A European dwarf and an American giant
Dr. George Voskopoulos
July 21, 2006
The ongoing crisis in Lebanon has once again illustrated that political leaderships in Israel and Palestine have failed to see the merits of a political solution to the Palestin-ian issue. Actually I still believe that this is the only viable solution to the dispute.
Above all it shows that military muscle has never ceased to define international be-havior thus making Political Realism a compass showing the way to predominance. In terms of the international configuration of power the US is the powerful actor that manipulates crises according to its perceived or misperceived national interests.
The current American administration has the power and influence to put an end the war and the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon but refuses to act and threatens to veto any decision by the United Nations Security Council. The appeal of UN Secretary General Koffi Anan to end military operations and “an immediate cessation of hostili-ties” was literally ignored and overlaid any international effort to put an end to the crisis.
President Bush has the power to effectively intervene but chooses to wait. It does so simply because it can, because this is viewed as a cost-effective strategy for a limited milieu of people around him. Actually this is one of the basic elements that enable him to materialize policies not appreciated by US allies. That is the uniform, compact way he and his administration conceptualize the world and advance narrow national interests. The second element that allows the application of similar policies is that America’s long-standing ally, Europe, is a political pigmy.
In diplomatic and strategic terms the European Union is absent from the Middle East. It constitutes a virtual player not disposing a macrostrategic plan for the region. Unless making appeals constitutes an act of exercising foreign policy. It is obvious that the EU’s depiction as an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm is more than accurate. The status of the EU as an international player and its inefficiency and dramatically limited regulatory and normative role in international politics set on-tological dilemmas to those of us who teach European Studies.
Where has the long step-by-step, incremental process of European integration led us after more than five decades? To what extent do the Cold War assumptions of com-patible interests between the US and Europe depict the realities of the post-Cold War order? Is it viable and realistic today to talk about a uniform framework of exercising an operationally and diplomatically fragmented European foreign policy? Is the “en-hanced cooperation model” the only way forward for a strong Europe?
These are hard questions for European leaders and above all European peoples. The latter sent their loud message with the French and the Dutch referenda on the Consti-tutional Treaty. This weak Europe cannot project alternative solutions to regional cri-ses nor can restrain its powerful ally across the Atlantic. A strong Europe could be useful to the US too, as it could assist it to put its multifaceted structural power in good use. However, this cannot materialize without political muscle and the presence of an American leadership operating outside the myopic syndrome of a superpower. Obviously a dwarf and a giant have by status and capabilities different views of the world.
Above all it shows that military muscle has never ceased to define international be-havior thus making Political Realism a compass showing the way to predominance. In terms of the international configuration of power the US is the powerful actor that manipulates crises according to its perceived or misperceived national interests.
The current American administration has the power and influence to put an end the war and the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon but refuses to act and threatens to veto any decision by the United Nations Security Council. The appeal of UN Secretary General Koffi Anan to end military operations and “an immediate cessation of hostili-ties” was literally ignored and overlaid any international effort to put an end to the crisis.
President Bush has the power to effectively intervene but chooses to wait. It does so simply because it can, because this is viewed as a cost-effective strategy for a limited milieu of people around him. Actually this is one of the basic elements that enable him to materialize policies not appreciated by US allies. That is the uniform, compact way he and his administration conceptualize the world and advance narrow national interests. The second element that allows the application of similar policies is that America’s long-standing ally, Europe, is a political pigmy.
In diplomatic and strategic terms the European Union is absent from the Middle East. It constitutes a virtual player not disposing a macrostrategic plan for the region. Unless making appeals constitutes an act of exercising foreign policy. It is obvious that the EU’s depiction as an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm is more than accurate. The status of the EU as an international player and its inefficiency and dramatically limited regulatory and normative role in international politics set on-tological dilemmas to those of us who teach European Studies.
Where has the long step-by-step, incremental process of European integration led us after more than five decades? To what extent do the Cold War assumptions of com-patible interests between the US and Europe depict the realities of the post-Cold War order? Is it viable and realistic today to talk about a uniform framework of exercising an operationally and diplomatically fragmented European foreign policy? Is the “en-hanced cooperation model” the only way forward for a strong Europe?
These are hard questions for European leaders and above all European peoples. The latter sent their loud message with the French and the Dutch referenda on the Consti-tutional Treaty. This weak Europe cannot project alternative solutions to regional cri-ses nor can restrain its powerful ally across the Atlantic. A strong Europe could be useful to the US too, as it could assist it to put its multifaceted structural power in good use. However, this cannot materialize without political muscle and the presence of an American leadership operating outside the myopic syndrome of a superpower. Obviously a dwarf and a giant have by status and capabilities different views of the world.
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