Establishment Creating Hindrances In War On Terrorism
Muhammad Khurshid
September 26, 2007
Some of the events in Pakistan indicated that the most powerful establishment had been creating hindrances in war on terrorism launched by the United States after 9/11 in which Pakistan was given the status of frontline state. At the initial stage all the people were happy as they were earning dollars, but now when the US had stopped some payments to them they had started negative propoganda against the war on war.
The political crisis in Pakistan was the handiwork of the establishment people. Writers who have affiliation with the establishment have started propoganda against the United States and now they even wrote against the Saudi Arabia. One of the writers Ijaz Hussain in his latest essay state that Pakistanis have reacted sharply to the Saudi role in the deportation of Nawaz Sharif on September 10. For example, accusing the Saudi government of supporting “a military dictator against the wishes of 160 million Pakistanis”, the APDM warned that, it “will not tolerate Saudi interference in Pakistan’s internal matters”. It did not restrict its criticism to a mere statement and boycotted the Saudi reception held soon after. Apart from the APDM, religious scholars, khateebs and political commentators also denounced the Saudi role. The criticism during some of the TV talk shows was so scathing that the Pakistani government had to warn independent channels against airing such criticism failing which, it threatened to take action against them under the PEMRA rules. Was the criticism against Saudi Arabia justified? How do we explain the proactive role of the Saudis?
It is undeniable that Saudi Arabia is no ordinary friend of Pakistan. It has a special place for Pakistanis because of the location of Islam’s holiest places on its soil, its help at critical junctures in Pakistan’s history and for providing employment to about 1.5 million Pakistanis. The relationship between the two countries is so unique that the Pakistani government or the opposition has from time to time sought Saudi help to sort out political disputes.
This was the case in 1977 during the PNA movement against the government and then again in 2000 following Sharif’s conviction in the plane hijacking case. These examples prove that the Saudis did not involve themselves in Pakistan’s domestic politics uninvited; and that they did so at the request of the parties involved. Hence they cannot be accused of interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.
The “not guilty” verdict, however, cannot be passed against them in the case of Sharif’s deportation. This is so because as opposed to the past when all the parties in dispute were on board, in the present situation one of the parties, namely Sharif, was not consenting. The argument that the Saudis had a locus standi in the case by virtue of the “deal” is inconsequential because for all practical purposes in the absence of Sharif’s consent, the Saudi involvement amounted to interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Incidentally, the “deal” that provided the pretext for the Saudi interference has no place in the eyes of law because, being a unilateral undertaking, it fails to fulfil the essential condition of an agreement. Nor can international law take cognisance of it because, being at best an agreement between a state and a private citizen, it lacks international character. It can at the most be described as a “gentleman’s agreement” with an undoubted moral value but unenforceable under law.
There is another dimension to the Sharif affair that made critics subject the desert kingdom to criticism. It relates to Saudi violation of the order of the Pakistan Supreme Court that had asked the Pakistan government not to prevent Sharif from returning to Pakistan because it was an inalienable right that could not be contracted away. The Musharraf government shamelessly violated the SC order by abducting and deporting Sharif. The Saudis became an accomplice in this disgraceful transgression when their intelligence chief refused to accept the SC judgment and urged Sharif not to come to Pakistan, in addition to the Saudi king’s reported letter to the Pakistan government asking for Sharif’s return. The way the Saudis conducted themselves showed that they looked upon Pakistan as their fiefdom.
Why did the Saudis, who are worldly wise and discreet in their dealings, undertake a mission that was utterly impervious to the sensitivities of Pakistanis? The Saudi apologists explain it in terms of the place that a given word has in the Saudi tribal setup and their desire to see to it that the “deal” they had struck with Sharif was implemented in letter and spirit. It is true that a given word is sacrosanct in Saudi society but the argument applies to Saudi subjects and cannot be stretched to cover recalcitrant foreigners such as Sharif. The Saudis are clever enough to know this fact yet they ignored it, which signifies that the argument based on the sanctity of a given word does not hold and we need to look elsewhere for an adequate answer.
The Saudi intelligence chief provided the answer to this conundrum during his Islamabad press conference when he justified Sharif’s staying in exile for the sake of the “stability” of Pakistan. Now what is the meaning of this cryptic remark? Its significance becomes clear when we view the whole episode in the context of the existential struggle in which Pakistan is at present engaged. The country is threatened by forces of extremism that are increasingly gaining ground and if not checked now could overwhelm it. If that happens, it would be an unmitigated disaster not only for a nuclear Pakistan but also for the region and the world at large. The House of Saud, already under attack from Al Qaeda that is bent on its elimination, seems to share this threat as testified by its use of the Imam of Kaaba as a trouble-shooter during the Lal Masjid crisis.
The “stability” argument has an American dimension that needs to be kept in mind. The Bush Administration, paranoid about the “terror”, wants the continuation in power of President Musharraf who, in its reckoning, is the best man to deal with the extremist threat in Pakistan. Additionally, it wants moderate forces, particularly Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party, to lend a helping hand in this battle. Sharif does not figure in the script because in the American eyes, his credentials are suspect. The Bush Administration, therefore, views his presence in Pakistan as a stumbling block in achieving the desired goal. Since the Saudi and American DNA in the matter apparently matches, the House of Saud decided to play an overt and proactive role in Sharif’s deportation.
The Nawaz Sharif affair raises the critical question of the wisdom of letting foreign powers get involved in our domestic affairs. Some analysts condone the Saudi interference on the ground of their “generosity” towards us at critical junctures in our history. Now it is true that Saudis have been “generous” to us for which we should be grateful to them. However, it does not mean that this traffic is one-way and that we have nothing to offer in return. The fact is that Pakistan offers a lot in return. For example, the House of Saud knows that in case of an existential threat to it or Saudi Arabia, the one country on which it can absolutely count on is Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear programme is also on the firing line because of our intimate links with Saudi Arabia, giving rise to fears in the West that we may one day transfer nuclear technology to it. Finally, the Saudi “generosity” has bought them enormous influence that has been utterly unhealthy for Pakistan.
In the end, a word about what this affair has cost the Saudis. They had heretofore enjoyed blind support from Pakistanis. However, their blatant interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs (with their intelligence chief acting like a super-cop) seems to have lowered their prestige in the public’s eyes. This is evident from the way Pakistanis, not only the liberals but also the religious right, have severely criticised the Saudi role.
Did the Saudis ever give it a thought that Sharif, who they have humiliated through their role in his deportation and who is their virtual prisoner, could one day return to power carrying a grudge against them? Did they give it a thought that their action was utterly contrary to the aspirations of the people of Pakistan? If the Saudis persist in their present behaviour, they will squander the goodwill that they have earned in Pakistan and may soon compete for the unpopularity medal with the US.
The End
The political crisis in Pakistan was the handiwork of the establishment people. Writers who have affiliation with the establishment have started propoganda against the United States and now they even wrote against the Saudi Arabia. One of the writers Ijaz Hussain in his latest essay state that Pakistanis have reacted sharply to the Saudi role in the deportation of Nawaz Sharif on September 10. For example, accusing the Saudi government of supporting “a military dictator against the wishes of 160 million Pakistanis”, the APDM warned that, it “will not tolerate Saudi interference in Pakistan’s internal matters”. It did not restrict its criticism to a mere statement and boycotted the Saudi reception held soon after. Apart from the APDM, religious scholars, khateebs and political commentators also denounced the Saudi role. The criticism during some of the TV talk shows was so scathing that the Pakistani government had to warn independent channels against airing such criticism failing which, it threatened to take action against them under the PEMRA rules. Was the criticism against Saudi Arabia justified? How do we explain the proactive role of the Saudis?
It is undeniable that Saudi Arabia is no ordinary friend of Pakistan. It has a special place for Pakistanis because of the location of Islam’s holiest places on its soil, its help at critical junctures in Pakistan’s history and for providing employment to about 1.5 million Pakistanis. The relationship between the two countries is so unique that the Pakistani government or the opposition has from time to time sought Saudi help to sort out political disputes.
This was the case in 1977 during the PNA movement against the government and then again in 2000 following Sharif’s conviction in the plane hijacking case. These examples prove that the Saudis did not involve themselves in Pakistan’s domestic politics uninvited; and that they did so at the request of the parties involved. Hence they cannot be accused of interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.
The “not guilty” verdict, however, cannot be passed against them in the case of Sharif’s deportation. This is so because as opposed to the past when all the parties in dispute were on board, in the present situation one of the parties, namely Sharif, was not consenting. The argument that the Saudis had a locus standi in the case by virtue of the “deal” is inconsequential because for all practical purposes in the absence of Sharif’s consent, the Saudi involvement amounted to interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Incidentally, the “deal” that provided the pretext for the Saudi interference has no place in the eyes of law because, being a unilateral undertaking, it fails to fulfil the essential condition of an agreement. Nor can international law take cognisance of it because, being at best an agreement between a state and a private citizen, it lacks international character. It can at the most be described as a “gentleman’s agreement” with an undoubted moral value but unenforceable under law.
There is another dimension to the Sharif affair that made critics subject the desert kingdom to criticism. It relates to Saudi violation of the order of the Pakistan Supreme Court that had asked the Pakistan government not to prevent Sharif from returning to Pakistan because it was an inalienable right that could not be contracted away. The Musharraf government shamelessly violated the SC order by abducting and deporting Sharif. The Saudis became an accomplice in this disgraceful transgression when their intelligence chief refused to accept the SC judgment and urged Sharif not to come to Pakistan, in addition to the Saudi king’s reported letter to the Pakistan government asking for Sharif’s return. The way the Saudis conducted themselves showed that they looked upon Pakistan as their fiefdom.
Why did the Saudis, who are worldly wise and discreet in their dealings, undertake a mission that was utterly impervious to the sensitivities of Pakistanis? The Saudi apologists explain it in terms of the place that a given word has in the Saudi tribal setup and their desire to see to it that the “deal” they had struck with Sharif was implemented in letter and spirit. It is true that a given word is sacrosanct in Saudi society but the argument applies to Saudi subjects and cannot be stretched to cover recalcitrant foreigners such as Sharif. The Saudis are clever enough to know this fact yet they ignored it, which signifies that the argument based on the sanctity of a given word does not hold and we need to look elsewhere for an adequate answer.
The Saudi intelligence chief provided the answer to this conundrum during his Islamabad press conference when he justified Sharif’s staying in exile for the sake of the “stability” of Pakistan. Now what is the meaning of this cryptic remark? Its significance becomes clear when we view the whole episode in the context of the existential struggle in which Pakistan is at present engaged. The country is threatened by forces of extremism that are increasingly gaining ground and if not checked now could overwhelm it. If that happens, it would be an unmitigated disaster not only for a nuclear Pakistan but also for the region and the world at large. The House of Saud, already under attack from Al Qaeda that is bent on its elimination, seems to share this threat as testified by its use of the Imam of Kaaba as a trouble-shooter during the Lal Masjid crisis.
The “stability” argument has an American dimension that needs to be kept in mind. The Bush Administration, paranoid about the “terror”, wants the continuation in power of President Musharraf who, in its reckoning, is the best man to deal with the extremist threat in Pakistan. Additionally, it wants moderate forces, particularly Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party, to lend a helping hand in this battle. Sharif does not figure in the script because in the American eyes, his credentials are suspect. The Bush Administration, therefore, views his presence in Pakistan as a stumbling block in achieving the desired goal. Since the Saudi and American DNA in the matter apparently matches, the House of Saud decided to play an overt and proactive role in Sharif’s deportation.
The Nawaz Sharif affair raises the critical question of the wisdom of letting foreign powers get involved in our domestic affairs. Some analysts condone the Saudi interference on the ground of their “generosity” towards us at critical junctures in our history. Now it is true that Saudis have been “generous” to us for which we should be grateful to them. However, it does not mean that this traffic is one-way and that we have nothing to offer in return. The fact is that Pakistan offers a lot in return. For example, the House of Saud knows that in case of an existential threat to it or Saudi Arabia, the one country on which it can absolutely count on is Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear programme is also on the firing line because of our intimate links with Saudi Arabia, giving rise to fears in the West that we may one day transfer nuclear technology to it. Finally, the Saudi “generosity” has bought them enormous influence that has been utterly unhealthy for Pakistan.
In the end, a word about what this affair has cost the Saudis. They had heretofore enjoyed blind support from Pakistanis. However, their blatant interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs (with their intelligence chief acting like a super-cop) seems to have lowered their prestige in the public’s eyes. This is evident from the way Pakistanis, not only the liberals but also the religious right, have severely criticised the Saudi role.
Did the Saudis ever give it a thought that Sharif, who they have humiliated through their role in his deportation and who is their virtual prisoner, could one day return to power carrying a grudge against them? Did they give it a thought that their action was utterly contrary to the aspirations of the people of Pakistan? If the Saudis persist in their present behaviour, they will squander the goodwill that they have earned in Pakistan and may soon compete for the unpopularity medal with the US.
The End
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