well still ahead. President Bush on his part has linked troop withdrawal directly to the level of success registered in Iraq. “The more successful we are, the more American troops can return.” Robert Gates, US defence secretary agreed without reservation that the next US president who will assume office in January 2009 would retain 100.000 troops. This implies that American policy makers speculate well beyond President Bush’s mandate.

Peter Feaver (former senior official on the National Security who helped draft the troop increase strategy), outlined two choices for troop withdrawal in Iraq. “One choice is a withdrawal driven by progress on the ground and it will be slower than you want…or you can have withdrawals based on partisan politics and the result will be faster but the consequences more dire.” Considered both ways, the task remains gigantic.

From another angle, the level of preparedness of the Iraqi government is very crucial to this power restoration process. “We are there at the invitation of the Iraqi government,” declared President Bush. “This is a sovereign nation. Twelve million people went to the polls to approve a constitution. It’s their government’s choice. If they were to say leave, we would leave.” Without doubt, there is a clear, link between the transfer of power and the state of readiness of the Iraqi government, both of which have to be approached tactfully.

Britain, one of America’s frontline coalition partners has the Iraq debate central in its political debates. Upon assuming office in June, Gordon Brown made little secret his discomfort with British presence in Iraq. As The Washington Post observes, “the political battle in Washington over when and how fast to withdraw troops has lent momentum to the debate in Britain where opinion polls have shown a strong majority of Britons favouring an early troop withdrawal.” Gordon Brown announced his intention to withdraw 500 of the 5.500 British troops, making commitments to further withdrawals. Expressing his preference for deeper troop cuts, Brown insisted on fashioning his Iraq policy in Britain’s “national interest” and not in lockstep with America.

Britain’s change of stance irritated Washington which immediately dispatched Petraeus and Crocker to London soon after their presentations to Congress. In London, Petraeus acknowledged Britain’s role in the struggle, “you are the most significant contributor among our allies, and have been all along.” Meeting with Gordon Brown and later with British defence chiefs, Petraeus later admitted that the meetings had included an agreement to defer decisions on any further British troop withdrawals for several months. In his overall assessment of their diplomatic mission to London, Petraeus observed, “my sense of this is that there is a wait-and-see attitude.” Petraeus’s diplomacy paid-off partly when Des Brown, British Defence Secretary re-emphasised Britain’s commitment to Iraq, “… to continue to build their capacities – military and civilian so that they can take full responsibility for the security of their country.” However, Britain did not waver in its pledge to transfer Basra, the last of four Iraqi provinces held by Britain.

Bringing the Iraqi debate to Congress, it remains a source of division. “The American military cannot secure the peace for that country,” said Senator Ken Salazar, Democrat of Colarador, “we must take decisive action to force the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people to secure the peace for Iraq.” Despite such warnings from the anti-war Democrats, the Iraqi foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari, continues to warn against any abrupt withdrawal. “The division of the country would become a fact… Iraq would be a free for all, and because of the polarisation between Shia and Sunnis, the removal of the multinational forces would lead to a regional war,” Zabari said hours before General Petraeus delivered his report. Inspite of America’s overriding position in this crisis; the regional and global ramifications of the war have come to involve the international community. The responses of the international community are equally very crucial in measuring the feasibility of transferring power to the Iraqis.

As early as 2003, Iraq’s closest neighbours expressed concern for the fate of the new Iraq. Iranian president Mohammed Khatami remarked that the role of regional nations in setting up a new Iraqi government was “very important.” In a meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, foreign ministers from Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait and Turkey discussed their agenda for a new Iraq. “We want to find a common policy to bring to the table whether it be humanitarian aid or reconstruction, and what political relations (with the future government in Iraq) will be.” Since this meeting, Iraq’s neighbours have responded in different ways to the search peace in Iraq.

The EU on its part called on the US and Britain to assume the responsibility of restoring stability and security in Iraq. It also called on the UN to play a central role in the transition process. “The UN must play a central role, including in the process leading towards self-government for the Iraqi people, utilizing its unique capacity and experience in post-conflict nation-building.” The EU also pledged “to play a significant role in the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. French president Jacque Chirac who had fiercely opposed the war stressed the need for a quick solution which could only come through UN intervention. “The UN is the sole body with the competence and legitimacy to find a way out of Iraq.” He called on the coalition to assume responsibility for immediate security in Iraq.

The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon on his part, said the international community must not abandon Iraq. “The international community, the United Nations, the whole international community should help the Iraqi people and government so that they can overcome this difficulty as soon as possible.” Ban said the situation in Iraq was a problem to be dealt with by the whole world and the United Nations would continue to make every effort on the humanitarian front. Ban however warned against any abrupt troop withdrawal which he said “may lead to further deterioration of the situation in Iraq.” True to Ban’s words, and as Crocker’s report showed, the UN has been instrumental in Iraq through the United Nations mandate in Iraq (UNAMI) under Security Council Resolution 1770.

The full impact of media criticisms on Petraeus still remain to be felt. The American public remains highly divided over the war, though as media polls suggest, anti-war sentiments are rising by the day. Major decisions over Iraq still remain with Congress and the president who wields considerable veto powers. But given that President Bush endorsed Petraeus’s recommendation for gradual troop withdrawal to pre-surge levels; one begins to see the early phase of reconciling two hostile extremes. The media no doubt plays a significant role in this difficult game of choosing whether to continue the war or end it, and how to go about both ways. Whether for political propaganda or otherwise media polls constitute an important asset for politicians and decision makers. This is even more so in America where the Iraq question remains the major dividing line between the media, the public and politicians in the up-coming presidential elections.

The Iraq war remains a thorn in the flesh of the US and the international community. Each day brings new challenges. In Iraq, “… change is a daily occurrence,” says Crocker. No one can tell with absolute certainty when complete “governability” will replace the present “ungovernability.” “Iraq is experiencing a revolution – not just regime change,” said the frustrated Crocker who lamented further, “I cannot guarantee success in Iraq.” General Petraeus on his part admitted, “I believe Iraq’s problems will require a long term effort, there are no easy answers or quick solutions.” A similar message had been echoed earlier by Syrian Foreign Minister Faroug al Sharaa, “no one can guess or predict how long it will take to stabilise Iraq.”

The Iraq crisis remains fluid, uncertain and potentially explosive. The American and international media show decreasing support for the war. Negotiation and dialogue remain the best options since military force shows no sign of succeeding. This dialogue must address three main issues; political reconciliation within Iraq, economic reconstruction and the security of the Iraqi people. It is time to unleash what the Financial Times calls “a politico-diplomatic surge.” The change of administration in London has pointed to the direction of troop withdrawal on the part of Britain. It still remains to be seen what the change of administration in Washington holds for Iraq come January 2009