The Future of the Arabian Peninsula
Bill Webb
August 30, 2007
It is difficult to believe that the intelligence professionals who put together the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) would threaten their careers by pandering to the desires of an administration with only 18 months to live -- and virtually certain to be replaced by a more liberal one. It is probably safe to assume that the NIE is, in fact, the best information that the combined intelligence services could come up with to describe the situation in Iraq.
In essence, that estimate is that four years of combat have failed to achieve useful strategic goals in Iraq: the creation of a stable society governed by a competent body favorable toward the United States. The NIE states that the current government has next to no chance of success, that the country is unlikely to stabilize without a period of serious internal strife, and that the levels of violence against our troops are unlikely to change as long as we occupy urban areas of the country where insurgents can operate with impunity.
The three options left are (1) continuing as we have been, (2) a phased withdrawal, or (3) immediate and complete withdrawal, as advocated by a few on the left of the American political spectrum -- three to six months, depending on how much equipment we would be willing to leave on the ground in Iraq.
These are all impractical.
Allowing our current operations across Mesopotamia to continue would be utter folly. We cannot achieve, with a military that is stretched to its limits, goals that could not be attained when it was fresh. We would continue to sustain casualties, continue to maintain a troop commitment that we cannot afford, and to pour huge quantities of money, material and manpower into the black hole of an obviously fruitless effort.
Further, continued combat commitments in Iraq would prevent our rebuilding our military into anything approaching its pre-war capability, barring a draft and further huge expenditures. They have already severely limited our range of responses to problems elsewhere that might require the projection of military power. We are witnessing reactions to that weakness: the muscle-flexing of the Russian bear the most obvious example. Putin knows that Russia will never become a power to seriously threaten US interests over the long term, but he sees and is taking advantage of the opportunity to do some local housecleaning and alliance-making that will serve Russia's own interests well in the long run.
Staying the course is out of the question.
A phased withdrawal would be the worst possible scenario. The troops left in Iraq would be required to carry out essentially the same mission with fewer resources. Nothing would be achieved beyond the present point, and we would pay a substantial price in lives. The Iraqi army and police forces would rapidly become even more the direct arms of the various conflicting factions then they are already. Iranian influence, through political pressure and infiltration, would increase. Nothing substantive would be gained strategically. The US domestic political price would be enormous.
Immediate withdrawal, by first ceasing combat operations, then moving to less-populated, less hostile areas preparatory to a massive removal of equipment and personnel would seem to be the least problematic of the three scenarios, but in terms of US interests in the Arabian Peninsula it could be the worst. Iran could (and would) immediately step into the power vacuum in Iraq. While it would be resisted to a degree, its eventual success at hegemony would be inevitable. The combined regional forces could not seriously threaten Iran's powerful army, and the Iranian people remember well Saddam's predations. They remember that a million unavenged Iranians were killed by Iraqis, and they would most likely view a takeover as a reasonable and inevitable continuation of the previous war.
The handover of regional influence to Iran would place them in a position that would allow them to threaten Saudi Arabia, and over time gain political -- if not physical -- control of a majority of the world's energy supplies. As the consumer of far more energy than it can itself produce, the United States cannot and will not allow that to happen.
Strategic imperatives in the Peninsula have changed. They are no longer about setting up a US Puppet government in Iraq. Because of our destabilization of the region, the issue is now whether Iran or the United States will be the dominant power in that portion of the world for the foreseeable future.
There is a fourth option, and it is the one that I believe we can expect to see played out: withdrawal of US forces to either bases in virtually unpopulated southwest Iraq, or to Kuwait, and maintenance of a large, permanent force in the region.
Removing our troops from the war zone would reduce expenses, improve the political climate at home, and allow rebuilding the armed forces to a level of strategic effectiveness. Troops could be deployed to the Persian Gulf region in reasonable rotations, instead of the cruel regime of present deployments. Reserves could be taken off the line and returned to their lives and their families -- whatever is left of either.
Navy and Air Force assets in the Gulf region would stabilize the situation further. The Persians are not bad people, and the rank and file maintain positive impressions of the American people even today. A working relationship with Iran itself might well develop after the dust settles and their expansionist ambitions are thwarted, but most importantly for long-term purposes, deployment to the theater would become a routine posting, rather than an exercise in terror.
The presence of a large, capable, well-equipped and ready US peacetime force in the region, while it would not prevent the subornation of Iraq to Persian interests, would guarantee the integrity of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and prevent Iran from extending its influence further around the region. Such a presence, with the permission and cooperation of the countries involved, would greatly lessen the potential for insurgent strikes against our troops. Our forces could, for the most part, be properly secured in safe areas until needed elsewhere.
Look for this to be the eventual resolution, when more competent hands guide the ship of state.
In essence, that estimate is that four years of combat have failed to achieve useful strategic goals in Iraq: the creation of a stable society governed by a competent body favorable toward the United States. The NIE states that the current government has next to no chance of success, that the country is unlikely to stabilize without a period of serious internal strife, and that the levels of violence against our troops are unlikely to change as long as we occupy urban areas of the country where insurgents can operate with impunity.
The three options left are (1) continuing as we have been, (2) a phased withdrawal, or (3) immediate and complete withdrawal, as advocated by a few on the left of the American political spectrum -- three to six months, depending on how much equipment we would be willing to leave on the ground in Iraq.
These are all impractical.
Allowing our current operations across Mesopotamia to continue would be utter folly. We cannot achieve, with a military that is stretched to its limits, goals that could not be attained when it was fresh. We would continue to sustain casualties, continue to maintain a troop commitment that we cannot afford, and to pour huge quantities of money, material and manpower into the black hole of an obviously fruitless effort.
Further, continued combat commitments in Iraq would prevent our rebuilding our military into anything approaching its pre-war capability, barring a draft and further huge expenditures. They have already severely limited our range of responses to problems elsewhere that might require the projection of military power. We are witnessing reactions to that weakness: the muscle-flexing of the Russian bear the most obvious example. Putin knows that Russia will never become a power to seriously threaten US interests over the long term, but he sees and is taking advantage of the opportunity to do some local housecleaning and alliance-making that will serve Russia's own interests well in the long run.
Staying the course is out of the question.
A phased withdrawal would be the worst possible scenario. The troops left in Iraq would be required to carry out essentially the same mission with fewer resources. Nothing would be achieved beyond the present point, and we would pay a substantial price in lives. The Iraqi army and police forces would rapidly become even more the direct arms of the various conflicting factions then they are already. Iranian influence, through political pressure and infiltration, would increase. Nothing substantive would be gained strategically. The US domestic political price would be enormous.
Immediate withdrawal, by first ceasing combat operations, then moving to less-populated, less hostile areas preparatory to a massive removal of equipment and personnel would seem to be the least problematic of the three scenarios, but in terms of US interests in the Arabian Peninsula it could be the worst. Iran could (and would) immediately step into the power vacuum in Iraq. While it would be resisted to a degree, its eventual success at hegemony would be inevitable. The combined regional forces could not seriously threaten Iran's powerful army, and the Iranian people remember well Saddam's predations. They remember that a million unavenged Iranians were killed by Iraqis, and they would most likely view a takeover as a reasonable and inevitable continuation of the previous war.
The handover of regional influence to Iran would place them in a position that would allow them to threaten Saudi Arabia, and over time gain political -- if not physical -- control of a majority of the world's energy supplies. As the consumer of far more energy than it can itself produce, the United States cannot and will not allow that to happen.
Strategic imperatives in the Peninsula have changed. They are no longer about setting up a US Puppet government in Iraq. Because of our destabilization of the region, the issue is now whether Iran or the United States will be the dominant power in that portion of the world for the foreseeable future.
There is a fourth option, and it is the one that I believe we can expect to see played out: withdrawal of US forces to either bases in virtually unpopulated southwest Iraq, or to Kuwait, and maintenance of a large, permanent force in the region.
Removing our troops from the war zone would reduce expenses, improve the political climate at home, and allow rebuilding the armed forces to a level of strategic effectiveness. Troops could be deployed to the Persian Gulf region in reasonable rotations, instead of the cruel regime of present deployments. Reserves could be taken off the line and returned to their lives and their families -- whatever is left of either.
Navy and Air Force assets in the Gulf region would stabilize the situation further. The Persians are not bad people, and the rank and file maintain positive impressions of the American people even today. A working relationship with Iran itself might well develop after the dust settles and their expansionist ambitions are thwarted, but most importantly for long-term purposes, deployment to the theater would become a routine posting, rather than an exercise in terror.
The presence of a large, capable, well-equipped and ready US peacetime force in the region, while it would not prevent the subornation of Iraq to Persian interests, would guarantee the integrity of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and prevent Iran from extending its influence further around the region. Such a presence, with the permission and cooperation of the countries involved, would greatly lessen the potential for insurgent strikes against our troops. Our forces could, for the most part, be properly secured in safe areas until needed elsewhere.
Look for this to be the eventual resolution, when more competent hands guide the ship of state.
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