Europe, the US and Russia
Dr. George Voskopoulos
March 15, 2007
Russia's policy in the post-Cold War era has become Europe-oriented, showing that co-operation with the EU has become a strategic priority for Moscow. Under this spectrum Russia may not be considered a threat to the US and the EU, unless stra-tegic isolation turns it into a smuggler of nuclear know-how and material. In this case Russia will be totally isolated not only from the US but also from western Europe, whose security depends heavily on Moscow's strategic orientation and energy policy.
A policy that may lead to Russia's isolation will not be welcome by EU states that have enhanced their relations with Moscow. Russia consists not only the main pa-rameter of European security but also a strategic trade and energy partner for the EU, a fact pinpointed ever since the 10th EU-Russian Summit that took place in No-vember 2002. Eventually an American policy that threatens the stability and security of Russia and affects the energy security of Europe is bound to become a source of incompatibility between the EU and the US.
The US are facing a strategic dilemma that is ensure regular flow of oil to its Western European partners and acknowledge in substance the emerging importance of Rus-sia as an energy supplier to Western European allies. The decision will influence U.S. and Western European energy security as well as Russia's global role. More-over, it will affect the EU's co-operative mode when it comes to support American policies, since Russia matters to Western Europeans a lot more than it does to the Americans. Thus, American strategic choices bear crucial implications for the bal-ance and degree of co-operation amongst the EU, the US and Russia.
Russia and its role in world and European politics may become an additional point of divergence between the US and the EU, particularly after the EU-Russian rap-prochement of the last years. The strategic interaction amongst the US, the EU and Russia and the asymmetric importance of Russia vis-à-vis the EU and the US, in terms of energy security, imposes, in the long-term, the adoption of policies that take into account European considerations. It is in the American interest not to allow Rus-sia to become the cause of a rift between Washington and Brussels.
Post-Cold War American policy towards Russia has been wise and careful not to iso-late Russia. It was introduced in the late 1980s with President Bush’s strategic deci-sion not to treat the defeated superpower and its most powerful successor, Russia, as a de facto failed opponent. This led to the expression of intense criticism concern-ing Russia's involvement in American strategic planning. Robert Hutchings sug-gested that, "in our zeal to avert Russia's exclusion from the emerging international order, we allowed the Russian agenda to dictate our own and put ourselves in the position of trying to compensate Russia for lost influence".
The Clinton administration adopted a constructive policy and approached Russia al-though Moscow found itself in a practical power vacuum due to the inability of Boris Yeltsin to govern the country. President Clinton elevated "Russia's internal transfor-mation to first place in American global agenda". American strategy during the G. Bush and B. Clinton administrations illustrated a degree of continuity for support to-wards Russia, a fact hat undeniably assisted Moscow in finding a new constructive role in world politics. That was a prudent policy on the part of the winning alliance to-wards a former foe that could be most helpful if it became a future ally. America's European partners supported the policy of integrating Russia into European institu-tions, although they acknowledged deficiencies in the human rights field and democ-ratic operation of the Russian political system. This "flexibility" was based on the need not to isolate Moscow and turn it into a potential or actual threat to European energy security.
In the recent past the debate focused on whether Russia's constructive involvement should be a matter of "inviting" or "integrating" Moscow into a new world order. "Inte-grating" is a task outside American capacity and responsibility as it is related to do-mestic parameters and the operational framework of the neophyte Russian democ-racy. Yet, "inviting" appears to be not only within America's capabilities but should also be its strategic goal. The aforementioned goal overlaps with the need to support the stability of Europe, which has always been a vital American interest, nowadays related to EU-Russian rapprochement and the need to lay the foundations of a wider antiterrorist alliance or the more idealist suggestion of G. Bush in the 1990s for the establishment of a "consensual international system". Russia's future is a matter of strategic speculation but American grand strategy could provide carrots to turn this speculation into a rational choice and anticipation.
For the US, building selective strategic partnerships may be realistic and might pro-vide "the most fruitful guide to American policy", since concerted action will be an ex-pression of respect for other sovereign states and their legal rights. Political Realists would tend to support a policy that would allow the US to prolong a unilateral world at any cost. Yet, the qualitative framework of EU-Russian strengthened relations might alienate further US-EU relations.
A policy that may lead to Russia's isolation will not be welcome by EU states that have enhanced their relations with Moscow. Russia consists not only the main pa-rameter of European security but also a strategic trade and energy partner for the EU, a fact pinpointed ever since the 10th EU-Russian Summit that took place in No-vember 2002. Eventually an American policy that threatens the stability and security of Russia and affects the energy security of Europe is bound to become a source of incompatibility between the EU and the US.
The US are facing a strategic dilemma that is ensure regular flow of oil to its Western European partners and acknowledge in substance the emerging importance of Rus-sia as an energy supplier to Western European allies. The decision will influence U.S. and Western European energy security as well as Russia's global role. More-over, it will affect the EU's co-operative mode when it comes to support American policies, since Russia matters to Western Europeans a lot more than it does to the Americans. Thus, American strategic choices bear crucial implications for the bal-ance and degree of co-operation amongst the EU, the US and Russia.
Russia and its role in world and European politics may become an additional point of divergence between the US and the EU, particularly after the EU-Russian rap-prochement of the last years. The strategic interaction amongst the US, the EU and Russia and the asymmetric importance of Russia vis-à-vis the EU and the US, in terms of energy security, imposes, in the long-term, the adoption of policies that take into account European considerations. It is in the American interest not to allow Rus-sia to become the cause of a rift between Washington and Brussels.
Post-Cold War American policy towards Russia has been wise and careful not to iso-late Russia. It was introduced in the late 1980s with President Bush’s strategic deci-sion not to treat the defeated superpower and its most powerful successor, Russia, as a de facto failed opponent. This led to the expression of intense criticism concern-ing Russia's involvement in American strategic planning. Robert Hutchings sug-gested that, "in our zeal to avert Russia's exclusion from the emerging international order, we allowed the Russian agenda to dictate our own and put ourselves in the position of trying to compensate Russia for lost influence".
The Clinton administration adopted a constructive policy and approached Russia al-though Moscow found itself in a practical power vacuum due to the inability of Boris Yeltsin to govern the country. President Clinton elevated "Russia's internal transfor-mation to first place in American global agenda". American strategy during the G. Bush and B. Clinton administrations illustrated a degree of continuity for support to-wards Russia, a fact hat undeniably assisted Moscow in finding a new constructive role in world politics. That was a prudent policy on the part of the winning alliance to-wards a former foe that could be most helpful if it became a future ally. America's European partners supported the policy of integrating Russia into European institu-tions, although they acknowledged deficiencies in the human rights field and democ-ratic operation of the Russian political system. This "flexibility" was based on the need not to isolate Moscow and turn it into a potential or actual threat to European energy security.
In the recent past the debate focused on whether Russia's constructive involvement should be a matter of "inviting" or "integrating" Moscow into a new world order. "Inte-grating" is a task outside American capacity and responsibility as it is related to do-mestic parameters and the operational framework of the neophyte Russian democ-racy. Yet, "inviting" appears to be not only within America's capabilities but should also be its strategic goal. The aforementioned goal overlaps with the need to support the stability of Europe, which has always been a vital American interest, nowadays related to EU-Russian rapprochement and the need to lay the foundations of a wider antiterrorist alliance or the more idealist suggestion of G. Bush in the 1990s for the establishment of a "consensual international system". Russia's future is a matter of strategic speculation but American grand strategy could provide carrots to turn this speculation into a rational choice and anticipation.
For the US, building selective strategic partnerships may be realistic and might pro-vide "the most fruitful guide to American policy", since concerted action will be an ex-pression of respect for other sovereign states and their legal rights. Political Realists would tend to support a policy that would allow the US to prolong a unilateral world at any cost. Yet, the qualitative framework of EU-Russian strengthened relations might alienate further US-EU relations.
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