Border Security: Feds to Increase Safeguards Against Visa Fraud
Jim Kouri, CPP
November 12, 2005
Issuing a United States visa to a foreign citizen in exchange for money or something of value is a crime that can facilitate entry into the United States of unqualified persons, including those who may wish to do our country harm.
According to Immigration officials, internal controls make it difficult for an employee to commit visa-related crimes without being detected, but despite these safeguards, visa malfeasance does occur.
The US Department of State has a set of internal controls to prevent visa-related crimes and has taken actions to improve them; however, these internal controls are not being fully and consistently implemented by the posts we visited.
While the State Department's controls are consistent with accepted standards, analysts with the US General Accounting Office found noncompliance with required supervisory oversight at 6 of the 11 posts they visited. This included failure to inventory items used to issue visas, review visa decisions, and follow State's procedures when issuing visas for applicants referred by officers within the post. Lack of full compliance with internal controls increases vulnerability to visa malfeasance.
The State Department recently established two headquarters operations in order to monitor visa activities. While stronger oversight should help strengthen compliance with internal controls, the State Department has not developed automated software to sort and analyze abnormalities in visa issuances that could indicate potential malfeasance.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security substantiated 28 visa malfeasance cases between 2001 and 2004 involving US employees. The suspects were fired, chose to resign, or were arrested. State investigators could not tell analysts how many opened cases were referred to the US Justice Department for possible prosecution because they had not been routinely collecting that information. In fact, their case records did not permit investigators to identify malfeasance trends or consular managers to identify internal control weaknesses needing attention.
The Justice Department's Public Integrity Section successfully prosecuted 10 US government employees. State Diplomatic Security and Justice officials noted that their investigations and prosecutions were impeded by constraints on evidence gathering. Additionally, investigators can not obtain US search warrants to search consular officer's offices or residences overseas. Both the Justice and State Departments are discussing the possibility of pursuing legal changes and other means to address these constraints.
Sources: US Department of State, US Department of Justice, US General Accounting Office, National Security Institute
According to Immigration officials, internal controls make it difficult for an employee to commit visa-related crimes without being detected, but despite these safeguards, visa malfeasance does occur.
The US Department of State has a set of internal controls to prevent visa-related crimes and has taken actions to improve them; however, these internal controls are not being fully and consistently implemented by the posts we visited.
While the State Department's controls are consistent with accepted standards, analysts with the US General Accounting Office found noncompliance with required supervisory oversight at 6 of the 11 posts they visited. This included failure to inventory items used to issue visas, review visa decisions, and follow State's procedures when issuing visas for applicants referred by officers within the post. Lack of full compliance with internal controls increases vulnerability to visa malfeasance.
The State Department recently established two headquarters operations in order to monitor visa activities. While stronger oversight should help strengthen compliance with internal controls, the State Department has not developed automated software to sort and analyze abnormalities in visa issuances that could indicate potential malfeasance.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security substantiated 28 visa malfeasance cases between 2001 and 2004 involving US employees. The suspects were fired, chose to resign, or were arrested. State investigators could not tell analysts how many opened cases were referred to the US Justice Department for possible prosecution because they had not been routinely collecting that information. In fact, their case records did not permit investigators to identify malfeasance trends or consular managers to identify internal control weaknesses needing attention.
The Justice Department's Public Integrity Section successfully prosecuted 10 US government employees. State Diplomatic Security and Justice officials noted that their investigations and prosecutions were impeded by constraints on evidence gathering. Additionally, investigators can not obtain US search warrants to search consular officer's offices or residences overseas. Both the Justice and State Departments are discussing the possibility of pursuing legal changes and other means to address these constraints.
Sources: US Department of State, US Department of Justice, US General Accounting Office, National Security Institute
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