Why Did Things Go So Wrong In Iraq?
Alex Zakson
November 08, 2006
Iraq is a mess. The sectarian war is escalating with each passing day, with no prospect of ebbing. The country that could be a major source of oil for the world markets is not. In fact the world markets can and do get along without Iraqi oil.
It seems that religious, political and clan feuds, and greed rule Iraq. The Iraqis hate each other with passions stronger than those against us. Every religious group, politician, and clan is trying to get the upper hand in controlling the minds and the potential wealth of Iraq by undercutting and cutting off all others. We are caught in the middle of this chaotic situation and are paying the price in lost lives, ruined lives and billions wasted.
We will never bring about peace and tranquility to Iraq. To bring peace there must be unity, an impossible end in a country deeply divided along religious chasms, political greed and historically feuding clans. Unity can be achieved in one of two ways: forget old feuds, compromise and come up with a united government, something the Iraqis have been unwilling to do, or establish a strong central government like Saddam had imposed, something we are not willing to do. So it appears that creating a unified, democratic Iraq is a pipe dream.
Europeans and Russians capitalize on the chaos in Iraq to weaken America, and to re-establish their influence in the region. The Shiites use the chaos to weaken the Sunni stranglehold on Islam, and the Sunnis to maintain it. It is used by Iran to increase its sphere of influence on natural resources (oil) beyond its borders, and by Saudi Arabia to do the same and empower the Sunnis.
SHIITE AND SUNNI SPLIT. Roots of Shiite and Sunni split run deep. The split is rooted in a conflict on who should succeed the Islamic prophet Muhammad as the political and spiritual leader of Islam. The conflict was bloody and long.
After Muhammad's death, in 632 AD, spiritual and political leadership of Islam passed on Abu Bakr (632-634), Omar (634-644), Othman (644-656) and Ali (656-661). This is the historical order of the first four Imams (or Caliphs as Sunnis called them), and the one that the Sunni unquestionably accept.
On the other hand, from day one Ali, Muhammad's son-in-law and cousin claimed the right to succeed Muhammad and fought (as in wars) the Caliphs to this end. The Shiites believe that Muhammad had personally selected Ali to succeed him; consequently they believe that Ali was the first, not the fourth Imam, followed by Hassan and Hussein, Ali's sons, as second and third Imams. The Shiites consider the three Caliphs that preceded Ali as usurpers, not true Imams, while the Sunnis accept Ali as the fourth imam, but do not acknowledge either Hassan or Hussein as Imams.
The wars between these factions were fierce, and Ali's two sons Hassan and Hussein were killed in these wars. Commemoration of their deaths is a major Shiite observance. So the roots of animosity between Shiites and Sunnis run long and deep, back to the beginning of Islam and in a blood feud.
ARABS. Arabs have been mostly tribesmen who for centuries lived as clans. Their loyalty to their clans goes beyond religion or sect. The nation of Iraq was not a historical entity, but one that the West established in the 20th century. Sectarianism, clan loyalty, and greed (for wealth and power) have been the primary motivators in the region. So there is little motivation to give up things they value most, wealth and power, to gain something they care little about: unity. As the short history of Iraq war II shows the Iraqis have no desire to be a united nation.
IRAN. Iran considers itself a non-Arab nation. Iranians have little respect for Arab nations. After all, they reason, Iran (also known as Persia) has a long history as a nation, with conquests dating back thousands of years. They have disdain for Arabs, who until recent times were tribesmen and nomads. The Arab's only contribution to Iran was Islam, and in that particular case, Iranians are Shiites who diverge from the Arab's Sunni version of Islam.
NEIGHBORS. Iran and Turkey have Kurdish populations. They fear that if Iraqi Kurds establish an autonomous entity, the Iranian and Turkish Kurds will someday want to join the Iraqi Kurds to establish an independent Kurdistan. So keeping the Iraqi Kurds under control of the Shiite majority is in their interest.
Saudi Arabia is a fiefdom run by the royal family for the benefit of the royal family. They enjoy their enormous wealth, and the accompanying influence. They are loath to see a democratic Arab nation next door, lest it foment discord among its population. Deep inside, they relish the chaos in Iraq. The other lesser Arab neighbors are no different.
CONCLUSIONS. A people divided by sectarianism, clan loyalty and greed cannot be united, absent an acceptable form of government. What we have there now does not work. The way we have conducted the war has not worked either.
Many nations, allies and foes, tell us to get out of Iraq, and let the Iraqis work things out. We could oblige these nations, declare "Mission Accomplished" and let the Iraqis and the world community deal with the problems. Or we could take a stronger stand and try the following:
1. Prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari has strong ties to Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of al-Mahdi army, and other Shiite groups. He has strong ties with Iran, and visited the Tehran government in recent months. He is too political and self-serving; he clings to power even if interests of other Iraqis are compromised. He will never disarm the insurgents, especially not the Shiites. He must be replaced with a less self-serving individual.
2. We must admit that we are engaged in a war. We are fighting a real war with self-imposed limitations that guarantee defeat. As the world's greatest power we can and must bring overwhelming force to defeat the opposition. Our generals understand that, Donald Rumsfeld does not; he should be replaced. We should fight the war to win. If it takes 350,000 or 500,000 troops, we should commit that many, and put a quick end to the opposition.
3. To achieve victory we must disarm all militias, private armies, clan enforcers, and even the general population. The only groups carrying weapons should be the coalition forces, and the Iraqi army and police. We should deal severely with violators.
4. The political and religious leaders who incite the population against the coalition and the Iraqi government should be muzzled. While this is undemocratic, we must realize that we are fighting a war, and during a war, it is acceptable to restrict the enemy's freedom, especially if it prolongs the conflict. After the war, we will make amends.
5. Once we achieve a decisive victory, we should allow Iraq to divide into the three federations - Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish. We should help the Iraqis establish a government headed by a trio of co-executives, with equal power, chosen from the 3 factions.
6. We should create an Iraqi National Oil Company to manage the entire country's oil resources, and give 50% of its shares to individual Iraqis and the other to the central government. The $2,000 a year per man woman and child will be a fair division of the country's natural resource, and the rest will allow the central government to rebuild the county. (The figures assume 5 million barrels of crude oil a day at $50 a barrel.)
Of course there will be power struggles among the Shiites. The Sunnis will fight one another to gain the advantage over other Sunnis. The Kurds will similarly be conflicted. And each of the three groups will try to dominate the others. Yet, with every Iraqi having a stake in the well being of Iraq, the situation will be significantly better. And our troops will be able to come home, and our taxpayers will be relieved of the burden of throwing away billions and billions for the foreseeable future.
It seems that religious, political and clan feuds, and greed rule Iraq. The Iraqis hate each other with passions stronger than those against us. Every religious group, politician, and clan is trying to get the upper hand in controlling the minds and the potential wealth of Iraq by undercutting and cutting off all others. We are caught in the middle of this chaotic situation and are paying the price in lost lives, ruined lives and billions wasted.
We will never bring about peace and tranquility to Iraq. To bring peace there must be unity, an impossible end in a country deeply divided along religious chasms, political greed and historically feuding clans. Unity can be achieved in one of two ways: forget old feuds, compromise and come up with a united government, something the Iraqis have been unwilling to do, or establish a strong central government like Saddam had imposed, something we are not willing to do. So it appears that creating a unified, democratic Iraq is a pipe dream.
Europeans and Russians capitalize on the chaos in Iraq to weaken America, and to re-establish their influence in the region. The Shiites use the chaos to weaken the Sunni stranglehold on Islam, and the Sunnis to maintain it. It is used by Iran to increase its sphere of influence on natural resources (oil) beyond its borders, and by Saudi Arabia to do the same and empower the Sunnis.
SHIITE AND SUNNI SPLIT. Roots of Shiite and Sunni split run deep. The split is rooted in a conflict on who should succeed the Islamic prophet Muhammad as the political and spiritual leader of Islam. The conflict was bloody and long.
After Muhammad's death, in 632 AD, spiritual and political leadership of Islam passed on Abu Bakr (632-634), Omar (634-644), Othman (644-656) and Ali (656-661). This is the historical order of the first four Imams (or Caliphs as Sunnis called them), and the one that the Sunni unquestionably accept.
On the other hand, from day one Ali, Muhammad's son-in-law and cousin claimed the right to succeed Muhammad and fought (as in wars) the Caliphs to this end. The Shiites believe that Muhammad had personally selected Ali to succeed him; consequently they believe that Ali was the first, not the fourth Imam, followed by Hassan and Hussein, Ali's sons, as second and third Imams. The Shiites consider the three Caliphs that preceded Ali as usurpers, not true Imams, while the Sunnis accept Ali as the fourth imam, but do not acknowledge either Hassan or Hussein as Imams.
The wars between these factions were fierce, and Ali's two sons Hassan and Hussein were killed in these wars. Commemoration of their deaths is a major Shiite observance. So the roots of animosity between Shiites and Sunnis run long and deep, back to the beginning of Islam and in a blood feud.
ARABS. Arabs have been mostly tribesmen who for centuries lived as clans. Their loyalty to their clans goes beyond religion or sect. The nation of Iraq was not a historical entity, but one that the West established in the 20th century. Sectarianism, clan loyalty, and greed (for wealth and power) have been the primary motivators in the region. So there is little motivation to give up things they value most, wealth and power, to gain something they care little about: unity. As the short history of Iraq war II shows the Iraqis have no desire to be a united nation.
IRAN. Iran considers itself a non-Arab nation. Iranians have little respect for Arab nations. After all, they reason, Iran (also known as Persia) has a long history as a nation, with conquests dating back thousands of years. They have disdain for Arabs, who until recent times were tribesmen and nomads. The Arab's only contribution to Iran was Islam, and in that particular case, Iranians are Shiites who diverge from the Arab's Sunni version of Islam.
NEIGHBORS. Iran and Turkey have Kurdish populations. They fear that if Iraqi Kurds establish an autonomous entity, the Iranian and Turkish Kurds will someday want to join the Iraqi Kurds to establish an independent Kurdistan. So keeping the Iraqi Kurds under control of the Shiite majority is in their interest.
Saudi Arabia is a fiefdom run by the royal family for the benefit of the royal family. They enjoy their enormous wealth, and the accompanying influence. They are loath to see a democratic Arab nation next door, lest it foment discord among its population. Deep inside, they relish the chaos in Iraq. The other lesser Arab neighbors are no different.
CONCLUSIONS. A people divided by sectarianism, clan loyalty and greed cannot be united, absent an acceptable form of government. What we have there now does not work. The way we have conducted the war has not worked either.
Many nations, allies and foes, tell us to get out of Iraq, and let the Iraqis work things out. We could oblige these nations, declare "Mission Accomplished" and let the Iraqis and the world community deal with the problems. Or we could take a stronger stand and try the following:
1. Prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari has strong ties to Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of al-Mahdi army, and other Shiite groups. He has strong ties with Iran, and visited the Tehran government in recent months. He is too political and self-serving; he clings to power even if interests of other Iraqis are compromised. He will never disarm the insurgents, especially not the Shiites. He must be replaced with a less self-serving individual.
2. We must admit that we are engaged in a war. We are fighting a real war with self-imposed limitations that guarantee defeat. As the world's greatest power we can and must bring overwhelming force to defeat the opposition. Our generals understand that, Donald Rumsfeld does not; he should be replaced. We should fight the war to win. If it takes 350,000 or 500,000 troops, we should commit that many, and put a quick end to the opposition.
3. To achieve victory we must disarm all militias, private armies, clan enforcers, and even the general population. The only groups carrying weapons should be the coalition forces, and the Iraqi army and police. We should deal severely with violators.
4. The political and religious leaders who incite the population against the coalition and the Iraqi government should be muzzled. While this is undemocratic, we must realize that we are fighting a war, and during a war, it is acceptable to restrict the enemy's freedom, especially if it prolongs the conflict. After the war, we will make amends.
5. Once we achieve a decisive victory, we should allow Iraq to divide into the three federations - Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish. We should help the Iraqis establish a government headed by a trio of co-executives, with equal power, chosen from the 3 factions.
6. We should create an Iraqi National Oil Company to manage the entire country's oil resources, and give 50% of its shares to individual Iraqis and the other to the central government. The $2,000 a year per man woman and child will be a fair division of the country's natural resource, and the rest will allow the central government to rebuild the county. (The figures assume 5 million barrels of crude oil a day at $50 a barrel.)
Of course there will be power struggles among the Shiites. The Sunnis will fight one another to gain the advantage over other Sunnis. The Kurds will similarly be conflicted. And each of the three groups will try to dominate the others. Yet, with every Iraqi having a stake in the well being of Iraq, the situation will be significantly better. And our troops will be able to come home, and our taxpayers will be relieved of the burden of throwing away billions and billions for the foreseeable future.
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