Yemen´s History Distorted to Fit Freemasonic Anglo-French Goals - HRW Report´s Background

In an earlier article published under the title ´Devastating HRW Report on Yemen Reveals Need for Instant Secession of the South´

(http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/133889), I republished part of the enlightening HRW Report on South Yemen, namely the Contents, the Summary, and the Recommendations. In the present article, I republish further parts, notably the Methodology and the Background, including however again the Contents in order to offer a brief overview to readers. At the end, the notes to the aforementioned parts are made available.

Although the Report focuses on violations of Human Rights in occupied South Yemen, a brief historical background is added (that I integrally republish herewith). The background´s largest part is dedicated to the mechanisms of control and oppression, and to Yemenite politics after the forced unification. Yet, two paragraphs are included for the description of Yemenite History´s earlier phases. The over-generalizations, misconceptions, oversights and inaccuracies found therein reveal the epicenter of the problem that lies in the false representation of the historical reality by the Anglo-French academia.

Only because of the Orientalist fallacies and their totalitarian imposition throughout the Western academia and universities, the world´s mass media (controlled by those who generate the Orientalist fallacies) manage to be successful in their systematic work of distortion of today´s reality. With the average people misinformed and misled, the Freemasonic regimes of London, Paris and Washington face practically speaking no opposition to their shameful and Anti-Christian deeds.

I will first refute in brief the inaccuracies contained in these two paragraphs, and then proceed with the Report´s republication.

Error 1

"In 1962, an army coup ended centuries of rule by the Zaidi imam"

This is wrong because the Ottoman presence was determinant for four (4) consecutive centuries until 1918. The Zaidi imam had to rule in the name of the Sultan and to comply with his orders; his authority was mainly nominal. The minimization of the dominant Ottoman presence in Yemen (and elsewhwere) represents one of the most typical clichés of the Anti-Turkish racism and the Anti-Islamic hysteria of the evil Anglo-French Freemasons who falsified the World History accordingly.

Error 2

"What was then South Yemen had been a British protectorate until it achieved independence as the socialist People´s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in November 1967".

This consists in another fallacy. South Yemen was Turkish, as it belonged for many long centuries to the Ottoman Empire. The English protectorate was the result of the terrorist attack against, and annexation of, Aden; it gradually expanded later on other parts of South Yemen mainly after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The ridiculously called "British protectorate" (how do you dare associate the slaughtered Irish and the oppressed Scots with the evil deeds of the English?) started with the terrorist act against the Ottoman harbour of Aden (1839).

What sort of Satanic deed this was is easy to narrate; first, the Freemasons of the evil East India company bribed a local tribal leader named Muhsin bin Fadl who was a low and unimportant Ottoman citizen. Then, they ludicrously promoted him to the rank of ´sultan´, and finally, he conceded to them a piece of land that was not his! It is as if an American citizen today, bribed by the Russians, concedes US national territory to Russia! On such claims, English fleet anchored in Aden on 19 January 1839 to turn the geo-strategic location to colonial territory useful for the consolidation of the illegal English acquisitions in India.

The villainous and ominous English tyranny over Aden was loathed by the entire indigenous population who passionately desired to be part of the Ottoman Empire.

We can therefore conclude that speaking about the historical phase that preceded South Yemen´s independence without stating its prevalently Ottoman identity is a complete fallacy.

Error 3

"Historical accounts and the Qur´an refer to Yemen as a geographic entity"

This forgery reveals the bond between the Freemasonic colonial elites and their puppets, all the Islamic extremists ranging from Yousuf al Qaradawi to Ayman Zawahiri.

The Coran is not a historical book, and despite the fact that it contains a vast number of references to historical events, it was not revealed to serve as a manual of History.

The Coran does indeed contain many references to the Roman Empire, to the Assyrians (described as the people of Jonah because his preaching was accepted at Nineveh), to Ancient Egypt, and to the Ancient Israelites. As these references are not compatible with the Freemasonic fallacies diffused about Ancient Rome, Assyria, Egypt and Israel, they have never been taken into consideration by the West´s Freemasonic academia. In their academic courses, these shameless liars denounce the approach that the Coran can possibly be used as historical source for periods earlier than that of its revelation.

But when they deploy an effort to gain their illegitimate children (the ´Islamists´) to their ´cause´ of historical falsification (and in this case the orchestrated distortion of the History of Yemen), they do include the Coran as a point of reference. It is evident that their position shifts every time according to their interests.

In the present case, the assumption is totally false; the Coran does not include any reference to Yemen´s unity and does not refer to it as a geographic entity, but as a land with a certain number of states, cultures, peoples and civilizations that were distinct from Arabia and the Arabs. And we know very well that at the times the Coran was revealed, the entire Yemen was under Sassanid Iranian control.

But this last point does not please the evil Freemasonic elites of France and England; and that is why they don´t mention it at all.

And what are the anonymous ´historical accounts´? Nothing but a figure of speech to support the Freemasonic forgery of Yemen´s Ancient History.

In fact, we have a vast documentation about Ancient Yemen, either in Pre-Islamic Yemenite writing (erroneously called ´South Arabic´ instead of merely ´Ancient Yemenite´ by the Orientalist academia) or in other sources, e.g. Latin, Ancient Greek, Assyrian – Babylonian, Aramaic Syriac, Middle Persian, and other. In none of all these historical sources do we attest the term Yemen as designatory of a geographic entity encompassing today´s Yemen territory. Quite contrarily, the term refers to one of the Ancient Yemenite tribes. It finally applied to the entire area only during the Islamic era.

Error 4

"although kingdoms and principalities with different names existed on the territory"

The great kingdoms of Ancient Yemen did not have an all-Yemenite vocation, let alone vision, to fittingly please the fancy of today´s irrelevant Anglo-French academia. The kingdoms of Sheba, Qataban, Himyar, Awsan, Ma´in and Hadhramawt never aspired to unite the entire territory occupied by all of them. Their antagonism was at times rude, their navigational skills let them sail far away, their expasionism in Eastern Africa inaugurated an early colonialism, but despite their cultural and linguistic affinities, they never felt the need to unite – under any form whatsoever. So, this sentence cannot start with ´although´.

Error 5

"until colonial powers including the Portuguese, Ottomans, and the British occupied parts of what is now Yemen"

This is another irrelevant statement; the Portuguese never occupied any part "of what is now Yemen" except the island of Socotra (Suqutra) for a very brief period of just …… 4 years! Analytical details of the Portuguese presence on the territory of today´s Yemen, Oman, Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain is available here: http://www.colonialvoyage.com/PpossAsArabia.html.

So, the Portuguese are out.

Worse, the Ottomans were not a colonial power in either Yemen or Algeria or Egypt. This is the fallacy that the Anglo-French Freemasonic academia and diplomats strive to diffuse in order to lessen the monstrous impressions they made to all the indigenous peoples, whom they occupied, tyrannized and slaughtered, and to assuage the extremely negative memory they left in every place they invaded and thus plunged into barbarism due to their calamitous and evil colonial presence.

History made it clear that for many long centuries and from India to the Atlantic the Turks were viewed as the good and the English were considered as the evil. This is an irrvocable conclusion that neither a pseudo-historian quoted by an NGO nor an entire ´royal´ academy can change.

Finally, the English did colonize indeed the territory of South Yemen, but only gradually and mainly after the Ottoman Empire collapsed.

So, the erroneous statement should be rectified as per below:

"until the Ottomans made of Yemen part of the Islamic Caliphate again".

Error 6

"Throughout the twentieth century, people living there under different political regimes nonetheless thought of themselves as Yemenis"

This is a lie. Modern Yemen is a country with very strongly marked localism.

This occurs in continuation of the political fragmentation of Ancient and Islamic Yemen. As a matter of fact, the centrifugal forces prevail easily when quasi-inaccessible mountains, remote wadis, and vast coasts generate among various populations a certain feeling of distance, and a conviction of difference among those who may look to our eyes as just neighbours. Then comes the temptation for diverse adventure and future (in the mountains; in the desert; in the high seas), and this automatically heralds a greatly different identity.

In addition, the aforementioned statement represents a deliberate trickery; to think of yourself as Yemeni does not necessarily signify that you believe you are similar to, let alone identical with, another Yemeni. To better illustrate this reality, I hereby offer the following example:

In pre-1991 Yugoslavia, Slovenes, Kosovars and Macedonians "thought of themselves as" Yugoslavians.

However, this thought, which was common to all, did not mean common identity, let alone common acceptance of (their supposedly) common identity.

Error 7

"part of "a mythological past in ´Arabia Felix´,"[2]"

Arabia Felix represents mythology only for ignorants and uneducated people; to true historians and real scholars, Arabia Felix (in Ancient Greek ´Eudaimon Arabia´) is the term by which ancient historiographers called the fecund part of the Arabian peninsula, which corresponds approximately to the territory of today´s Yemen. As Aden was the main city – harbour in that area, the same term was attributed to Aden as well; this is attested in various texts, such as the Periplus of the Red Sea, which was written at the times of the Roman Emperor Nero (2nd half of the 1st century CE). There are no mythological contents in the references to Arabia Felix either in this text or in amy other. Eventually, there are inaccuracies in some of these texts relating to Arabia Felix; however, these do not constitute literary evidence of the "mythological past" of the area.

Error 8

"providing the popular foundation for the unification of the YAR and the PDRY"

There has never been any foundation, scholarly or popular, for the biased and ominous attempt to compress two byproducts of the colonial involvment (North Yemen and South Yemen) within the borders of a calamitous tyranny; in fact, the entire territory of Yemen belongs to Turkey and / or the Islamic Caliphate. This is the reality, and the unfairly violated legitimacy.

The much publicized - by the evil mass media of the Anti-Christian West - unification of the two ´countries´ corresponded only to the needs of the Anglo-French Freemasonic conspiarcy against the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic World.

As a necessary tool of the US fake war on terrorism, ´United Yemen´ became an infinite cemetery for all those who aspire to national integrity, cultural authenticity, linguistic continuity, historical identity, and human dignity. At the same time, it became a real danger for the entire Mankind. It is therefore high time for this colonial fabrication to be obliterated and for the tyrannized populations of Saada, Hadhramawt and Mahra to be liberated.

The inaccuracies contained in the chapter ´Background´ of the HRW Report on South Yemen do not however affect in anything the pertinency of the entire Report, and do not reduce in anything its credibility with respect to the violations of Human Rights in South Yemen – which must be worldwide denounced.

T h e Y e m e n i G o v e r n m e n t´ s B r u t a l R e s p o n s e t o S o u t h e r n M o v e m e n t P r o t e s t s

http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87085/section/1

C o n t e n t s

Summary

I. Recommendations

To the Government of Yemen

To the Southern Movement

To Yemen´s Neighbors and Donors

II. Methodology

III. Background

Unity and Secession

Security Forces

IV. The Southern Movement: An Overview

Genesis and Make-up of the Southern Movement

Declared Nonviolence and Armed Clashes

Al Qaeda in Yemen and the Southern Movement

V. Unlawful Use of Deadly Force against Peaceful Protestors

Legal Provisions on Freedom of Assembly and the Use of Deadly Force

The Role of Pro-government Militias

Denial of Medical Care and Attacks Against Medical Staff and Facilities

VI. Arbitrary Detentions and Unfair Trials

Legal standards

Mass Arbitrary Arrests

Other Arbitrary Arrests

Long-term Detention Without Charge

Detention of Children

VII. Press Censorship and Attacks against Journalists and Newspapers

Legal Standards on Freedom of Expression

"Red Lines": Government-Imposed Self-Censorship

Closure of Al-Ayyam Newspaper

Multiple Closure of Newspapers, May-June 2009

Arrests of Journalists

Attacks against Al Jazeera Television

Detention of Bloggers and Blocking of Websites

Saudi Arrest and Rendition of Yemeni Bloggers

VIII. Detention of Academics and Other Opinion-makers

Detention of Husain ´Aqil

House Arrest of Salih Yahya Sa´id

Abduction of Abd al-Khaliq Muthanna Abdullah

Acknowledgments

II. M e t h o d o l o g y

http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87085/section/4

A three-person Human Rights Watch team visited Yemen for two weeks in July 2009, carrying out research in the capital, San´a, and in the southern Yemeni cities of Aden and Mukalla. We interviewed more than 80 victims of and eyewitnesses to human rights abuses, in addition to local journalists, human rights activists, intellectuals and academics, politicians, and activists in the Southern Movement, government officials, and diplomats in the capital. We also conducted follow-up phone interviews after completion of the field mission.

For many of the cases documented in this report, Human Rights Watch also reviewed accounts in the local and international media, as well as extensive videos taken at the protests and made available on such public websites as Youtube and websites devoted to Yemen. Video materials were usually uncut and covered long periods of the incidents. We closely scrutinized video and photographic materials to determine the presence, or lack thereof, of armed persons among protesters, a crucial point of contention in the differing accounts by southern activists on the one hand, who claim that there are no armed persons at their protests, and by government officials on the other hand, who claim that deadly violence often results because of the actions of armed protesters. These videos, while invariably taken by persons affiliated with or at least sympathetic to the goals of the protestors, can provide additional evidence to supplement witness accounts Human Rights Watch collected because they generally comprised lengthy, raw, unedited footage. Human Rights Watch cross-checked videos about attacks in Habilain in April and in Zunjibar in July with detailed interviews with eyewitnesses present at the time.

We conducted most interviews in Arabic: one native Arabic-speaking member of the team interpreted for the non-Arabic-speaking member; the third member of the team conducted separate interviews in Arabic. Most interviews were conducted in a private setting, with only the interviewing team and the person interviewed present, although crowded interview settings in Mukalla made strictly private interviews difficult.

Yemeni authorities did not interfere with Human Rights Watch´s research in southern Yemen, but heavy security presence and the general security situation in some rural areas complicated field work. Local activists advised Human Rights Watch against visiting rural areas in Radfan, al-Dhali´, Abyan, and Shabwa, both because of dangers posed from armed persons in rural areas as well as the possibility that the security forces would detain our team and confiscate notes or other materials.

Websites and television stations in south Yemen announced Human Rights Watch´s visit while the team was conducting research in the area. The authorities did not directly interfere with our work in Aden, but an escort of armed tourist police and an armed security officer in civilian clothes waited for our team at our hotel in Mukalla, and insisted on accompanying our team on our second day, citing concern for our safety, which made further research impossible. Agents of the Political Security Organization, a domestic intelligence agency, that same night telephoned a local taxi driver, who had briefly driven the team around on its first day in Mukalla, and questioned him about our activities. An official of the National Security Agency in San´a, another intelligence organization, told a Yemeni human rights activist that he was aware of our activities and presence in Aden before such news became public.

Human Rights Watch is grateful to the Minister of Human Rights, Dr. Huda Alban, for promptly accommodating our request for a meeting, and for the detailed information her office provided. Unfortunately, that meeting coincided with the timing of a separate meeting the Ministry of Interior had arranged with its deputy minister; we were only informed of that meeting by phone while we were at the meeting with Dr. Alban. We appreciate the Interior Ministry´s willingness to meet to discuss the situation in south Yemen.

III. B a c k g r o u n d

http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87085/section/5

Yemen is a country of 22 million people, geographically slightly larger than France, on the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula across the Red Sea from the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia). The World Bank estimated Yemen´s annual per capita gross domestic product at US$520 in 2003, making it one of the poorest countries in the world. That year, Yemen ranked 151 out of 177 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index.[1] Three quarters of Yemenis live in rural areas.

In 1962, an army coup ended centuries of rule by the Zaidi imam, establishing the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), in what many referred to as North Yemen. A civil war in the 1960s drew-in Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the republican and imamate sides respectively. What was then South Yemen had been a British protectorate until it achieved independence as the socialist People´s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in November 1967.

Unity and Secession

Historical accounts and the Qur´an refer to Yemen as a geographic entity, although kingdoms and principalities with different names existed on the territory until colonial powers including the Portuguese, Ottomans, and the British occupied parts of what is now Yemen. Throughout the twentieth century, people living there under different political regimes nonetheless thought of themselves as Yemenis, part of "a mythological past in ´Arabia Felix´,"[2] providing the popular foundation for the unification of the YAR and the PDRY.

In 1989, the PDRY´s Soviet backers pulled out their military personnel, recalled their advisers, and cut aid, leading the government to begin a program of political liberalization and to consider union with the north.[3] The YAR, meanwhile, also faced economic pressures and was keen to develop oil fields around Shabwa, in the territory of the PDRY.[4] The two leaders, Ali Salim al-Baidh and Ali Abdullah Saleh, declared unity of the two Yemens on May 22, 1990 as the Republic of Yemen. Yemen embarked on a path of multiparty politics and held its first elections in 1993. Rather than spur unity, the elections reinforced the divide between southern Yemen which overwhelmingly voted for Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) candidates, and northern Yemen, whose voters returned candidates of the Islah party, an Islamist group, and General People´s Congress (GPC), the party of President Saleh.[5] Relations between the YSP and the GPC, which had formed a coalition government after 1990, deteriorated over policy differences, not least the speed and extent of integration of the two separate armies, bureaucratic and judicial reform, and measures against corruption and terrorism.[6] An attack on southern army units stationed in the north, allegedly by northern tribesmen, sparked the civil war of April-June 1994, which ended in southern defeat.[7]

After the 1994 war, the authorities in San`a forcibly retired many southern military officers and civil servants and replaced them with northerners. Many southerners regard the defeat as the beginning of a sharp decline in their economic fortunes and the start of an even greater marginalization of southerners in northerner-dominated united Yemen, although southern Yemen´s formerly socialist economy was already in sharp decline long before the civil war, and mismanagement of the economy was one of the main factors driving South Yemen towards unification.[8] The damage from the war and the looting to factories and industries was never fully repaired, and southerners claim that economic patronage and oil-based development has bypassed them in favor of northerners.[9] According to southern accounts, southern land and oil contracts often went to northerners close to the president, and the profits from Yemen´s oil exploitation in the south lined the pockets of northerners.[10] Some 100,000 retired southern military officers and civil servants only sporadically received their pensions.[11] Suspensions of pensions often appear to be politically motivated, occurring after the individual participated in a political protest.[12] These economic grievances are at the core of the southern protests.

Security Forces

There are many security agencies in Yemen answering to different parts of the executive. Their remits overlap, leading to public uncertainty about which agency might be responsible for a particular human rights violation.

A 1980 presidential order established Central Security (al-Amn al-Markazi), tasking the agency with responsibilities ranging from ensuring the safety of property and persons to border patrolling and counter-terrorism.[13] Central Security is officially under the Minister of Interior´s direct authority.[14] This agency has been heavily involved in the use of force against southern demonstrators.

Also under the Interior Ministry are the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) responsible for non-political crimes, and a separate counter-terrorism unit. However, both the CID and the counter-terrorism unit have carried out arrests of persons for alleged political offenses. The CID has been responsible for many of the arrests of southern protestors and activists at the local level.

Political Security is Yemen´s domestic intelligence agency, established by Decree 121 in 1992 as the Central Agency for Political Security (al-Jihaz al-Markazi lil-Amn al-Siyasi). Its powers of arrest and detention derive only from this decree and not from any law, and its detention facilities are not among the authorized places of detention, as required by the Yemeni constitution.[15] The agency reports directly to President Saleh. Political Security appears to be responsible chiefly for arresting suspected leaders and organizers of the Southern Movement, as well as intellectuals and other prominent persons involved with the Southern Movement whose influence reaches beyond the local level.

National Security, an agency established by decree 262 in 2002, mainly prepares analyses and provides advice to the government. A dispute over competency and authority between it and Political Security led National Security to establish its own detention centers in the early 2000s, also undeclared and therefore outside the framework of Yemeni law. Its powers of arrest and detention similarly only derive from decree and not law.[16] This agency does not appear to play much of a role in the state´s response to the Southern Movement.

Other agencies that witnesses said are involved in suppressing protests, arresting or detaining activists include the military police, Presidential Guard, military intelligence, and various military units, including air defense troops.

Yemen´s judiciary provides no effective oversight over the legality of arrests and detentions. National Security and Political Security in particular do not abide by requirements under Yemeni´s Criminal Procedure Law of 1994 that officials conduct arrests only pursuant to a warrant, present suspects for charge within 24 hours of arrest, and release prisoners whose sentences have expired.[17]

The Specialized Criminal Court (al-Mahkama al-Jaza´iyya al-Mutakhassisa), established by law in 1999, was originally set up to try crimes defined in the Qur´an and included in the Penal Code, such as highway robbery (hiraba), in addition to other statutory offenses not specified in the Qur´an, including the abduction of foreigners, harming oil installations, theft by armed groups of means of transportation, membership in an armed group seeking to attack public property or citizens, and attacking members of the judiciary or abducting officials or their family members. In 2004, a new law broadened the court´s jurisdiction to include vaguely-worded crimes against national security.[18] The court, like most of the judiciary in Yemen, is not independent and its trials do not meet international standards of fairness.[19]

Notes

1] World Bank, "Yemen," http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/YEMENEXT/o,,menuPK:310170~pagePK:141159~piPK:14110~theSitePK:310165,00.html (last accessed October 2, 2008).

2] Joseph Kostiner, "Yemen. The Tortuous Quest for Unity, 1990-94," The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: 1996), p.2.

3] Joseph Kostiner, "Yemen," p.7.

4] Joseph Kostiner, "Yemen," p.11. See also: Klaus Enders et al., "Yemen in the 1990s: From Unification to Economic Reform," International Monetary Fund, Occasional Papers 208, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/op/208/index.htm (accessed October 29, 2009), p. 4.

5]Brian Whitaker, The Birth of Modern Yemen (2009), e-book published at www.al-bab.com/yemen/birthofmodernyemen (accessed October 28, 2009), p.137.

6] Joseph Kostiner, "Yemen," p. 65-74.

7] Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Yemen: Human Rights in Yemen During and After the 1994 War, vol. 6, no. 5, October 1994, p.6.

8]Brian Whitaker, The Birth of Modern Yemen, pp. 16-22. A 1990 contemporary account described the economic conditions in South Yemen prior to unification as follows: "[T]he economy had effectively broken down; farmers refused to deliver food for the miserable prices they could get, for weeks the only food available in Aden market was potatoes, bread and onions. The government´s coffers were empty…" Liesl Graz, "South Yemen Waits for Unity," Middle East International, March 16, 1990.

9] Ginny Hill, "Yemen: Fear of Failure," Chatham House Middle East Programme Briefing Paper, November 2008, p.5.

10]"Troubled Yemen," The Economist (London), June 2, 2009.

11]Brian Whitaker, The Birth of Modern Yemen, p. 216.

12] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Jamal Shunaitir, teacher, Shabwa, and Ali bin Yahya, civil servant in education department, Shabwa, July 12, 2009.

13] Republican Decision no 107, Ministry of Interior, 1980, published on the website of the Central Security Forces, www.yemencsf.org (accessed November 28, 2009).

14]Ministry of Interior, Organizational Regulation of the Ministry of Interior, 1995. www.police-info.gov.ye/laws/Min01.htm (accessed August 19, 2008).

15] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Qasim, lawyer, San´a, September 2, 2008. According to information Human Rights Watch obtained, the Political Security agency´s places of detention are also not authorized as required by the Constitution. Yemen´s constitution prohibits detention "in any place not authorized under the Prisons Administration Law." Constitution of the Republic of Yemen, 2001, art. 48(b).

16] President of the Republic of Yemen, "Republican Decision on the Establishment of the National Security Agency by the Republic of Yemen," August 6, 2002. Article 5.2 provides National Security officers with the powers of judicial arrest officers. Article 84 of Yemen´s law of Criminal Procedure lists prosecutors, governors, police officers and others as "judicial arrest officers," and further specifies that "all officers who have been given the quality of judicial arrest officers by law (emphasis added) may be added to the list." President of the Republic of Yemen, "Republican Decision on Law no 13 of Year 1994 Regarding Criminal Procedures," articles 84-9.

17] Republican Decision on Law no 13 for the Year 1994 Regarding Criminal Procedure.

18] Republican Decision on Law no 391 for the Year 1999 Regarding the Specialized Criminal Court, art. 3; and Republican Decision on Law no 8 for the Year 2004, Regarding the Specialized Criminal Court, art 1.

19] Human Rights Watch interview with defense lawyer for suspected Huthi rebel sympathizers [name withheld on request], San´a, July 2008. The lawyer detailed how the court refused to allow defense witnesses to give evidence, and how the court accepted prosecution allegations, such as plans to poison San´a´s water supply, without evidence.

Note

Picture: Innocent victims of the criminal US raid against those who have been falsely and fallaciously labeled as "Islamic terrorists" in Abyan, Occupied South Yemen. From: http://www.yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=33242