Unsafe At Any Speed: Take #2
Roger J. Burke
December 12, 2007
Everybody has a worst nightmare.
Soon we'll all be able to share one more: a passenger jet being blown out of the sky while a terrorist sips his latte in the airport lounge, having just triggered the onboard bomb via mobile phone.
No doubt you have a mobile, perhaps two. In emergencies, they may be lifesavers; and you can use them anywhere. Well…not quite. There are some places where they are machina non grata: doctor's office; hospital; library; cinema/theatre; school rooms; gas/petrol stations; local, state or federal Government public galleries; and now while driving. There may slight differences between countries, but the point is clear: mobile phones have a place in our society but not every place should have a mobile phone.
Is there a case to allow use of mobile phones on aircraft? Well…yes. But, apart from technical problems and the prospect of 'phone rage', there is the overarching fact that the mobile is the most dangerously effective go-to plug-in for terrorists when they want to detonate bombs – and soon with the potential of remote detonation on aircraft.
Nobody, except the terrorist, wants to see that happen.
Whereas this particular nightmare has been only vaguely possible, the probability of that event is now greater than zero, and increasing, because in-flight use of mobile phones will be a reality in 2008 or sooner. And that's a scary prospect considering the fact that, up till end 2006, the probability did not exist.
Not any more, however, because times change and technology with it.
Let's go back to early 2004, first. Business groups in USA, lead by the major airlines, submitted a proposal to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), to introduce in-flight use of mobile phones on all passenger aircraft. But, together with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the FAA delayed a go-ahead because "the technology could interfere with avionics and onboard electronic gear" thus potentially affecting the safety of the aircraft and passengers. Moreover, it was suggested that existing ground-based cell phone systems also could be adversely affected by transmissions from aircraft. It's puzzling, however, that neither the FAA nor the FCC have any published comment on the risk of cell phones as remote bomb triggers because the FAA already knew in 2003 that mobile phones and bombs don't go together: in its corporate Employee Response to Emergencies booklet, there is a specific reference that "Transmitting on two-way radios and cell phones in the vicinity of a bomb, suspected bomb, or suspicious package/container, may be hazardous."(1)
That risk is well known, however. As early as 2001, a would-be terrorist attempted to blow up the Vietnamese embassy in Bangkok using a mobile phone as "a remote detonation device", according to an FBI report.(2) It's also well known that such triggers were used in the Madrid terrorist attack, in London, in Bali and continues in Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Thailand and other places around the world. In 2005, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in USA warned, "that terrorists could use cell phones as remote-controlled improvised explosive devices in the air."(3) So everybody who wants to know, knows – especially terrorists, worldwide.
Which brings us to the looming problem…
By late 2006 things had changed, technically: new technology that addresses the issue of interference to avionics, and which is supplied by two communications companies, OnAir and GSM World, has been introduced and is now undergoing in-flight tests in Europe on selected carriers, and in Australia on QANTAS. Other airlines either showing interest or actually testing the new equipment – called the picocell – include AirBus, Air France, British Midland Airways (BMI), TAP Air Portugal, Ryan Air, and Cathay Pacific. Hence, while the FCC and FAA in USA still maintain a prohibition on in-flight use, regulatory authorities in Europe and Australasia have obviously seen fit to very soon allow full use of in-flight mobile phones, provided the testing is satisfactory. On that score, recent news reports from around the world indicate all appears to be going well. (4)
Considering the enormous profits to be made by airlines, with expensive in-flight user fees, why are authorities in USA holding out? There has been some limited testing in the USA but, given the recent advances noted above, why don't the FCC and FAA give the green light to US airlines to allow use of in-flight cell phones? I put that question to the news media contact at the FCC on October 8th, 2007; a reply to my email query has yet to come back.
Part of the problem, however, rests with the ongoing debate about interference to aircraft avionics. In that regard, a paper from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) – appropriately entitled Unsafe at Any Airspeed? and prepared by four academics – acknowledged that "there is no definitive instance of an air accident known to have been caused by a passenger's use of an electronic device" but strongly advocated curbing the use of cell phones on aircraft in view of the proven record of interference with aircraft avionics. I found no subsequent papers on the topic at IEEE so, although published in 2005, it’s reasonable to think that the basic conclusion remains, as stated by the authors: "Our data and the NASA studies suggest to us that there is a clear and present danger: cell phones can render GPS instrument useless for landings."(5) The unknown, at this point, is the effectiveness of the picocell in nullifying that danger.
A bone of contention with many travellers is the potential problem of onboard 'phone rage': the risk of paying customers getting into disputes with others who tend to talk too loud, too long or both. On a bus or train, we've all been there, maybe; hence, the same prospect on an aircraft isn't particularly appealing. To some extent, the picocell will handle this problem, but only in an indirect manner: the aircrew can switch off that unit at anytime of their choosing – thus shutting down all portable electronic device (PED) transmissions. So: shut up or get shut down. Good psychology from one perspective, perhaps, but not the best way to improve customer satisfaction. In the context of a cell phone bomb trigger, however, it's a non-issue.
Hence, although electronic interference is still a safety issue, the all-important question remains: how to prevent any use of a mobile phone to detonate a bomb. On a train or bus, it's bad enough that some die; on a plane at 10,000 meters, everybody dies.
Given that manual security procedures are not perfect, with anecdotal evidence about journalists, official security testers and others habitually getting through barriers with prohibited objects, how much easier will it be for a suicidal extremist with a mobile phone as part of a small and seemingly innocuous package – for example, a fake new phone package, dressed up to look exactly like a brand name purchase? If that doesn’t worry you, consider this: there is no guarantee that all luggage is always scanned, searched or opened properly; and technology is still years away from providing a fool-proof electronic solution that includes scanning for explosive devices, if that is ever possible. A recent paper about terahertz wave generators, for example, for producing spatial imaging of hidden objects concluded “no imaging or detection technology can reliably find every threat to security."(6)
So, what more can be done about the threat from cell phones as bomb triggers?
Who better to ask than the relevant players? Those most involved are: the mobile phone companies, the telecommunication suppliers, the airlines and pertinent regulatory bodies.
From website data, it appears that four majors of the cell phone industry are: Sony-Ericsson, Motorola, Vodaphone, and Nokia.(7) They control much of the mobile market, with Nokia being the largest. However, the only publicly available data on security and safety information is in relation to normal phone use; that is, the effects of radio-frequency (RF) waves on the brain and the continued efforts to explore other health hazards. There is nothing about the misuse of mobile phones as bomb triggers. To some extent, perhaps, that may have been understandable prior to 9/11; in a world now of increasing uncertainties, such a public omission is puzzling.
Hence I sent an email, on October 3rd 2007, to each representative I could find, requesting an official response about this issue. I posed two questions: first, what will the phone company do to prevent all future phones from being used as remote bomb triggers; and second, what can be done to render the already-installed base of mobile phones totally ineffective for use as triggers?
I received three replies: the first, from Vodaphone, was obviously from an automatic reply generator that completely ignored the questions; it was unsigned, unhelpful and useless. The second, from Nokia, was more substantial, being written by a human hand; beyond that, it was composed of unrelated statements such as "mobile operator networks typically have a high level of security, utilizing solutions to prevent viruses and other harmful content from reaching mobile phones"; and it was unsigned. The third was from the Partner Support Manager (PSM) at Sony-Ericsson, who made a good point: extremists have already and can still use other electronic triggers to destroy aircraft – radio devices and electronic timers, for example. To those I can add infrared devices such as garage door openers and electro-chemical timers.
The PSM claims that "this is not an issue related to the mobile phone industry as such" but that diverts attention from the core issue: why should we actively assist the bad guys in their efforts to, once again, use our technology against us – technology that is just too easy and too pervasive?
I've yet to receive a reply from Motorola.
With little likelihood of anything further from that quarter, it was time to knock on other doors. On the website for AirBus – in joint venture with OnAir – there's not a shred of information about any technology solution designed to prevent a terrorist using an onboard mobile phone as a remote bomb trigger. Why not? I posed that question via email on October 8th, 2007, to the marketing manager at AirBus responsible for the document containing much of the public information on mobile technology. On the GSM World website – the other supplier of similar technology – it's much the same: there is everything but information pertinent to this issue. Hence, the same question was sent. I'm still waiting for replies from both…
With still no reply from the FCC, I searched various agencies in Australia: the Civil Aviation Safety Administration (CASA) website, the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) and the Australian Communications and Media Authority, a sub-department within the former. The result: absolutely no public information on the topic of mobile phones as bomb triggers. So, I sent an email to the responsible minister, requesting further information, if any is available. As yet, there has been no reply.
Is it likely that most of these people and organizations are unaware of the risk?
Perish the thought. What's more likely, instead, is that the threat is recognized; the risk is assessed as being low; safety and security procedures are viewed as being more robust since 9/11 – which they are, perhaps, despite ongoing concerns; and crucially, though extremists keep trying to blow up aircraft, nobody has succeeded yet in actualizing our collective nightmare with a cell phone – in colloquial terms, it ain't happened yet on a plane, pilgrim. That's the type of thinking epitomized by security experts such as Bruce Schneier – well-known consultant who often advises the US government and is often interviewed by the media – who essentially sees the benefits of mobile phones as outweighing the risk of attack. (8)
That sort of cost-benefit analysis is a familiar refrain that, in brutal terms, means it's okay for some to die so that the rest of us can get on with business. In some areas, they call it 'collateral damage'; but nobody ever wants to be part of that damage. In truth, however, it is a viable frame of reference needed to maintain modern society and business growth: construction deaths occur, yet building continues; mining deaths are often horrendously high, but the diggers keeps digging; policing is dangerous and officers die, but the absence of police is worse; thousands die on the roads, but few will give up their car, and so on. All valid arguments, up to a point, but which break down when we recall that not everybody is in construction, very few want to be miners, only some become cops and, unless you're drunk, you have control of your car.
But, we're all travelers, of one sort or another, and often at the mercy of providers of all persuasions.
From that perspective and for some time now, it is patently obvious we have all been at greater risk of dying by commuting on buses and trains; extremists in London, Madrid and other places have already demonstrated that conclusively. Significantly, however, after each attack some people survive to get on a bus or train another day. In the next few months, when in-flight mobile phone use is scheduled to fly, the actual risk of attack may not be too different to that for a bus or train, but survivability of any passenger is so unlikely as to be non-existent; which means, in effect, the risk of dying on a plane will soon be greater.
Management of any business includes the eternal need for risk assessment, so what more can be done to reduce that risk?
Well, consider this: some forty years ago, a then little known consumer activist, Ralph Nader, published Unsafe at Any Speed, the book that tore the corporate hood off automobile safety in America. In perhaps the first concerted attack on The Big Three automakers – GM, Ford and Chrysler – Mr Nader showed how well established design faults were a cause for concern and of passenger death. His book made a big impact: ultimately, the Big Three were obliged to make production changes to improve automobile safety.(9)
There's no time, however, to wait for another book because terrorists have exploited the well established design flaw/weakness/oversight – take your pick – of cell phones for years.
And that's why the phone makers must act: first, because of the soon increased risk of death to all travellers and, second, corporate management knows about the problem and published history. It's probably too late to do anything about the millions of existing phones – which, over time, will be replaced anyway – but all new phones should have embedded software – a simple electronic switch – that automatically prevents tampering with its circuitry or operation, preferably to the point of rendering the unit useless and beyond repair. Considering the growth in air traffic, the market size for cell phones and the enormous profits enjoyed by manufacturers – with uninformed consumers in the middle – the financial risk for airlines, communications providers and the phone companies must be in peril as soon as one aircraft is blown to bits.(10) Quite frankly, in these days of uncertainty it's no longer an option, nor very smart, for management to sit on its hands, waiting for proof that cell phones really are unsafe at any speed.
Moreover, the clock is ticking and, like I said, only a terrorist wants to see passengers wake up to live out – and die in – their worst nightmare.
End Notes:
(1) Employee Response to Emergencies, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), dated 20th February, 2003, retrieved from
http://www.tc.faa.gov/emergency/Employee%20Response%20To%20Emergencies.pdf on May 5, 2005.
"Transmitting on two-way radios and cell phones in the vicinity of a bomb, suspected bomb, or suspicious package/container, may be hazardous. Radios and cell phones in the vicinity of a bombsite should remain "off" until the matter is resolved." As at October 19, 2007, the above link times out; and the text of the HTML version of the same page found at http://www.tc.faa.gov/emergency/Employee%20Response%20To%20Emergencies.htm is also inaccessible.
The search function at FAA, however, allowed me to access a results page at this URL:
http://search.google.dot.gov/FAA/FAASearchProcess.asp?q=Radios+and+cell+phones+&btnG=Search&output=xml_no_dtd&sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Ad1&ie=UTF-8&client=default_frontend&oe=UTF-8&proxystylesheet=default_frontend&site=FAA_Pages which showed the above quote as being part of the Employee Response Package. Apparently, FAA may now be blocking public access to the full package.
(2) MAN ARRESTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO BOMB VIETNAMESE EMBASSY IN BANGKOK, THAILAND, FBI press release, October 12, 2001, retrieved from http://losangeles.fbi.gov/pressrel/2001/101201vanvo.htm on May 5, 2005.
"The explosive device was connected to a mobile phone which was to function as a remote detonation device." Since obtaining that link, the Los Angeles FBI office has removed all archives earlier than 2005, and, as at October 19, 2007, there is no public email address with which to make further requests. Further global searching for the above headline resulted in: "June, 2001 - A US citizen Van Duc Vo is accused of trying to bomb the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok in 2001 using a cell phone to detonate the bomb. The bombs did not go off." Retrieved from http://2bangkok.com/thai-terror-incidents.shtml on November 2, 2007.
(3) DOJ seeks wiretap access for cell phone calls on planes by Todd R. Weiss
13/07/2005. Retrieved on April 27, 2005 from http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;125802242;relcomp;1
"The DOJ also warned the FCC that terrorists could use cell phones as remote-controlled improvised explosive devices in the air."
(4) See the following:
RyanAir set to switch on OnAir, dated September 12th 2007, retrieved on October 18, 2007 from http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/09/12/2932300.htm
Europe approves cell phone use on selected planes, dated June 20, 2007, retrieved on October 18, 2007 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2007/06/20/cell-plane.html
The Mile High Call, dated June 22nd, 2007 retrieved on October 19, 2007 from http://www.news24.com/News24/Technology/News/0,,2-13-1443_2134670,00.html
(5) Unsafe At Any Airspeed? by Bill Strauss, M. Granger Morgan, Jay Apt, and Daniel D. Stancil, accessed on October 5th, 2007 from http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/3069
"…our research has found that these items can interrupt the normal operation of key cockpit instruments, especially Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, which are increasingly vital to safe landings."
"This much is certain: there exists a greater potential for problems than was previously believed."
"Our data and the NASA studies suggest to us that there is a clear and present danger: cellphones can render GPS instrument useless for landings."
(6) T-Rays vs. Terrorists by: John F. Federici, Dale Gary, Robert Barat, and Zoi-Heleni Michalopoulou – the use of terahertz wave generators to produce spatial imaging on hidden objects. Web page retrieved from http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/5278 on October 12th, 2007.
"Powerful as terahertz imaging is, no imaging or detection technology can reliably find every threat to security." The article contained no information, however, about cell phones used as bomb triggers.
(7) Some of the publicly available statistics about the four I contacted can be found at the following websites, all accessed on October 3rd and 4th, 2007:
Nokia: http://www.nokia.com/link?cid=EDITORIAL_4070
Motorola: http://www.motorola.com/mediacenter/news/detail.jsp?globalObjectId=8129_8058_23
Vodaphone: http://vodafone.custhelp.com/cgi-bin/vodafone.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php
Sony-Ericsson: http://www.sonyericsson.com/spg.jsp?cc=global&lc=en&ver=4001&template=pc3_1_1&zone=pc&lm=pc3&prid=8363
(8) Bruce Schneier, who operates a number of websites devoted to all facets of safety and security (www.counterpane.com ; www.bruceschneier.com ) is called upon often by governments as an official consultant. He has written about a whole range of security and safety aspects, including this topic. Essentially, he sees the benefits of mobile phones on aircraft as outweighing the risk of terrorist attack using a cell phone trigger. See http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/06/risks_of_cell_p.html where he explicitly says, "…the benefit to society of having the technology is much greater than the benefit to society of controlling, crippling, or banning the technology."
(9) A copy of Nader's book was not available, but information about the effect on the auto industry can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ralph_Nader, retrieved on October 19, 2007. While there has been much dispute about Nader's book, there is no doubt that American cars were regarded as unsafe. My own experience with the Chevrolet Corvair, in the 1970s, and American cars in general, supports Nader's criticism.
(10) See the following:
CAPA: Worldwide traffic growth accelerating, retrieved on October 19, 2007 from http://www.expresstravelworld.com/200710/aviationworld15.shtml
Nokia gains with 3Q profit jump, retrieved on October 19, 2007 from http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/fn/5225327.html
And, for a peek at the rate of expansion of worldwide mobile connections, see the real-time update at http://www.gsmworld.com/index.shtml, retrieved on October 19, 2007. Boggles the mind…
Copyright Roger J. Burke, 2007. All rights reserved.
Soon we'll all be able to share one more: a passenger jet being blown out of the sky while a terrorist sips his latte in the airport lounge, having just triggered the onboard bomb via mobile phone.
No doubt you have a mobile, perhaps two. In emergencies, they may be lifesavers; and you can use them anywhere. Well…not quite. There are some places where they are machina non grata: doctor's office; hospital; library; cinema/theatre; school rooms; gas/petrol stations; local, state or federal Government public galleries; and now while driving. There may slight differences between countries, but the point is clear: mobile phones have a place in our society but not every place should have a mobile phone.
Is there a case to allow use of mobile phones on aircraft? Well…yes. But, apart from technical problems and the prospect of 'phone rage', there is the overarching fact that the mobile is the most dangerously effective go-to plug-in for terrorists when they want to detonate bombs – and soon with the potential of remote detonation on aircraft.
Nobody, except the terrorist, wants to see that happen.
Whereas this particular nightmare has been only vaguely possible, the probability of that event is now greater than zero, and increasing, because in-flight use of mobile phones will be a reality in 2008 or sooner. And that's a scary prospect considering the fact that, up till end 2006, the probability did not exist.
Not any more, however, because times change and technology with it.
Let's go back to early 2004, first. Business groups in USA, lead by the major airlines, submitted a proposal to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), to introduce in-flight use of mobile phones on all passenger aircraft. But, together with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the FAA delayed a go-ahead because "the technology could interfere with avionics and onboard electronic gear" thus potentially affecting the safety of the aircraft and passengers. Moreover, it was suggested that existing ground-based cell phone systems also could be adversely affected by transmissions from aircraft. It's puzzling, however, that neither the FAA nor the FCC have any published comment on the risk of cell phones as remote bomb triggers because the FAA already knew in 2003 that mobile phones and bombs don't go together: in its corporate Employee Response to Emergencies booklet, there is a specific reference that "Transmitting on two-way radios and cell phones in the vicinity of a bomb, suspected bomb, or suspicious package/container, may be hazardous."(1)
That risk is well known, however. As early as 2001, a would-be terrorist attempted to blow up the Vietnamese embassy in Bangkok using a mobile phone as "a remote detonation device", according to an FBI report.(2) It's also well known that such triggers were used in the Madrid terrorist attack, in London, in Bali and continues in Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Thailand and other places around the world. In 2005, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in USA warned, "that terrorists could use cell phones as remote-controlled improvised explosive devices in the air."(3) So everybody who wants to know, knows – especially terrorists, worldwide.
Which brings us to the looming problem…
By late 2006 things had changed, technically: new technology that addresses the issue of interference to avionics, and which is supplied by two communications companies, OnAir and GSM World, has been introduced and is now undergoing in-flight tests in Europe on selected carriers, and in Australia on QANTAS. Other airlines either showing interest or actually testing the new equipment – called the picocell – include AirBus, Air France, British Midland Airways (BMI), TAP Air Portugal, Ryan Air, and Cathay Pacific. Hence, while the FCC and FAA in USA still maintain a prohibition on in-flight use, regulatory authorities in Europe and Australasia have obviously seen fit to very soon allow full use of in-flight mobile phones, provided the testing is satisfactory. On that score, recent news reports from around the world indicate all appears to be going well. (4)
Considering the enormous profits to be made by airlines, with expensive in-flight user fees, why are authorities in USA holding out? There has been some limited testing in the USA but, given the recent advances noted above, why don't the FCC and FAA give the green light to US airlines to allow use of in-flight cell phones? I put that question to the news media contact at the FCC on October 8th, 2007; a reply to my email query has yet to come back.
Part of the problem, however, rests with the ongoing debate about interference to aircraft avionics. In that regard, a paper from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) – appropriately entitled Unsafe at Any Airspeed? and prepared by four academics – acknowledged that "there is no definitive instance of an air accident known to have been caused by a passenger's use of an electronic device" but strongly advocated curbing the use of cell phones on aircraft in view of the proven record of interference with aircraft avionics. I found no subsequent papers on the topic at IEEE so, although published in 2005, it’s reasonable to think that the basic conclusion remains, as stated by the authors: "Our data and the NASA studies suggest to us that there is a clear and present danger: cell phones can render GPS instrument useless for landings."(5) The unknown, at this point, is the effectiveness of the picocell in nullifying that danger.
A bone of contention with many travellers is the potential problem of onboard 'phone rage': the risk of paying customers getting into disputes with others who tend to talk too loud, too long or both. On a bus or train, we've all been there, maybe; hence, the same prospect on an aircraft isn't particularly appealing. To some extent, the picocell will handle this problem, but only in an indirect manner: the aircrew can switch off that unit at anytime of their choosing – thus shutting down all portable electronic device (PED) transmissions. So: shut up or get shut down. Good psychology from one perspective, perhaps, but not the best way to improve customer satisfaction. In the context of a cell phone bomb trigger, however, it's a non-issue.
Hence, although electronic interference is still a safety issue, the all-important question remains: how to prevent any use of a mobile phone to detonate a bomb. On a train or bus, it's bad enough that some die; on a plane at 10,000 meters, everybody dies.
Given that manual security procedures are not perfect, with anecdotal evidence about journalists, official security testers and others habitually getting through barriers with prohibited objects, how much easier will it be for a suicidal extremist with a mobile phone as part of a small and seemingly innocuous package – for example, a fake new phone package, dressed up to look exactly like a brand name purchase? If that doesn’t worry you, consider this: there is no guarantee that all luggage is always scanned, searched or opened properly; and technology is still years away from providing a fool-proof electronic solution that includes scanning for explosive devices, if that is ever possible. A recent paper about terahertz wave generators, for example, for producing spatial imaging of hidden objects concluded “no imaging or detection technology can reliably find every threat to security."(6)
So, what more can be done about the threat from cell phones as bomb triggers?
Who better to ask than the relevant players? Those most involved are: the mobile phone companies, the telecommunication suppliers, the airlines and pertinent regulatory bodies.
From website data, it appears that four majors of the cell phone industry are: Sony-Ericsson, Motorola, Vodaphone, and Nokia.(7) They control much of the mobile market, with Nokia being the largest. However, the only publicly available data on security and safety information is in relation to normal phone use; that is, the effects of radio-frequency (RF) waves on the brain and the continued efforts to explore other health hazards. There is nothing about the misuse of mobile phones as bomb triggers. To some extent, perhaps, that may have been understandable prior to 9/11; in a world now of increasing uncertainties, such a public omission is puzzling.
Hence I sent an email, on October 3rd 2007, to each representative I could find, requesting an official response about this issue. I posed two questions: first, what will the phone company do to prevent all future phones from being used as remote bomb triggers; and second, what can be done to render the already-installed base of mobile phones totally ineffective for use as triggers?
I received three replies: the first, from Vodaphone, was obviously from an automatic reply generator that completely ignored the questions; it was unsigned, unhelpful and useless. The second, from Nokia, was more substantial, being written by a human hand; beyond that, it was composed of unrelated statements such as "mobile operator networks typically have a high level of security, utilizing solutions to prevent viruses and other harmful content from reaching mobile phones"; and it was unsigned. The third was from the Partner Support Manager (PSM) at Sony-Ericsson, who made a good point: extremists have already and can still use other electronic triggers to destroy aircraft – radio devices and electronic timers, for example. To those I can add infrared devices such as garage door openers and electro-chemical timers.
The PSM claims that "this is not an issue related to the mobile phone industry as such" but that diverts attention from the core issue: why should we actively assist the bad guys in their efforts to, once again, use our technology against us – technology that is just too easy and too pervasive?
I've yet to receive a reply from Motorola.
With little likelihood of anything further from that quarter, it was time to knock on other doors. On the website for AirBus – in joint venture with OnAir – there's not a shred of information about any technology solution designed to prevent a terrorist using an onboard mobile phone as a remote bomb trigger. Why not? I posed that question via email on October 8th, 2007, to the marketing manager at AirBus responsible for the document containing much of the public information on mobile technology. On the GSM World website – the other supplier of similar technology – it's much the same: there is everything but information pertinent to this issue. Hence, the same question was sent. I'm still waiting for replies from both…
With still no reply from the FCC, I searched various agencies in Australia: the Civil Aviation Safety Administration (CASA) website, the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) and the Australian Communications and Media Authority, a sub-department within the former. The result: absolutely no public information on the topic of mobile phones as bomb triggers. So, I sent an email to the responsible minister, requesting further information, if any is available. As yet, there has been no reply.
Is it likely that most of these people and organizations are unaware of the risk?
Perish the thought. What's more likely, instead, is that the threat is recognized; the risk is assessed as being low; safety and security procedures are viewed as being more robust since 9/11 – which they are, perhaps, despite ongoing concerns; and crucially, though extremists keep trying to blow up aircraft, nobody has succeeded yet in actualizing our collective nightmare with a cell phone – in colloquial terms, it ain't happened yet on a plane, pilgrim. That's the type of thinking epitomized by security experts such as Bruce Schneier – well-known consultant who often advises the US government and is often interviewed by the media – who essentially sees the benefits of mobile phones as outweighing the risk of attack. (8)
That sort of cost-benefit analysis is a familiar refrain that, in brutal terms, means it's okay for some to die so that the rest of us can get on with business. In some areas, they call it 'collateral damage'; but nobody ever wants to be part of that damage. In truth, however, it is a viable frame of reference needed to maintain modern society and business growth: construction deaths occur, yet building continues; mining deaths are often horrendously high, but the diggers keeps digging; policing is dangerous and officers die, but the absence of police is worse; thousands die on the roads, but few will give up their car, and so on. All valid arguments, up to a point, but which break down when we recall that not everybody is in construction, very few want to be miners, only some become cops and, unless you're drunk, you have control of your car.
But, we're all travelers, of one sort or another, and often at the mercy of providers of all persuasions.
From that perspective and for some time now, it is patently obvious we have all been at greater risk of dying by commuting on buses and trains; extremists in London, Madrid and other places have already demonstrated that conclusively. Significantly, however, after each attack some people survive to get on a bus or train another day. In the next few months, when in-flight mobile phone use is scheduled to fly, the actual risk of attack may not be too different to that for a bus or train, but survivability of any passenger is so unlikely as to be non-existent; which means, in effect, the risk of dying on a plane will soon be greater.
Management of any business includes the eternal need for risk assessment, so what more can be done to reduce that risk?
Well, consider this: some forty years ago, a then little known consumer activist, Ralph Nader, published Unsafe at Any Speed, the book that tore the corporate hood off automobile safety in America. In perhaps the first concerted attack on The Big Three automakers – GM, Ford and Chrysler – Mr Nader showed how well established design faults were a cause for concern and of passenger death. His book made a big impact: ultimately, the Big Three were obliged to make production changes to improve automobile safety.(9)
There's no time, however, to wait for another book because terrorists have exploited the well established design flaw/weakness/oversight – take your pick – of cell phones for years.
And that's why the phone makers must act: first, because of the soon increased risk of death to all travellers and, second, corporate management knows about the problem and published history. It's probably too late to do anything about the millions of existing phones – which, over time, will be replaced anyway – but all new phones should have embedded software – a simple electronic switch – that automatically prevents tampering with its circuitry or operation, preferably to the point of rendering the unit useless and beyond repair. Considering the growth in air traffic, the market size for cell phones and the enormous profits enjoyed by manufacturers – with uninformed consumers in the middle – the financial risk for airlines, communications providers and the phone companies must be in peril as soon as one aircraft is blown to bits.(10) Quite frankly, in these days of uncertainty it's no longer an option, nor very smart, for management to sit on its hands, waiting for proof that cell phones really are unsafe at any speed.
Moreover, the clock is ticking and, like I said, only a terrorist wants to see passengers wake up to live out – and die in – their worst nightmare.
End Notes:
(1) Employee Response to Emergencies, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), dated 20th February, 2003, retrieved from
http://www.tc.faa.gov/emergency/Employee%20Response%20To%20Emergencies.pdf on May 5, 2005.
"Transmitting on two-way radios and cell phones in the vicinity of a bomb, suspected bomb, or suspicious package/container, may be hazardous. Radios and cell phones in the vicinity of a bombsite should remain "off" until the matter is resolved." As at October 19, 2007, the above link times out; and the text of the HTML version of the same page found at http://www.tc.faa.gov/emergency/Employee%20Response%20To%20Emergencies.htm is also inaccessible.
The search function at FAA, however, allowed me to access a results page at this URL:
http://search.google.dot.gov/FAA/FAASearchProcess.asp?q=Radios+and+cell+phones+&btnG=Search&output=xml_no_dtd&sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Ad1&ie=UTF-8&client=default_frontend&oe=UTF-8&proxystylesheet=default_frontend&site=FAA_Pages which showed the above quote as being part of the Employee Response Package. Apparently, FAA may now be blocking public access to the full package.
(2) MAN ARRESTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO BOMB VIETNAMESE EMBASSY IN BANGKOK, THAILAND, FBI press release, October 12, 2001, retrieved from http://losangeles.fbi.gov/pressrel/2001/101201vanvo.htm on May 5, 2005.
"The explosive device was connected to a mobile phone which was to function as a remote detonation device." Since obtaining that link, the Los Angeles FBI office has removed all archives earlier than 2005, and, as at October 19, 2007, there is no public email address with which to make further requests. Further global searching for the above headline resulted in: "June, 2001 - A US citizen Van Duc Vo is accused of trying to bomb the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok in 2001 using a cell phone to detonate the bomb. The bombs did not go off." Retrieved from http://2bangkok.com/thai-terror-incidents.shtml on November 2, 2007.
(3) DOJ seeks wiretap access for cell phone calls on planes by Todd R. Weiss
13/07/2005. Retrieved on April 27, 2005 from http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;125802242;relcomp;1
"The DOJ also warned the FCC that terrorists could use cell phones as remote-controlled improvised explosive devices in the air."
(4) See the following:
RyanAir set to switch on OnAir, dated September 12th 2007, retrieved on October 18, 2007 from http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/09/12/2932300.htm
Europe approves cell phone use on selected planes, dated June 20, 2007, retrieved on October 18, 2007 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2007/06/20/cell-plane.html
The Mile High Call, dated June 22nd, 2007 retrieved on October 19, 2007 from http://www.news24.com/News24/Technology/News/0,,2-13-1443_2134670,00.html
(5) Unsafe At Any Airspeed? by Bill Strauss, M. Granger Morgan, Jay Apt, and Daniel D. Stancil, accessed on October 5th, 2007 from http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/3069
"…our research has found that these items can interrupt the normal operation of key cockpit instruments, especially Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, which are increasingly vital to safe landings."
"This much is certain: there exists a greater potential for problems than was previously believed."
"Our data and the NASA studies suggest to us that there is a clear and present danger: cellphones can render GPS instrument useless for landings."
(6) T-Rays vs. Terrorists by: John F. Federici, Dale Gary, Robert Barat, and Zoi-Heleni Michalopoulou – the use of terahertz wave generators to produce spatial imaging on hidden objects. Web page retrieved from http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/print/5278 on October 12th, 2007.
"Powerful as terahertz imaging is, no imaging or detection technology can reliably find every threat to security." The article contained no information, however, about cell phones used as bomb triggers.
(7) Some of the publicly available statistics about the four I contacted can be found at the following websites, all accessed on October 3rd and 4th, 2007:
Nokia: http://www.nokia.com/link?cid=EDITORIAL_4070
Motorola: http://www.motorola.com/mediacenter/news/detail.jsp?globalObjectId=8129_8058_23
Vodaphone: http://vodafone.custhelp.com/cgi-bin/vodafone.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php
Sony-Ericsson: http://www.sonyericsson.com/spg.jsp?cc=global&lc=en&ver=4001&template=pc3_1_1&zone=pc&lm=pc3&prid=8363
(8) Bruce Schneier, who operates a number of websites devoted to all facets of safety and security (www.counterpane.com ; www.bruceschneier.com ) is called upon often by governments as an official consultant. He has written about a whole range of security and safety aspects, including this topic. Essentially, he sees the benefits of mobile phones on aircraft as outweighing the risk of terrorist attack using a cell phone trigger. See http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/06/risks_of_cell_p.html where he explicitly says, "…the benefit to society of having the technology is much greater than the benefit to society of controlling, crippling, or banning the technology."
(9) A copy of Nader's book was not available, but information about the effect on the auto industry can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ralph_Nader, retrieved on October 19, 2007. While there has been much dispute about Nader's book, there is no doubt that American cars were regarded as unsafe. My own experience with the Chevrolet Corvair, in the 1970s, and American cars in general, supports Nader's criticism.
(10) See the following:
CAPA: Worldwide traffic growth accelerating, retrieved on October 19, 2007 from http://www.expresstravelworld.com/200710/aviationworld15.shtml
Nokia gains with 3Q profit jump, retrieved on October 19, 2007 from http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/fn/5225327.html
And, for a peek at the rate of expansion of worldwide mobile connections, see the real-time update at http://www.gsmworld.com/index.shtml, retrieved on October 19, 2007. Boggles the mind…
Copyright Roger J. Burke, 2007. All rights reserved.
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