German elections and the EU crisis

Germany is facing one of the most serious political crises in the post-Cold War era. The political stalemate and the dilemmas it represents, reflects the actual situation in the European Union and the hard choices to be made.

Angela Merkel’s expected landslide victory turned out to be a frustration for herself and her Christian Democratic Party. Her substantial lead in the pre-elections period was consumed by a number of factors that illustrated that G. Schroder is a die-hard political figure.

The reasons for this electoral result may be approached in different ways, however, a number of issues should be stressed. First, Angela Merkel did not persuade the elec-torate. The debates on TV directly or indirectly enhanced the profile of Mr. Schroder, who survived his inconsistencies and broken promises. The five million unemployed in Germany and his inability to proceed with socially costly reforms turned out to be an asset to him and his Social Democratic Party.

On the contrary, Mrs. Merkel’s program proved rather too radical for the German electorate. Practically A. Merkel “violated” a basic rule for political survival. She was too clear in a number of issues. Demagogues suggest that if you wish to go ahead you should never say what you mean to do. This is a basic rule to fail in an electorate campaign amidst an economic crisis, when difficult decisions are to be made and a mistake for which A. Merkel paid a price. She appeared too realistic for an electorate that desperately needed hope for immediate economic recovery. She was thrifty in promises and this is something electorates do not really appreciate. When this mes-sage was conveyed she made a final attempt to be more vague but it was already too late.

Both candidates spoke of the need for reform, a process that reflects the actual di-lemmas of the European Union edifice. Neoliberals and the UK focus their efforts on labor market deregulation, under-employment, welfare and a number of issues that constitute the very essence of the European social world. These are threatened by the current world oil crisis and the low development in Europe.

Germany has long been considered the motor of European economy and this motor seemed to be running out of political gas and economic steam. The country failed to turned the new EU members states from Central and eastern Europe into its strategic zone of influence and find assistance in an effort to enhance the process of political integration. On the contrary, its “near abroad” rushed to cash the economic benefits of EU accession and at the same time support President Bush and his policy in Iraq.

G. Shroder’s come back may be considered a miraculous recovery, but it should be analyzed through certain issues that influenced public opinion. First, the Chancellor’s most powerful weapon was his opposition to the war in Iraq and his policy of non-engagement. His bad relation to President Bush proved to be a catalyst for many vot-ers who appreciated did policy and critical stance towards American foreign policy. Practically the issue partly overlaid the problem of job cuts. Second, G. Shroder’s rhetoric had made a turn to the left already from April focusing on class struggle is-sues and uncontrollable capitalism that threatened workers’ rights and social welfare benefits. The Chancellor became a symbol to all those who rejected the British concept of European integration, its neo-liberal elements and its pro-atlanticist policy. There seems to be a chaotic distance between the non-continental UK and the several continental member states as far as strategy, ideology and operational orientation of the EU is concerned.

On the other hand, A. Merkel’s pro-atlanticist feelings were not appreciated by the electorate that rejected almost aphoristically American involvement in Iraq. That was stressed emphatically by her opponent, who underpinned that Germany did not send troops to Iraq. At the same time public opinion feared that Merkel’s reform project was closer to what the British have suggested after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands. Analysts suggested that Tony Blair could find valuable support in his pro-atlanticist strategy and neo-liberal policies in Merkel’s grand strategy for Europe. This explains the bad feelings in London about Merkel’s failure to politically eliminate G. Shroder. The fundamental thorn between Blair and Merkel’s policies concerned Turkey’s EU accession, as Merkel did not support An-kara’s dream for full membership.

Small parties may be considered the actual winners of the elections and those that will define the ruling coalition. However, the political stalemate and the insistence of both Merkel and Shroder to be nominated Chancellors illustrate the political crisis Germany is facing. In its turn, a crisis in Germany constitutes a crisis for the EU itself. It illustrates the crucial point the EU as a whole and Germany as its fundamental unit have reached and demands clarification of the strategy to be adopted.

Germany is as politically weak as the EU itself and this is manifested in the political stagnation after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the German elections and the orientation of the current British presidency that sets questionable goals as far as acceptance by continental European electorates are concerned.