Scholarly or Sophistry? A take on Chatham house’s “Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion”
Sophia Tesfamariam
February 06, 2007
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
Chatham House’s, Sally Healy and Martin Plaut, presented a briefing paper on the Eritrea Ethiopia conflict, titled “Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion”. The report apparently meant to looks into the challenges of conflict resolution between the two neighbors, as well as, the “undermining of the Algiers Agreement”, that formally ended the Eritrea Ethiopia border conflict.
The report is note worthy for what it contains and more importantly for what it dexterously avoids. Both the authors and the paper provide a instructive opportunity at gleaning what is considered an “expert” in the African context, as well as, what passes for “analysis” on which policies are based on, unquestioningly at times. On April 2004, The Times published an article titled “Watch out when bias is broadcast as objective truth”. It stated,
Thirty-four years ago the distinguished historian of the Middle East, Elie Kedourie, published an essay entitled The Chatham House Version. He pointed out that the conventional, consensual wisdom of the British foreign policy establishment embodied by Chatham House, which claimed to be the product of objective observation of the world, was in fact the product of a string of questionable assumptions, intellectual biases and personal prejudices.
Journalists like to believe that they are torch bearers for objectivity. But in the editorial choices that they make, the questions they ask, the words they choose, they betray a series of biases. Indeed these prejudices are all the more powerful because they pass unexamined by their holders.”
Consequently, it becomes imperative to assess whether the report by Healy and Plaut is a “product of objective observation” or if it does “betray a series of biases” that necessitate exploring. Given that “obtaining trustworthy information is an integral component of conflict resolution”, it is of paramount significance to ensure that foreign policy recommendations based on “a string of questionable assumptions, intellectual biases and personal prejudices” do not exacerbate an already difficult issue.
On Diplomacy
It must be noted that diplomacy does not take place in a vacuum. There is a context and a history that affects this milieu. It involves actors that are looking to influence and manipulate any situation to advance their interest. The diplomatic milieu in this case has a long history, with its entrenched alliances and neglect of justice, which stretches back many decades before this conflict.
The authors points out that the diplomatic milieu in which the Eritrea Ethiopia conflict operates plays a role. However, it does not explore properly the negative role it played by neglecting to honor its obligation. “Underpinning” this milieu, according to the report, is “Ethiopia’s vastly superior skill in diplomacy” - which it owes to the magnitude of its misery and its part on the “Global war on Terror”. It has attempted to use these “advantages” to “win a revision of the Commission’s ruling.” On the other hand, Eritrea prefers independence to aid dependency, cannot compete with Ethiopia’s level of misery. What’s more, “Eritrea won’t negotiate”, what was suppose to be a “final and bidding” agreement, so this represents Eritrea’s diplomatic quandary.
The report details the benefits to Ethiopia, in this setting, if it gets to reopen the Commission’s ruling. However, it sheds no light on how this diplomatic tussle fashions a win-win situation. Or what advantage there is for Eritrea if it relinquishes its legally strong position in favor of this undefined and un-definable “dialogue”? This asymmetrical diplomatic environment, a reflection of outside forces’ interests and Ethiopia’s “level of poverty”, does indeed “impede progress”. But it impedes the progress of international legality, the credibility of the international Community and system.
Is it Badme or not?
Despite the protagonists insistence that their conflict is a border issue and “central to the peace agreement was a mechanism to decide the location of the border between the two countries” for which they agreed in advance would be “final and binding” the writers doubt that the conflict is border issue or the symbolic town of Badme. Readers must be forgiven if they are perplexed by the reports’ imperviousness to the countless contradictions contained.
For instance, Ethiopian Foreign Minister bombastically declared victory when he misguidedly believed he was awarded Badme and declared the Commissions decision as the ‘prevailing of rule of law.’ Later, the same Commissions work is denounced as “a blatant miscarriage of justices”, “totally illegal, unjust and irresponsible’, because Ethiopia realized it was not awarded Badme. Undaunted by the contradictions the authors declare it was the agreement that was weak. The reasoning being: “interpretation of colonial treaties might have been an adequate method to decide on the boundary if …Eritrea had pulled out of Badme while an adjudication took place.” Leaving aside, for now, the veracity of the statement lets ask the question that desperately cries out for clarification.
If as the writers insist over and again that the conflict is not about border issues why would the “interpretation of colonial treaties” be considered an “adequate method” to solve the problem at any stage of the conflict? The underlying “complex” issue would still remain.
Weaknesses of Agreement?”
The party that insists on full implementation of the agreements it signed, Eritrea, and Ethiopia - “superior skill in diplomacy” and all - are depicted as ‘not fully appreciating’ agreements they signed. Its ironic that those who can’t “fully appreciate” their actions are hailed as of having “vastly superior skill”. It is a peculiar assessment that really boils down to, ‘these Africans do not know what they are doing’. Colonial Hang-ups!
Here, at the crux of the matter, the report turns a dangerous leaf to advocate for lawlessness, which has far reaching implication. It begins by an innocuous sounding statement that questions the Algiers Agreement’s “emphasis on border delimitation”. More perilously and inaccurately, however, it goes to state that: “Africa is the exception in having its boundaries decided by third party treaties: most state borders represent the realities of power.” African is not an “exception”. This however, is a commonly held ignorance but one not expected from “experts” worthy of the designation.
Whether the “colonial borders methodology was the right one to employ” when “one side has apparently won the war” is, of course, a loaded question, which is premised on improper and unexamined biases. It also arise from their endorsement of what is called “the striking flaw at heart of the Boundary Commission ruling, namely that it flew in the face of the result of the fighting – literally requiring Ethiopia to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.” But, to insure they did not understate this dangerous idea they felt they ought to make the point one last time. And it goes:
The interpretation of colonial treaties might have been an adequate method to decide on the boundary if – as was proposed by US mediators in 1998 – Eritrea had pulled out of Badme while an adjudication took place. But Eritrea refused to pull back and was only removed by force. This reality underscores the limitations of the legalistic approach to boundarymaking.”
If fully appreciated what they are driving at by intimation to “limitations of the legalistic approach” and “the realities of power” the implication of these suggestion is to endorse anarchy in the entire continent of Africa. To guard against this anarchy the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor to African Union (AU), and in a bid to avoid ‘cross-border political instability and boundary disputes’ chose to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of its members. It accepted former colonial boundaries as sacrosanct in an attempt to avoid the mayhem “the realities of power” would have prompted and the carnage that a new scramble for Africa would surely entailed.
Yet, again, in another display of historic amnesia, or unawareness, is the notion that “Eritrea refused to pull back”. It is forgivable for the layperson to confuse Ethiopian propaganda for facts, it is completely another for an “expert” to do so. If the so called African “experts” did their homework they would find out that on May 14, 1998, days after Ethiopia’s unprovoked execution of Eritrea patrol unites, The Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of Eritrea proposed a peace plan. In which it “condemns the logic of force” and called for “areas under "dispute" to be demilitarized”. The salient points of this peace proposal where:
Ethiopia [to present to] the international community the territories that it claims--if any--and designate them on the political map with clear geographical coordinates. Each party shall also accept that the dispute cannot, and should not, be resolved by force, but through peaceful negotiations.
Both parties shall agree that all negotiations and understandings shall be carried out in the presence and through the mediation of a Third Party. The latter will act as a witness and guarantor.
If the above proposal for resolving the dispute through the involvement of a Third Party and without complications is not acceptable, the matter is to be referred to international adjudication
It would be needless to point out that Eritrea through out the entire conflict presented the “demilitarization” of the “disputed” areas over and again. However, the blatant disregard of these facts makes it imperative to point it out once more.
Again, just days after Ethiopia initiated the arial bombardment of the Eritrean Capital Asmara, a “Proposal for a Solution Submitted by the Government of Eritrea” on June 15, 1998 - which incidentally reads a lot like the Algiers Agreement - called for “demilitarization”. The relevant section of the proposal reads:
DEMILITARIZATION as a measure for defusing the crisis and expediting the demarcation of the borders so as to ensure a lasting solution shall be accepted and adhered to by both sides.
DEMILITARIZATION shall begin by the Mereb-Setit segment; proceed next to the Bada area and be implemented throughout the entire boundary in accordance with this phased pattern.
DEMILITARIZATION shall be implemented trough the involvement and monitoring of observers. The team of observers shall be composed of the forces and commanders from the facilitators as well as representatives of both sides.
DEMILITARIZATION shall be completed within the time-frame of one month.
This COMPREHENSIVE agreement, signed by both parties, shall be deposited in the UN and OAU as a legal agreement so as to ensure its binding nature.
As Ethiopia was trying hard for the disputed territories to be designated "Ethiopian border territories occupied by Eritrea", Eritrea asked for a list of “disputed” areas from which it is expected to demilitarize in vain.
26 April 1999 a press release from Eritrea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, titled “Eritrea Reaffirms Its Commitment and Readiness to the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement”, President Isaias Afwerki on behalf of Eritrea
reaffirmed its strict adherence to the OAU Framework Agreement that was endorsed by the Summit of the Central Organ and expressed its commitment and readiness for its full implementation. In this context, the Eritrean Government further reiterated its readiness for redeployment as clearly stipulated by, and in the letter and spirit of, the Framework Agreement.”
Eritrea had no issues with “demilitarization” or “redeployment” in the Framework Agreement”, as long as the process did not prejudice the outcome of arbitration and it was given a clear map of the “disputed territories”.
For any unbiased and objective investigator the fact that Eritrea had no objections to the “demilitarization” of disputed territories in order to avoid conflict is well documented and easy to ascertain. David Arnold in his article “Battle for Badme” in fact reveals that a proposal for “demilitarization” was given “in writing” to the Ethiopian Embassy in Washington DC, as well as the facilitators at the time, namely “Tony Lake and to the U.N special envoy”. The entity that maintained, “Eritrea refused to pull back” is Ethiopia’s propaganda machine and its uncritical consumers. The only thing Eritrea refused to accept is the logic of force over the rule of law.
Fully Appreciating Options?
Ethiopia clearly understood that a legal solution was not in its favor from the get go. That is why it insisted the “disputed” territories to be declared "Ethiopian border territories occupied by Eritrea" ahead of arbitration. Before the signing of the Algiers Agreement, nearly ever expert that commented on the Eritrea Ethiopia conflict, including some Ethiopians, asserted that Ethiopia territorial claims of sovereign Eritrean territory had no legal leg to stand on. Given these facts the report provokes several questions. For instance, if as stated, Ethiopia has “vastly superior skill in diplomacy” and it “apparently won the war”, why did Ethiopia rush to sign an agreement “to delimit and demarcate” its borders based on “pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law”?
Is it possible that Ethiopia’s assessment of the “result of the fighting” and its military adventure were different from what is publicly claimed? Did its setbacks, especially, in the Assab front and the strategic withdrawal that left the Eritrea defense forces intact cause it consternations that forced it rush into signing a legal document that left it with no legal leg to stand on?
What is clear with absolute certainty is that Ethiopia did sign an agreement which it knew put it at a disadvantage from the get go. “Superior skill”? Definitely NOT! However, Ethiopia may indeed have fully appreciated the “result of the fighting” and the consequences of not signing the agreement.
WHY? Chatham House!
Why, perhaps is the most appropriate question to ask? Why is Chatham House endorsing, through its affiliates, that the rule of law be subservient to “the realities of power”? Why does Chatham House, through its affiliates envisage “limitations of the legalistic approach” where “force” prevail? Why reward aggression? Why not promote rule of law?
Chatham House’s, Sally Healy and Martin Plaut, briefing paper prescribes nothing short of chaos to rule in Africa. Why does Chatham House want Africa to descend into ‘cross-border political instability and boundary disputes’, as well as, into the disorders that “the realities of power” and “result of the fighting” would surely prompt? Why?
Perhaps some answers can be gleaned from the opinions of Arnold J. Toynbee, the former Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), a.ka, Chatham House.
I will merely repeat that we are at present working, discreetly but with all our might, to wrest this mysterious political force called sovereignty out of the clutches of the local national states of our world. And all the time we are denying with our lips what we are doing with our hands....” (Arnold J. Toynbee, Former Director of Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs)
It is instructive to remember that the “consensual wisdom of the British foreign policy establishment embodied by Chatham House” has as its primary goal to serve the interest of the British ruling classes. If this entails chaos and anarchy to rule in Africa, or anywhere else for that matter, as far as the British foreign policy establishment is concerned, so be it. One need not go far into imperial and colonial history to find examples, it suffices to explore their role in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, etcetera and the many brutal puppet regimes that are prop up in Africa and beyond by these foreign policies.
If support for brutal puppet regimes that have no legitimacy like that of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi are justified on the ground that Ethiopia “has elections, even if these are flawed; it has an independent press, even if this is curtailed and journalists are locked up”, then the whole of the British foreign policy establishment, including Chatham House, as well as, Sally Healy and Martin Plaut, should take their own advice to heart and cut Robert Mugabe some slack. Zimbabwe at least has a monitored and “free and fair elections”, according to outside observes and a robust independent press. Hypocrisy perhaps has no meaning in British foreign policy establishments.
So, if Chatham House’s, Sally Healy and Martin Plaut, have little regard for the “sovereignty” of “national states” and rule of law that governs these bodies in the international political arena, they are following the tradition that has been “discreetly with all [its] might” trying to “wrest” that “sovereignty out of the clutches of the local national states.” While “all the time we are denying with our lips what we are doing with our hands....” in Arnold J. Toynbee words.
As there are ample examples to illustrate how conflicts and emergences have been used to coerce leaders into agreements that erode sovereignty of nations. The more chaos, the easer the job. The subservience of the rule of law to “the realities of power” and “result of the fighting” ought to facilitate that. But if we have learned one thing it is that no peoples are too docile to accept “the realities of power” over their basic right to self-determination. Take Eritrea’s thirty years of struggle for self-determination as case and point.
Finally, it ought to be said that the reason, perhaps, why these “experts” persist in presenting flawed information and peddle dangerous position undaunted by contradictions, with blatant disregard for facts, you could say allergic to facts really, as well as, misrepresent historic verifiable and documented events is because they have already reached preconceived position. And like an “insensibly” “experts”, to support these preconceived position, they are trying to cherry pick and “twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts”. The report’s pretences of objectivity and “objective observation” hence, are just that, pretences. Its goals have nothing to do with “trying to achieve lasting peace” between the two neighbors or in advancing the long-term interests of the peoples of Eritrea, Ethiopia or Africa as whole. Its priorities rest elsewhere
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
Chatham House’s, Sally Healy and Martin Plaut, presented a briefing paper on the Eritrea Ethiopia conflict, titled “Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion”. The report apparently meant to looks into the challenges of conflict resolution between the two neighbors, as well as, the “undermining of the Algiers Agreement”, that formally ended the Eritrea Ethiopia border conflict.
The report is note worthy for what it contains and more importantly for what it dexterously avoids. Both the authors and the paper provide a instructive opportunity at gleaning what is considered an “expert” in the African context, as well as, what passes for “analysis” on which policies are based on, unquestioningly at times. On April 2004, The Times published an article titled “Watch out when bias is broadcast as objective truth”. It stated,
Thirty-four years ago the distinguished historian of the Middle East, Elie Kedourie, published an essay entitled The Chatham House Version. He pointed out that the conventional, consensual wisdom of the British foreign policy establishment embodied by Chatham House, which claimed to be the product of objective observation of the world, was in fact the product of a string of questionable assumptions, intellectual biases and personal prejudices.
Journalists like to believe that they are torch bearers for objectivity. But in the editorial choices that they make, the questions they ask, the words they choose, they betray a series of biases. Indeed these prejudices are all the more powerful because they pass unexamined by their holders.”
Consequently, it becomes imperative to assess whether the report by Healy and Plaut is a “product of objective observation” or if it does “betray a series of biases” that necessitate exploring. Given that “obtaining trustworthy information is an integral component of conflict resolution”, it is of paramount significance to ensure that foreign policy recommendations based on “a string of questionable assumptions, intellectual biases and personal prejudices” do not exacerbate an already difficult issue.
On Diplomacy
It must be noted that diplomacy does not take place in a vacuum. There is a context and a history that affects this milieu. It involves actors that are looking to influence and manipulate any situation to advance their interest. The diplomatic milieu in this case has a long history, with its entrenched alliances and neglect of justice, which stretches back many decades before this conflict.
The authors points out that the diplomatic milieu in which the Eritrea Ethiopia conflict operates plays a role. However, it does not explore properly the negative role it played by neglecting to honor its obligation. “Underpinning” this milieu, according to the report, is “Ethiopia’s vastly superior skill in diplomacy” - which it owes to the magnitude of its misery and its part on the “Global war on Terror”. It has attempted to use these “advantages” to “win a revision of the Commission’s ruling.” On the other hand, Eritrea prefers independence to aid dependency, cannot compete with Ethiopia’s level of misery. What’s more, “Eritrea won’t negotiate”, what was suppose to be a “final and bidding” agreement, so this represents Eritrea’s diplomatic quandary.
The report details the benefits to Ethiopia, in this setting, if it gets to reopen the Commission’s ruling. However, it sheds no light on how this diplomatic tussle fashions a win-win situation. Or what advantage there is for Eritrea if it relinquishes its legally strong position in favor of this undefined and un-definable “dialogue”? This asymmetrical diplomatic environment, a reflection of outside forces’ interests and Ethiopia’s “level of poverty”, does indeed “impede progress”. But it impedes the progress of international legality, the credibility of the international Community and system.
Is it Badme or not?
Despite the protagonists insistence that their conflict is a border issue and “central to the peace agreement was a mechanism to decide the location of the border between the two countries” for which they agreed in advance would be “final and binding” the writers doubt that the conflict is border issue or the symbolic town of Badme. Readers must be forgiven if they are perplexed by the reports’ imperviousness to the countless contradictions contained.
For instance, Ethiopian Foreign Minister bombastically declared victory when he misguidedly believed he was awarded Badme and declared the Commissions decision as the ‘prevailing of rule of law.’ Later, the same Commissions work is denounced as “a blatant miscarriage of justices”, “totally illegal, unjust and irresponsible’, because Ethiopia realized it was not awarded Badme. Undaunted by the contradictions the authors declare it was the agreement that was weak. The reasoning being: “interpretation of colonial treaties might have been an adequate method to decide on the boundary if …Eritrea had pulled out of Badme while an adjudication took place.” Leaving aside, for now, the veracity of the statement lets ask the question that desperately cries out for clarification.
If as the writers insist over and again that the conflict is not about border issues why would the “interpretation of colonial treaties” be considered an “adequate method” to solve the problem at any stage of the conflict? The underlying “complex” issue would still remain.
Weaknesses of Agreement?”
The party that insists on full implementation of the agreements it signed, Eritrea, and Ethiopia - “superior skill in diplomacy” and all - are depicted as ‘not fully appreciating’ agreements they signed. Its ironic that those who can’t “fully appreciate” their actions are hailed as of having “vastly superior skill”. It is a peculiar assessment that really boils down to, ‘these Africans do not know what they are doing’. Colonial Hang-ups!
Here, at the crux of the matter, the report turns a dangerous leaf to advocate for lawlessness, which has far reaching implication. It begins by an innocuous sounding statement that questions the Algiers Agreement’s “emphasis on border delimitation”. More perilously and inaccurately, however, it goes to state that: “Africa is the exception in having its boundaries decided by third party treaties: most state borders represent the realities of power.” African is not an “exception”. This however, is a commonly held ignorance but one not expected from “experts” worthy of the designation.
Whether the “colonial borders methodology was the right one to employ” when “one side has apparently won the war” is, of course, a loaded question, which is premised on improper and unexamined biases. It also arise from their endorsement of what is called “the striking flaw at heart of the Boundary Commission ruling, namely that it flew in the face of the result of the fighting – literally requiring Ethiopia to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.” But, to insure they did not understate this dangerous idea they felt they ought to make the point one last time. And it goes:
The interpretation of colonial treaties might have been an adequate method to decide on the boundary if – as was proposed by US mediators in 1998 – Eritrea had pulled out of Badme while an adjudication took place. But Eritrea refused to pull back and was only removed by force. This reality underscores the limitations of the legalistic approach to boundarymaking.”
If fully appreciated what they are driving at by intimation to “limitations of the legalistic approach” and “the realities of power” the implication of these suggestion is to endorse anarchy in the entire continent of Africa. To guard against this anarchy the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor to African Union (AU), and in a bid to avoid ‘cross-border political instability and boundary disputes’ chose to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of its members. It accepted former colonial boundaries as sacrosanct in an attempt to avoid the mayhem “the realities of power” would have prompted and the carnage that a new scramble for Africa would surely entailed.
Yet, again, in another display of historic amnesia, or unawareness, is the notion that “Eritrea refused to pull back”. It is forgivable for the layperson to confuse Ethiopian propaganda for facts, it is completely another for an “expert” to do so. If the so called African “experts” did their homework they would find out that on May 14, 1998, days after Ethiopia’s unprovoked execution of Eritrea patrol unites, The Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of Eritrea proposed a peace plan. In which it “condemns the logic of force” and called for “areas under "dispute" to be demilitarized”. The salient points of this peace proposal where:
Ethiopia [to present to] the international community the territories that it claims--if any--and designate them on the political map with clear geographical coordinates. Each party shall also accept that the dispute cannot, and should not, be resolved by force, but through peaceful negotiations.
Both parties shall agree that all negotiations and understandings shall be carried out in the presence and through the mediation of a Third Party. The latter will act as a witness and guarantor.
If the above proposal for resolving the dispute through the involvement of a Third Party and without complications is not acceptable, the matter is to be referred to international adjudication
It would be needless to point out that Eritrea through out the entire conflict presented the “demilitarization” of the “disputed” areas over and again. However, the blatant disregard of these facts makes it imperative to point it out once more.
Again, just days after Ethiopia initiated the arial bombardment of the Eritrean Capital Asmara, a “Proposal for a Solution Submitted by the Government of Eritrea” on June 15, 1998 - which incidentally reads a lot like the Algiers Agreement - called for “demilitarization”. The relevant section of the proposal reads:
DEMILITARIZATION as a measure for defusing the crisis and expediting the demarcation of the borders so as to ensure a lasting solution shall be accepted and adhered to by both sides.
DEMILITARIZATION shall begin by the Mereb-Setit segment; proceed next to the Bada area and be implemented throughout the entire boundary in accordance with this phased pattern.
DEMILITARIZATION shall be implemented trough the involvement and monitoring of observers. The team of observers shall be composed of the forces and commanders from the facilitators as well as representatives of both sides.
DEMILITARIZATION shall be completed within the time-frame of one month.
This COMPREHENSIVE agreement, signed by both parties, shall be deposited in the UN and OAU as a legal agreement so as to ensure its binding nature.
As Ethiopia was trying hard for the disputed territories to be designated "Ethiopian border territories occupied by Eritrea", Eritrea asked for a list of “disputed” areas from which it is expected to demilitarize in vain.
26 April 1999 a press release from Eritrea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, titled “Eritrea Reaffirms Its Commitment and Readiness to the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement”, President Isaias Afwerki on behalf of Eritrea
reaffirmed its strict adherence to the OAU Framework Agreement that was endorsed by the Summit of the Central Organ and expressed its commitment and readiness for its full implementation. In this context, the Eritrean Government further reiterated its readiness for redeployment as clearly stipulated by, and in the letter and spirit of, the Framework Agreement.”
Eritrea had no issues with “demilitarization” or “redeployment” in the Framework Agreement”, as long as the process did not prejudice the outcome of arbitration and it was given a clear map of the “disputed territories”.
For any unbiased and objective investigator the fact that Eritrea had no objections to the “demilitarization” of disputed territories in order to avoid conflict is well documented and easy to ascertain. David Arnold in his article “Battle for Badme” in fact reveals that a proposal for “demilitarization” was given “in writing” to the Ethiopian Embassy in Washington DC, as well as the facilitators at the time, namely “Tony Lake and to the U.N special envoy”. The entity that maintained, “Eritrea refused to pull back” is Ethiopia’s propaganda machine and its uncritical consumers. The only thing Eritrea refused to accept is the logic of force over the rule of law.
Fully Appreciating Options?
Ethiopia clearly understood that a legal solution was not in its favor from the get go. That is why it insisted the “disputed” territories to be declared "Ethiopian border territories occupied by Eritrea" ahead of arbitration. Before the signing of the Algiers Agreement, nearly ever expert that commented on the Eritrea Ethiopia conflict, including some Ethiopians, asserted that Ethiopia territorial claims of sovereign Eritrean territory had no legal leg to stand on. Given these facts the report provokes several questions. For instance, if as stated, Ethiopia has “vastly superior skill in diplomacy” and it “apparently won the war”, why did Ethiopia rush to sign an agreement “to delimit and demarcate” its borders based on “pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law”?
Is it possible that Ethiopia’s assessment of the “result of the fighting” and its military adventure were different from what is publicly claimed? Did its setbacks, especially, in the Assab front and the strategic withdrawal that left the Eritrea defense forces intact cause it consternations that forced it rush into signing a legal document that left it with no legal leg to stand on?
What is clear with absolute certainty is that Ethiopia did sign an agreement which it knew put it at a disadvantage from the get go. “Superior skill”? Definitely NOT! However, Ethiopia may indeed have fully appreciated the “result of the fighting” and the consequences of not signing the agreement.
WHY? Chatham House!
Why, perhaps is the most appropriate question to ask? Why is Chatham House endorsing, through its affiliates, that the rule of law be subservient to “the realities of power”? Why does Chatham House, through its affiliates envisage “limitations of the legalistic approach” where “force” prevail? Why reward aggression? Why not promote rule of law?
Chatham House’s, Sally Healy and Martin Plaut, briefing paper prescribes nothing short of chaos to rule in Africa. Why does Chatham House want Africa to descend into ‘cross-border political instability and boundary disputes’, as well as, into the disorders that “the realities of power” and “result of the fighting” would surely prompt? Why?
Perhaps some answers can be gleaned from the opinions of Arnold J. Toynbee, the former Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), a.ka, Chatham House.
I will merely repeat that we are at present working, discreetly but with all our might, to wrest this mysterious political force called sovereignty out of the clutches of the local national states of our world. And all the time we are denying with our lips what we are doing with our hands....” (Arnold J. Toynbee, Former Director of Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs)
It is instructive to remember that the “consensual wisdom of the British foreign policy establishment embodied by Chatham House” has as its primary goal to serve the interest of the British ruling classes. If this entails chaos and anarchy to rule in Africa, or anywhere else for that matter, as far as the British foreign policy establishment is concerned, so be it. One need not go far into imperial and colonial history to find examples, it suffices to explore their role in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, etcetera and the many brutal puppet regimes that are prop up in Africa and beyond by these foreign policies.
If support for brutal puppet regimes that have no legitimacy like that of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi are justified on the ground that Ethiopia “has elections, even if these are flawed; it has an independent press, even if this is curtailed and journalists are locked up”, then the whole of the British foreign policy establishment, including Chatham House, as well as, Sally Healy and Martin Plaut, should take their own advice to heart and cut Robert Mugabe some slack. Zimbabwe at least has a monitored and “free and fair elections”, according to outside observes and a robust independent press. Hypocrisy perhaps has no meaning in British foreign policy establishments.
So, if Chatham House’s, Sally Healy and Martin Plaut, have little regard for the “sovereignty” of “national states” and rule of law that governs these bodies in the international political arena, they are following the tradition that has been “discreetly with all [its] might” trying to “wrest” that “sovereignty out of the clutches of the local national states.” While “all the time we are denying with our lips what we are doing with our hands....” in Arnold J. Toynbee words.
As there are ample examples to illustrate how conflicts and emergences have been used to coerce leaders into agreements that erode sovereignty of nations. The more chaos, the easer the job. The subservience of the rule of law to “the realities of power” and “result of the fighting” ought to facilitate that. But if we have learned one thing it is that no peoples are too docile to accept “the realities of power” over their basic right to self-determination. Take Eritrea’s thirty years of struggle for self-determination as case and point.
Finally, it ought to be said that the reason, perhaps, why these “experts” persist in presenting flawed information and peddle dangerous position undaunted by contradictions, with blatant disregard for facts, you could say allergic to facts really, as well as, misrepresent historic verifiable and documented events is because they have already reached preconceived position. And like an “insensibly” “experts”, to support these preconceived position, they are trying to cherry pick and “twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts”. The report’s pretences of objectivity and “objective observation” hence, are just that, pretences. Its goals have nothing to do with “trying to achieve lasting peace” between the two neighbors or in advancing the long-term interests of the peoples of Eritrea, Ethiopia or Africa as whole. Its priorities rest elsewhere
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