A LITTLE WORSE THAN ANARCHY…
Richard Boegner
October 30, 2006
The raid was launched before dawn Wednesday October 25th . US-led Iraqi special forces entered Sadr City, a neighborhood northeast of Baghdad, home to some 2,5 million Shites, and stronghold of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
Formerly known as Saddam City until the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the district was rechristened in honor of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Moqtada‘s father, who along with two of his sons, was killed in an ambush by Saddam’s henchmen in 1999.
As the intruding forces progressed, they were fired upon by militants. US support was then requested; F16s flew over the area, and responded with “precision gun fire”, according to a US military statement (1).
The target of the operation was in all likelihood the notorious Abu Dereh ,“the Butcher” (2), a leader of a Shiite militia who found refuge in Sadr City. Yet, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki criticized the raid indicating that he would “ask for clarification about what has happened in Sadr Ciy, and review the issue with the multinational forces so that it will not be repeated” (3).
Sometimes referred to as the Shiite Zarqawi (4), that is to say a Shiite version of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qadae in Iraq, killed by US forces on June 8th, he is believed to have been responsible for the deaths of hundreds if not thousands of Sunnis in the Baghdad area.
He started against the Americans, but he moved on to killing Sunnis”, said Satter Awad, a local resident. “People here look at him as a brave man” (5).
Abu Dereh’s modus operandi is standard militia operating procedure: victims are selected at checkpoints, abducted, tortured, shot and discarded, often at al-Saddeh, a field in Sadr City where mutilated bodies are buried in shallow graves. Iraqis call this place “Happiness Hotel” (6)…
An anonymous letter circulating in some Sunni mosques in Baghdad last June described Abu Dereh thus:
He is a professional killer who isn’t any less dangerous than al Zarqawi. Abu Dereh is a dangerous criminal who even the Interior Minister fears. Some of the Sadr City police work under his command and other forces from the Sayyid (Muqtada al-Sadr). Abu Dereh is a wild terrorist and dozens of killers prey behind him. Everyone in Sadr City knows this madman, but they don’t say his name, it is whispered in Sadr City when they wake up to the news of blindfolded dead bodies and bodies thrown out at al Seddeh, or on the junkyards of Qasra wah Atash, even in the sewers of Rustumiya, which the Interior Ministry officially made as a place for Abu Dereh’s victims. The bodies have been raked by claws” (7).
According to some reports, he murdered one of Saddam Hussein’s defense lawyers, Khamis al-Obedi last June, and in July, kidnapped a Sunni woman MP, Tayseer Najah al-Mashhadani (8).
He has also been held responsible for cleansing entire neighborhoods of their Sunni inhabitants (9)…
The bombing by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi last February of the sacred Shiite al-Askari shrine in Samara changed the nature and intensity of sectarian warfare in Iraq. Outraged by what they deemed an egregious and sacrilegious act, many Shiites who hitherto had exercised restraint demanded retribution. Abu Dereh vigorously responded to such calls for vengeance.
As one US observer commented, “Abu Dereh is the new Shiite hero. He fights blood with more blood” (10).
The radicalisation of the Shiite movement has led to the splintering of the Mahdi Army, the militia founded by Moqtada al-Sadr after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, and composed of the Shiite slum’s downtrodden. It is all at once a political party, a paramilitary group and an organization providing welfare services to the poorest, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Yet, it also established its own Shariah courts, and metes out its rigid, ruthless brand of Islamic justice (11).
Many rogue elements of the Shiite militia went their own way, pursuing their own agendas.
Abu Dereh is thought to be one of them. Though he has been repudiated by Sadr’s organization, the exact nature of their ties is not clear.
Abu Bakr, a Mahdi Army official in Baghdad said, “He is the Mahdi Army’s first member. He kills many terrorists and we like him” (12). Sadr adamantly denies that his organization is involved in sectarian violence.
Yet, that Sadr has lost control of some of the branches of his militia seems beyond dispute.
In Basra, his inability to exert control over the militants of his organization left him with no choice but to close his office (13).
In Diwaniya, Sadr failed to prevent an armed confrontation between Mahdi Army elements and Iraqi forces last August (14).
In fact, Sadr alienated many of his followers by urging them to refrain from responding to sectarian provocations, and by choosing the political path, rather than the paramilitary one to further his objectives. Sadr no doubt concluded that the withdrawal of the occupation forces, weary and bloodied, was inevitable, and that it was wiser and safer to simply wait, play the role of the responsible, respectable political leader, taking advantage of any opportunities along the way.
Sgt 1st Class Jeff Nelson, an intelligence analyst with the US Army, stated that “they’ve (the Mahdi Army) infiltrated every branch of public service and every political office they could get their hands on. As soon as the US leaves, they’ll be able to dominate the area with key citizens, key positions, key officers. They’ll pretty much have the lay of the land” (15). Al-Sad’s goal is to establish an Islamic theocracy in Iraq.
Sadr’s party holds 30 seats in Parliament, and controls several ministries. He is one of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s most powerful supporters.
As a result, the more radical elements of his movement condemn his current strategy, considering him to be too moderate, too generous vis-à-vis the Sunnis, and too tolerant of the American presence in Iraq. One US official observed that “they’re (the radicals) not content to sit there and just defend their family on the street corner. They want to go out and take on what they view as al-Qaeda and Baathists or both in aggressive measure” (16).
Yet, the proliferation of militias has only made the situation in Iraq that much more violent and dangerous.
In Baghdad alone, there are now 23 (17) militias vying for power, and some 19 in Basra (18).
As Abdel-Aal al-Musawi, a leader of a Shiite sect in Basra said, “Each head of the militia is his own dictator. This is the reality. They don’t adhere to any limits” (19).
Internecine Shiite violence has also racked the southern city of Amarah (20), pitting the Mahdi Army against the Badr Brigade, the militia of Iraq’s main Shiite political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
As a result, the violence and anarchy has provided Iran, Iraq’s powerful Shiite neighbor, with numerous opportunities to exert influence in the country.
The Iranians have provided both funding and materiel to Abu Dereh and other freelance rebels, an investment in the post-occupation future of Iraq. A US official confirmed Iran‘s meddling in Iraqi affairs, “They’re not sure who will come out on top, so they fund everybody” (21).
The proliferation of militias, therefore, has led to a surge in sectarian violence which blatantly exposed and was facilitated by the shortcomings of the Iraqi security forces.
In many cases, the police, and in particular, the Iraqi National Police, not only has failed to quell sectarian violence, but also actively participated in attacks against the Sunni Iraqis, the latest major incident having taken place in Balad, October 13th (22).
The incompetence and complicity of the Iraqi security forces enhanced and legitimized the role of militias, and compelled neutral, moderate Iraqis to rely on the radicals for protection.
A judge on Iraq’s Criminal Court confirmed this nefarious development, “ Right now, I support the presence of the Mahdi Army. I know this is unacceptable in law, in politics, in society, but in this unusual time we are living in, this is the reality” (23).
Hence, though the disarming and disbanding of the militias is a US priority, it is considered premature by many in Iraq: “The support of the militias within the Shiite community comes from the failure of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the coalition forces to provide security. The creation of the militias comes as a reaction”, concluded Qasim Dawood, former Prime Minister Alawi’s national security minister (24). Support for the Militias may decline only if and when the government is able to provide security to all Iraqis.
The government cannot even be relied on to collect the corpses that litter the streets of Baghdad, because some districts are simply too dangerous.
If a government is too scared to pick up a body, is it a government”, asked Ibrahim (25), a Shiite from Ur in Baghdad?
The morgue itself is also often off-limits. Controlled by Sadr’s party, many Sunnis fail to claim the body of family members, fearing ambush, abduction and death at the hands of the Mahdi Army.
Hospitals are shunned for the same reasons (26)…
As for Sunis, they avoid the mainly Shiite police because it cannot be trusted. Furthermore, police officers often live in the areas they patrol, and thus are loathe to confront local militias.
A captain in the Ministry of Interior commandos agreed: “When we arrest a suspect, sometimes we get a letter from a Moqtada office asking for the suspect to be transferred to their custody. We do it. What can you do if you are a policeman standing at a checkpoint and see militiamen with a dead body? Nothing. The policemen can’t do anything. They are scared of the militia; they let them pass” (27).
As a result, one national unit has been suspended in Baghdad because of its links with militias.
The others will all be progressively retrained to ensure they behave in a professional and ethical manner (28)…
The Iraqi government neither has the will nor the means to neutralize the militias. The various Shiite paramilitary groups will thrive as long as Sunni extremists continue attacking and killing Shiites, and no one, not US forces, not Iraqi security personnel have been able to stop them from doing so…
Furthermore, because Prime Minister al-Malki is politically dependent on Moqtada al-Sadr, it is highly unlikely that he will confront the militias, and in particular the Mahdi Army, even if he could..
Not coincidentally, for the Prime Minister, the cause of the violence is elsewhere: “the efforts of all political groups should be focused on the most dangerous challenge, which is al-Qadae and the Saddam Baathists” (29). Both happen to be composed mainly of Sunnis…
Hence, it appears that the Prime Minister has pledged to support one side in Iraq’s brutal civil war.
In the meantime, “Baghdad has become the capital of death” (30), according to one resident, and Iraqis are left to cope as best they can.
Sheik Adnan Aidani, responsible for law and order in Yusufa near Basra, concluded that “everyone is on his own…These days, life is like a jungle. A rabbit doesn’t survive in a jungle. Only a lion does…Actually, it’s a little worse than anarchy” (31).
During the raid in Sadr City, ten Iraqis were killed and thirteen arrested (32).
Abu Dereh was not among them…
richard.boegner@orange.fr
Notes/
1) Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqi leader balks on U.S. timeline”, IHT, October 25, 2006.
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=3290127
2) Lydia Khalil, “Al-Sadr’s Weakening grip on the Mahdi Army”, Terrorism Focus, Vol 3, Issue 39,
October 10, 2006.
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370161&printthis=1
3) John Ward Anderson, “Iraqi Premier Denies U.S. Assertion He Agreed to Timelines”, WP,
October 26, 2006.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/25/AR2006102501138_pf.html
4) Sabrina Tavernise, “Cleric is said to lose reins over part of Iraqi militia”, IHT, September 28, 2006.
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=2959961
5) See note 4.
6) Philip Robertson, “City of vengeance”, salon.com, July 12, 2006.
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/07/12/baghdad/print.html
7) Philip Robertson, “The hatred incubator”, salon.com, July 13, 2006.
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/07/13/morgue/print.html
8) Paul McGeouch, “Lawyer’s fate sealed with a judas kiss”, Sydney Morning Herald, August 23, 2006.
http://www.smh.com.au/text/articles/2006/08/22/1156012541211.html
9) See note 8.
10) “Iraq-Shiite power struggle, Death Squads”, Villages with Torches, October 7, 2006.
http://vwt.d2g.com:8081/iraq/
11) See note 6.
12) See note 2.
13) See note 4.
14) See note 2.
15) Rick Jervis and Jim Michaels, “U.S. forces caught in crossfire on streets of ‘capital of death’ ”,
USA Today, October 23, 2006.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-10-22-baghdad-crossfire_x.htm
16) See note ‘.
17) Sudarsan Raghavan, “Militias Splintering Into Radicalized Cells”, WP, October 19, 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101801865_pf.html
18) Anthony Shahid, “In a Land Without Order, Punishment is Power”, WP, October 22 , 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/21/AR2006102101048_pf.html
19) See note 18.
20) Bourzou Daragahi, “Bloodletting continues in southern Iraq”, LAT, October 24, 2006.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq24oct24,0,6514888,print.story?coll=la- headlines-world
21) See note 4.
22) Ellen Knickmeyer, “In Balad, Age-Old Ties Were ‘Destroyed in a Second’ ”, WP, October 23, 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/22/AR2006102201071_pf.html
23) Sabrina Tavernise, “Many Iraqis look to Gunmen as Protectors”, NYT, October 21, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/21/world/middleeast/21militias.html?ei=5088&en=f934dd723f68677f&ex=1319083200&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print
24) See note 23.
25) See note 23.
26) Michael R. Gordon, “On Baghdad Streets, a Police Partnership Falters”, NYT, October 22, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/world/middleeast/22baghdad.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print ,
27) Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Tea and Kidnapping-behind the lines of a civil war”, The Guardian, October
28, 2006
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329613160-103550,00.html
28) Michael R. Gordon, “Iraq Realities Undermine the Pentagon’s Predictions”, NYT, October 25, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/25/world/middleeast/25assess.html?pagewanted=print
29) Jay Price, “Iraq’s al-Maliki sharply delineates differences with U.S. leadership”, McClatchy
Newspapers, October 26, 2006
http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/world/15857278.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp
30) See note 15.
31) See note 18.
32) See note 3.
Formerly known as Saddam City until the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the district was rechristened in honor of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Moqtada‘s father, who along with two of his sons, was killed in an ambush by Saddam’s henchmen in 1999.
As the intruding forces progressed, they were fired upon by militants. US support was then requested; F16s flew over the area, and responded with “precision gun fire”, according to a US military statement (1).
The target of the operation was in all likelihood the notorious Abu Dereh ,“the Butcher” (2), a leader of a Shiite militia who found refuge in Sadr City. Yet, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki criticized the raid indicating that he would “ask for clarification about what has happened in Sadr Ciy, and review the issue with the multinational forces so that it will not be repeated” (3).
Sometimes referred to as the Shiite Zarqawi (4), that is to say a Shiite version of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qadae in Iraq, killed by US forces on June 8th, he is believed to have been responsible for the deaths of hundreds if not thousands of Sunnis in the Baghdad area.
He started against the Americans, but he moved on to killing Sunnis”, said Satter Awad, a local resident. “People here look at him as a brave man” (5).
Abu Dereh’s modus operandi is standard militia operating procedure: victims are selected at checkpoints, abducted, tortured, shot and discarded, often at al-Saddeh, a field in Sadr City where mutilated bodies are buried in shallow graves. Iraqis call this place “Happiness Hotel” (6)…
An anonymous letter circulating in some Sunni mosques in Baghdad last June described Abu Dereh thus:
He is a professional killer who isn’t any less dangerous than al Zarqawi. Abu Dereh is a dangerous criminal who even the Interior Minister fears. Some of the Sadr City police work under his command and other forces from the Sayyid (Muqtada al-Sadr). Abu Dereh is a wild terrorist and dozens of killers prey behind him. Everyone in Sadr City knows this madman, but they don’t say his name, it is whispered in Sadr City when they wake up to the news of blindfolded dead bodies and bodies thrown out at al Seddeh, or on the junkyards of Qasra wah Atash, even in the sewers of Rustumiya, which the Interior Ministry officially made as a place for Abu Dereh’s victims. The bodies have been raked by claws” (7).
According to some reports, he murdered one of Saddam Hussein’s defense lawyers, Khamis al-Obedi last June, and in July, kidnapped a Sunni woman MP, Tayseer Najah al-Mashhadani (8).
He has also been held responsible for cleansing entire neighborhoods of their Sunni inhabitants (9)…
The bombing by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi last February of the sacred Shiite al-Askari shrine in Samara changed the nature and intensity of sectarian warfare in Iraq. Outraged by what they deemed an egregious and sacrilegious act, many Shiites who hitherto had exercised restraint demanded retribution. Abu Dereh vigorously responded to such calls for vengeance.
As one US observer commented, “Abu Dereh is the new Shiite hero. He fights blood with more blood” (10).
The radicalisation of the Shiite movement has led to the splintering of the Mahdi Army, the militia founded by Moqtada al-Sadr after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, and composed of the Shiite slum’s downtrodden. It is all at once a political party, a paramilitary group and an organization providing welfare services to the poorest, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Yet, it also established its own Shariah courts, and metes out its rigid, ruthless brand of Islamic justice (11).
Many rogue elements of the Shiite militia went their own way, pursuing their own agendas.
Abu Dereh is thought to be one of them. Though he has been repudiated by Sadr’s organization, the exact nature of their ties is not clear.
Abu Bakr, a Mahdi Army official in Baghdad said, “He is the Mahdi Army’s first member. He kills many terrorists and we like him” (12). Sadr adamantly denies that his organization is involved in sectarian violence.
Yet, that Sadr has lost control of some of the branches of his militia seems beyond dispute.
In Basra, his inability to exert control over the militants of his organization left him with no choice but to close his office (13).
In Diwaniya, Sadr failed to prevent an armed confrontation between Mahdi Army elements and Iraqi forces last August (14).
In fact, Sadr alienated many of his followers by urging them to refrain from responding to sectarian provocations, and by choosing the political path, rather than the paramilitary one to further his objectives. Sadr no doubt concluded that the withdrawal of the occupation forces, weary and bloodied, was inevitable, and that it was wiser and safer to simply wait, play the role of the responsible, respectable political leader, taking advantage of any opportunities along the way.
Sgt 1st Class Jeff Nelson, an intelligence analyst with the US Army, stated that “they’ve (the Mahdi Army) infiltrated every branch of public service and every political office they could get their hands on. As soon as the US leaves, they’ll be able to dominate the area with key citizens, key positions, key officers. They’ll pretty much have the lay of the land” (15). Al-Sad’s goal is to establish an Islamic theocracy in Iraq.
Sadr’s party holds 30 seats in Parliament, and controls several ministries. He is one of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s most powerful supporters.
As a result, the more radical elements of his movement condemn his current strategy, considering him to be too moderate, too generous vis-à-vis the Sunnis, and too tolerant of the American presence in Iraq. One US official observed that “they’re (the radicals) not content to sit there and just defend their family on the street corner. They want to go out and take on what they view as al-Qaeda and Baathists or both in aggressive measure” (16).
Yet, the proliferation of militias has only made the situation in Iraq that much more violent and dangerous.
In Baghdad alone, there are now 23 (17) militias vying for power, and some 19 in Basra (18).
As Abdel-Aal al-Musawi, a leader of a Shiite sect in Basra said, “Each head of the militia is his own dictator. This is the reality. They don’t adhere to any limits” (19).
Internecine Shiite violence has also racked the southern city of Amarah (20), pitting the Mahdi Army against the Badr Brigade, the militia of Iraq’s main Shiite political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
As a result, the violence and anarchy has provided Iran, Iraq’s powerful Shiite neighbor, with numerous opportunities to exert influence in the country.
The Iranians have provided both funding and materiel to Abu Dereh and other freelance rebels, an investment in the post-occupation future of Iraq. A US official confirmed Iran‘s meddling in Iraqi affairs, “They’re not sure who will come out on top, so they fund everybody” (21).
The proliferation of militias, therefore, has led to a surge in sectarian violence which blatantly exposed and was facilitated by the shortcomings of the Iraqi security forces.
In many cases, the police, and in particular, the Iraqi National Police, not only has failed to quell sectarian violence, but also actively participated in attacks against the Sunni Iraqis, the latest major incident having taken place in Balad, October 13th (22).
The incompetence and complicity of the Iraqi security forces enhanced and legitimized the role of militias, and compelled neutral, moderate Iraqis to rely on the radicals for protection.
A judge on Iraq’s Criminal Court confirmed this nefarious development, “ Right now, I support the presence of the Mahdi Army. I know this is unacceptable in law, in politics, in society, but in this unusual time we are living in, this is the reality” (23).
Hence, though the disarming and disbanding of the militias is a US priority, it is considered premature by many in Iraq: “The support of the militias within the Shiite community comes from the failure of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the coalition forces to provide security. The creation of the militias comes as a reaction”, concluded Qasim Dawood, former Prime Minister Alawi’s national security minister (24). Support for the Militias may decline only if and when the government is able to provide security to all Iraqis.
The government cannot even be relied on to collect the corpses that litter the streets of Baghdad, because some districts are simply too dangerous.
If a government is too scared to pick up a body, is it a government”, asked Ibrahim (25), a Shiite from Ur in Baghdad?
The morgue itself is also often off-limits. Controlled by Sadr’s party, many Sunnis fail to claim the body of family members, fearing ambush, abduction and death at the hands of the Mahdi Army.
Hospitals are shunned for the same reasons (26)…
As for Sunis, they avoid the mainly Shiite police because it cannot be trusted. Furthermore, police officers often live in the areas they patrol, and thus are loathe to confront local militias.
A captain in the Ministry of Interior commandos agreed: “When we arrest a suspect, sometimes we get a letter from a Moqtada office asking for the suspect to be transferred to their custody. We do it. What can you do if you are a policeman standing at a checkpoint and see militiamen with a dead body? Nothing. The policemen can’t do anything. They are scared of the militia; they let them pass” (27).
As a result, one national unit has been suspended in Baghdad because of its links with militias.
The others will all be progressively retrained to ensure they behave in a professional and ethical manner (28)…
The Iraqi government neither has the will nor the means to neutralize the militias. The various Shiite paramilitary groups will thrive as long as Sunni extremists continue attacking and killing Shiites, and no one, not US forces, not Iraqi security personnel have been able to stop them from doing so…
Furthermore, because Prime Minister al-Malki is politically dependent on Moqtada al-Sadr, it is highly unlikely that he will confront the militias, and in particular the Mahdi Army, even if he could..
Not coincidentally, for the Prime Minister, the cause of the violence is elsewhere: “the efforts of all political groups should be focused on the most dangerous challenge, which is al-Qadae and the Saddam Baathists” (29). Both happen to be composed mainly of Sunnis…
Hence, it appears that the Prime Minister has pledged to support one side in Iraq’s brutal civil war.
In the meantime, “Baghdad has become the capital of death” (30), according to one resident, and Iraqis are left to cope as best they can.
Sheik Adnan Aidani, responsible for law and order in Yusufa near Basra, concluded that “everyone is on his own…These days, life is like a jungle. A rabbit doesn’t survive in a jungle. Only a lion does…Actually, it’s a little worse than anarchy” (31).
During the raid in Sadr City, ten Iraqis were killed and thirteen arrested (32).
Abu Dereh was not among them…
richard.boegner@orange.fr
Notes/
1) Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqi leader balks on U.S. timeline”, IHT, October 25, 2006.
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=3290127
2) Lydia Khalil, “Al-Sadr’s Weakening grip on the Mahdi Army”, Terrorism Focus, Vol 3, Issue 39,
October 10, 2006.
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370161&printthis=1
3) John Ward Anderson, “Iraqi Premier Denies U.S. Assertion He Agreed to Timelines”, WP,
October 26, 2006.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/25/AR2006102501138_pf.html
4) Sabrina Tavernise, “Cleric is said to lose reins over part of Iraqi militia”, IHT, September 28, 2006.
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=2959961
5) See note 4.
6) Philip Robertson, “City of vengeance”, salon.com, July 12, 2006.
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/07/12/baghdad/print.html
7) Philip Robertson, “The hatred incubator”, salon.com, July 13, 2006.
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/07/13/morgue/print.html
8) Paul McGeouch, “Lawyer’s fate sealed with a judas kiss”, Sydney Morning Herald, August 23, 2006.
http://www.smh.com.au/text/articles/2006/08/22/1156012541211.html
9) See note 8.
10) “Iraq-Shiite power struggle, Death Squads”, Villages with Torches, October 7, 2006.
http://vwt.d2g.com:8081/iraq/
11) See note 6.
12) See note 2.
13) See note 4.
14) See note 2.
15) Rick Jervis and Jim Michaels, “U.S. forces caught in crossfire on streets of ‘capital of death’ ”,
USA Today, October 23, 2006.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-10-22-baghdad-crossfire_x.htm
16) See note ‘.
17) Sudarsan Raghavan, “Militias Splintering Into Radicalized Cells”, WP, October 19, 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101801865_pf.html
18) Anthony Shahid, “In a Land Without Order, Punishment is Power”, WP, October 22 , 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/21/AR2006102101048_pf.html
19) See note 18.
20) Bourzou Daragahi, “Bloodletting continues in southern Iraq”, LAT, October 24, 2006.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq24oct24,0,6514888,print.story?coll=la- headlines-world
21) See note 4.
22) Ellen Knickmeyer, “In Balad, Age-Old Ties Were ‘Destroyed in a Second’ ”, WP, October 23, 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/22/AR2006102201071_pf.html
23) Sabrina Tavernise, “Many Iraqis look to Gunmen as Protectors”, NYT, October 21, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/21/world/middleeast/21militias.html?ei=5088&en=f934dd723f68677f&ex=1319083200&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print
24) See note 23.
25) See note 23.
26) Michael R. Gordon, “On Baghdad Streets, a Police Partnership Falters”, NYT, October 22, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/world/middleeast/22baghdad.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print ,
27) Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Tea and Kidnapping-behind the lines of a civil war”, The Guardian, October
28, 2006
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329613160-103550,00.html
28) Michael R. Gordon, “Iraq Realities Undermine the Pentagon’s Predictions”, NYT, October 25, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/25/world/middleeast/25assess.html?pagewanted=print
29) Jay Price, “Iraq’s al-Maliki sharply delineates differences with U.S. leadership”, McClatchy
Newspapers, October 26, 2006
http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/world/15857278.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp
30) See note 15.
31) See note 18.
32) See note 3.
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