The European and American approaches to the United Nations
Dr. George Voskopoulos
March 03, 2007
The European response to international security may be epitomized under the rubrique of “An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism” introduced with the 2003 European Security Strategy. It stresses the commitment of the European liberal democracies “to upholding and developing International Law” and emphatically states that, “the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively is a European priority”.
In terms of strategic orientation the above set the EU at a divergent course from that of the U.S. Current American policy was pre-announced by Paul Wolfowitz with his 1994 article in Foreign Affairs when acting, when necessary, outside the UN framework was estimated as a means of accommodating American national interests. As he emphatically pointed out, “lead-ership cannot be exercised simply by going and asking other countries for their views”. In essence, the statement refers to a new strategy based on unilateral action. According to P. Wolfowitz “multilateralism emphasizes not alliances but much looser groupings, which nec-essarily must include countries that do not share close common interests, particularly at the global level of the United Nations. For its advocates such a broadly indiscriminate grouping both avoids the exclusivity of alliance-like relationships and forces the U.S. to pursue com-mon international interests rather than presumably narrow national ones”.
By contrast, the EU has focused its strategy on the UN regulatory system and multilateralism. In December 2003, in the EU Council of General Affairs it was stated that, “the Council reaffirms the deeply rooted commitment of the European Union to make effective multilateralism a central element of its external action, with at its heart a strong UN, as also reflected in the current work related to the European Security Strategy. The EU is firmly determined to play a major role within the UN system in line with its objective to develop a stronger international community, well functioning international institutions and international relations based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU reaffirms its intention to actively contribute to the ongoing UN comprehensive reform process. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN bodies, policies and processes is a priority for the EU”.
To the same direction pointed the European Commission’s Communication on “The Euro-pean Union and the United Nations: the Choice of Multilateralism” which “represents an im-portant contribution for further developing the EU role in the UN and to strengthen its sup-port for the UN”. It is stressed that, “in order to help the multilateral system to deliver on its core objectives, the Council reaffirms the EU’s will to improve co-operation with the UN in areas where its contribution may have a significant added value to UN activities”.
Both the EU and the U.S. support the UN reform process but it is rather unclear whether they set compatible goals. They both acknowledge a role for the UN in the post-Cold War, post-September 11 international system, but this does not imply setting the same priorities or simi-lar operational modes. Above all the two transatlantic partners refer to an operational frame-work based on enhanced or limited power and regulatory capacity. The U.S. appears not to wish to reform the UN in a way that constitutes a multilateral and institutional restraint on its policies.
An American unilateral policy is not realistically sustainable within a framework that provides the UN with all the required institutional tools to coordinate and streamline the response of international community to global issues. Paul Wolfowitz was explicit on the way perceived national interests may be best materialized. In his opinion, “…choice is sometimes necessary…choosing sides inevitably means reducing the number of countries cooperating with the U.S. and perhaps means encountering opposition. America cannot have it both ways; it cannot achieve substantial foreign policy aims, militarily or otherwise, if those aims must be limited to the shared interests of the most general of all international assemblies”.
Unless the U.S. formulates a different strategic concept and operational strategy towards global governance issues, the UN cannot operate as the cornerstone of multilateral action. Practically this role is not acknowledged to the UN by the current Republican administration. According to John Bolton, “the UN has arisen, fallen, risen, and fallen again in our esteem, all in just 51 years, and especially in the last 11. The UN was an admirable concept when conceived; it has served our purposes from time to time; and it is worth keeping alive for fu-ture service. But it is not worth the sacrifice of American troops, American freedom of action, or American national interests. The real question for the future is whether we will know how to keep our priorities straight. Above all, let us be realistic about the United Nations. It can be a useful tool in the American foreign policy kit. The UN should be used when and where we choose to use it to advance American national interests, not to validate academic theories and abstract models. But the UN is only a tool, not a theology. It is one of several options we have, and it is certainly not invariably the most important one”. The above illustrate how the EU and the U.S. look at the issue of international legitimacy when it comes to acting on the international level. Although the EU has built its strategy on the UN system, the U.S. has cho-sen “multilateralism a la carte”.
The process of European integration has been built within an institution-building framework, while glorifying the use of international institutions such as the UN. Actually this has been the institutional and operational compass of the EU treaties, although it may be assumed that this choice resulted from the limited power projection capacity of the Europeans in other fields. In the Treaty on European Union it is emphatically stressed that the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU shall be “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the princi-ples of the United Nations Charter”. Emphasis on the UN role has been put not only on Trea-ties but also on a number of official documents and Presidency Conclusions, particularly in the case of Iraq. In October 2003 it was stated that, “the European Council confirms the EU determination and commitment to play a significant role in the political and economic recon-struction of Iraq within the framework of the relevant UNSC resolutions”.
Multilateralism appears to have been the most stunning and defining feature of the EU – U.S. divide and should be scrutinized by both partners within a cost-gain ratio spectrum.
In terms of strategic orientation the above set the EU at a divergent course from that of the U.S. Current American policy was pre-announced by Paul Wolfowitz with his 1994 article in Foreign Affairs when acting, when necessary, outside the UN framework was estimated as a means of accommodating American national interests. As he emphatically pointed out, “lead-ership cannot be exercised simply by going and asking other countries for their views”. In essence, the statement refers to a new strategy based on unilateral action. According to P. Wolfowitz “multilateralism emphasizes not alliances but much looser groupings, which nec-essarily must include countries that do not share close common interests, particularly at the global level of the United Nations. For its advocates such a broadly indiscriminate grouping both avoids the exclusivity of alliance-like relationships and forces the U.S. to pursue com-mon international interests rather than presumably narrow national ones”.
By contrast, the EU has focused its strategy on the UN regulatory system and multilateralism. In December 2003, in the EU Council of General Affairs it was stated that, “the Council reaffirms the deeply rooted commitment of the European Union to make effective multilateralism a central element of its external action, with at its heart a strong UN, as also reflected in the current work related to the European Security Strategy. The EU is firmly determined to play a major role within the UN system in line with its objective to develop a stronger international community, well functioning international institutions and international relations based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU reaffirms its intention to actively contribute to the ongoing UN comprehensive reform process. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN bodies, policies and processes is a priority for the EU”.
To the same direction pointed the European Commission’s Communication on “The Euro-pean Union and the United Nations: the Choice of Multilateralism” which “represents an im-portant contribution for further developing the EU role in the UN and to strengthen its sup-port for the UN”. It is stressed that, “in order to help the multilateral system to deliver on its core objectives, the Council reaffirms the EU’s will to improve co-operation with the UN in areas where its contribution may have a significant added value to UN activities”.
Both the EU and the U.S. support the UN reform process but it is rather unclear whether they set compatible goals. They both acknowledge a role for the UN in the post-Cold War, post-September 11 international system, but this does not imply setting the same priorities or simi-lar operational modes. Above all the two transatlantic partners refer to an operational frame-work based on enhanced or limited power and regulatory capacity. The U.S. appears not to wish to reform the UN in a way that constitutes a multilateral and institutional restraint on its policies.
An American unilateral policy is not realistically sustainable within a framework that provides the UN with all the required institutional tools to coordinate and streamline the response of international community to global issues. Paul Wolfowitz was explicit on the way perceived national interests may be best materialized. In his opinion, “…choice is sometimes necessary…choosing sides inevitably means reducing the number of countries cooperating with the U.S. and perhaps means encountering opposition. America cannot have it both ways; it cannot achieve substantial foreign policy aims, militarily or otherwise, if those aims must be limited to the shared interests of the most general of all international assemblies”.
Unless the U.S. formulates a different strategic concept and operational strategy towards global governance issues, the UN cannot operate as the cornerstone of multilateral action. Practically this role is not acknowledged to the UN by the current Republican administration. According to John Bolton, “the UN has arisen, fallen, risen, and fallen again in our esteem, all in just 51 years, and especially in the last 11. The UN was an admirable concept when conceived; it has served our purposes from time to time; and it is worth keeping alive for fu-ture service. But it is not worth the sacrifice of American troops, American freedom of action, or American national interests. The real question for the future is whether we will know how to keep our priorities straight. Above all, let us be realistic about the United Nations. It can be a useful tool in the American foreign policy kit. The UN should be used when and where we choose to use it to advance American national interests, not to validate academic theories and abstract models. But the UN is only a tool, not a theology. It is one of several options we have, and it is certainly not invariably the most important one”. The above illustrate how the EU and the U.S. look at the issue of international legitimacy when it comes to acting on the international level. Although the EU has built its strategy on the UN system, the U.S. has cho-sen “multilateralism a la carte”.
The process of European integration has been built within an institution-building framework, while glorifying the use of international institutions such as the UN. Actually this has been the institutional and operational compass of the EU treaties, although it may be assumed that this choice resulted from the limited power projection capacity of the Europeans in other fields. In the Treaty on European Union it is emphatically stressed that the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU shall be “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the princi-ples of the United Nations Charter”. Emphasis on the UN role has been put not only on Trea-ties but also on a number of official documents and Presidency Conclusions, particularly in the case of Iraq. In October 2003 it was stated that, “the European Council confirms the EU determination and commitment to play a significant role in the political and economic recon-struction of Iraq within the framework of the relevant UNSC resolutions”.
Multilateralism appears to have been the most stunning and defining feature of the EU – U.S. divide and should be scrutinized by both partners within a cost-gain ratio spectrum.
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