Vietnam and Iraq: Lies Then and Now
Robert Fantina
February 05, 2007
Prior to his infamous invasion of Iraq and continuing on to today, President George W. Bush often proclaimed the need to fight the terrorists ‘there’ so we would not need to fight them ‘here.’ The fact that there were no terrorists ‘there’ threatening U.S. interests seemed to be unimportant.
Yet Mr. Bush clings to the idea of Iraq being the ‘central front in the global war against terrorism.’ He conveniently forgets that, until his ill-conceived war, Iraq was not a breeding ground for hatred of the U.S. If it is indeed the central front on the war against terrorism, he has caused it to be so.
For those who choose to remember the lessons of Vietnam, the ‘surge’ now ordered by the ‘decider’ can only be frightening. It is as if we went to sleep in 2007 and awoke in 1966. A brief review of some aspects of that earlier, tragic misadventure is instructive.
The actual start of the Vietnam War is difficult to pinpoint. America first became involved when attempting to assist the French in holding onto Vietnam as a colony in 1950. But it was not until the administration of President Lyndon Johnson that significant numbers of troops were deployed to that country. Mr. Johnson firmly believed that Vietnam was the frontier of freedom; the domino theory, the belief that if one country fell to ‘godless communism’ all those around it would soon follow suit, was a predominant one within the halls of Congress, and was preached vociferously to all and sundry. Those calling for de-escalation in Vietnam were accused of being weak, stupid, or otherwise less than patriotic. The result, of course, of this jingoistic rhetoric was the death of nearly 60,000 Americans and millions of Vietnamese.
It is far easier to pinpoint the start of the Iraq War, although the reasons for it remain nebulous at best. Initially Mr. Bush rattled the cages of many Americans by implying Iraqi links to the tragedies of September 11 – links that did not exist - and saying that he knew for a fact that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and was developing nuclear weapons all aimed at the living rooms America’s citizens. This third world country, crippled by years of unjust U.N. sanctions, suddenly was demonized as being within years, if not months, of being able to destroy the world. The irony that this accusation was made by the leader of the world’s only superpower, the country with more chemical weapons than all the rest of the world combined, and the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons, was lost on an enraptured Congress which jumped on this militaristic, pseudo-patriotic bandwagon.
As early as 1965, Mr. Johnson was proclaiming the following: “To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all [the people in the noncommunist world around the globe from Berlin to Thailand] in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war ... Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite for aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next.” Mr. Johnson continually escalated his war until 1968, when he decided not to run for reelection. Richard Nixon became president in 1969 and continued the policies of his predecessor. American soldiers continued to be fed into the meat grinder of the Vietnam War.
Fast forward again to 2007. In Mr. Bush’s State of the Union address, he said the following: “Yet it would not be like us to leave our promises unkept, our friends abandoned, and our own security at risk.” How our security was ever threatened by Iraq has never been answered, but the rationale for continuing the war remains the same for Mr. Bush as continuing the Vietnam War was for Mr. Johnson four decades earlier. The meat grinder continues to churn out its dead.
The old domino theory has been resurrected although, like escalation (now known as augmentation), it is masked by different names. Following Mr. Bush’s State of the Union address, when a skeptical Congress began drafting a resolution denouncing escalation, Sen. John McCain spoke supportively of Mr. Bush’s new policy. Said he: “If we walk away from Iraq, we will be back – possibly in the context of a wider war in the world’s most volatile region.” The consequences of an American withdrawal from Iraq are too dire to name; similarly with Vietnam, it was said that if Laos and Cambodia were to fall to communism, America would be threatened in some unnamed or unmentionable manner. The awful results predicted forty years ago did not come to pass; more thoughtful minds than those of Mr. Bush and Mr. McCain foresee the same happening should the U.S. depart from Iraq now.
Shortly after Mr. Johnson’s landside election victory in 1964, he and his advisers determined that the current U.S. policy in Vietnam had little chance of success, and without more active American military participation, South Vietnam would fall to communism. Thus began a major military escalation.
On January 12, 2007, Mr. McCain, again in support of Mr. Bush’s ‘augmentation,’ echoed the policy thoughts of forty years ago: “We should make no mistake - the potentially catastrophic consequences of failure demand that we do all we can to prevail in Iraq. A substantial and sustained increase in U.S. forces in Baghdad and Anbar province is necessary to bring down the toxic levels of violence there.”
The non-partisan Iraq Study Group recommended, among other things rejected or ignored by Mr. Bush, negotiation with Iran and Syria. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has dismissed this, stating that those countries would make unacceptable demands upon the United States in return for their cooperation. Back in the long ago and apparently forgotten 1960s, Mr. Johnson saw negotiation as appeasement, and as a result had no real interested in working towards a negotiated settlement.
It may be over-simplistic to say that American intervention in Iraq is the same is it was in Vietnam. Yet the clear parallels, mainly in the evident pathway to American disaster, cannot be avoided. Until Congress demonstrates the will to take the lead that the voters expect, as clearly demonstrated in the November 2006 elections, America will continue down that same bloody road.
Yet Mr. Bush clings to the idea of Iraq being the ‘central front in the global war against terrorism.’ He conveniently forgets that, until his ill-conceived war, Iraq was not a breeding ground for hatred of the U.S. If it is indeed the central front on the war against terrorism, he has caused it to be so.
For those who choose to remember the lessons of Vietnam, the ‘surge’ now ordered by the ‘decider’ can only be frightening. It is as if we went to sleep in 2007 and awoke in 1966. A brief review of some aspects of that earlier, tragic misadventure is instructive.
The actual start of the Vietnam War is difficult to pinpoint. America first became involved when attempting to assist the French in holding onto Vietnam as a colony in 1950. But it was not until the administration of President Lyndon Johnson that significant numbers of troops were deployed to that country. Mr. Johnson firmly believed that Vietnam was the frontier of freedom; the domino theory, the belief that if one country fell to ‘godless communism’ all those around it would soon follow suit, was a predominant one within the halls of Congress, and was preached vociferously to all and sundry. Those calling for de-escalation in Vietnam were accused of being weak, stupid, or otherwise less than patriotic. The result, of course, of this jingoistic rhetoric was the death of nearly 60,000 Americans and millions of Vietnamese.
It is far easier to pinpoint the start of the Iraq War, although the reasons for it remain nebulous at best. Initially Mr. Bush rattled the cages of many Americans by implying Iraqi links to the tragedies of September 11 – links that did not exist - and saying that he knew for a fact that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and was developing nuclear weapons all aimed at the living rooms America’s citizens. This third world country, crippled by years of unjust U.N. sanctions, suddenly was demonized as being within years, if not months, of being able to destroy the world. The irony that this accusation was made by the leader of the world’s only superpower, the country with more chemical weapons than all the rest of the world combined, and the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons, was lost on an enraptured Congress which jumped on this militaristic, pseudo-patriotic bandwagon.
As early as 1965, Mr. Johnson was proclaiming the following: “To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all [the people in the noncommunist world around the globe from Berlin to Thailand] in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war ... Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite for aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next.” Mr. Johnson continually escalated his war until 1968, when he decided not to run for reelection. Richard Nixon became president in 1969 and continued the policies of his predecessor. American soldiers continued to be fed into the meat grinder of the Vietnam War.
Fast forward again to 2007. In Mr. Bush’s State of the Union address, he said the following: “Yet it would not be like us to leave our promises unkept, our friends abandoned, and our own security at risk.” How our security was ever threatened by Iraq has never been answered, but the rationale for continuing the war remains the same for Mr. Bush as continuing the Vietnam War was for Mr. Johnson four decades earlier. The meat grinder continues to churn out its dead.
The old domino theory has been resurrected although, like escalation (now known as augmentation), it is masked by different names. Following Mr. Bush’s State of the Union address, when a skeptical Congress began drafting a resolution denouncing escalation, Sen. John McCain spoke supportively of Mr. Bush’s new policy. Said he: “If we walk away from Iraq, we will be back – possibly in the context of a wider war in the world’s most volatile region.” The consequences of an American withdrawal from Iraq are too dire to name; similarly with Vietnam, it was said that if Laos and Cambodia were to fall to communism, America would be threatened in some unnamed or unmentionable manner. The awful results predicted forty years ago did not come to pass; more thoughtful minds than those of Mr. Bush and Mr. McCain foresee the same happening should the U.S. depart from Iraq now.
Shortly after Mr. Johnson’s landside election victory in 1964, he and his advisers determined that the current U.S. policy in Vietnam had little chance of success, and without more active American military participation, South Vietnam would fall to communism. Thus began a major military escalation.
On January 12, 2007, Mr. McCain, again in support of Mr. Bush’s ‘augmentation,’ echoed the policy thoughts of forty years ago: “We should make no mistake - the potentially catastrophic consequences of failure demand that we do all we can to prevail in Iraq. A substantial and sustained increase in U.S. forces in Baghdad and Anbar province is necessary to bring down the toxic levels of violence there.”
The non-partisan Iraq Study Group recommended, among other things rejected or ignored by Mr. Bush, negotiation with Iran and Syria. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has dismissed this, stating that those countries would make unacceptable demands upon the United States in return for their cooperation. Back in the long ago and apparently forgotten 1960s, Mr. Johnson saw negotiation as appeasement, and as a result had no real interested in working towards a negotiated settlement.
It may be over-simplistic to say that American intervention in Iraq is the same is it was in Vietnam. Yet the clear parallels, mainly in the evident pathway to American disaster, cannot be avoided. Until Congress demonstrates the will to take the lead that the voters expect, as clearly demonstrated in the November 2006 elections, America will continue down that same bloody road.
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