Irregular Warfare Education: Winning the Long War

Undoubtedly, warfare has never been a static endeavor. One can see throughout history the changing landscape of the battlefield, and how technological advances have served as catalysts that caused shifts in the paradigm of warfare, both as a science and an art. For example, the introduction of mounted cavalry onto the battlefield, iron smelting causing the leap from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age, the development of gun powder, and today´s computer and nuclear technologies creating evermore deadly weapons provide evidence that warfare is an evolving endeavor. Significantly, the combatant who mastered the paradigm shift first has inevitably proved the victor.

While technology has normally marked the greatest changes in the conduct of warfare, events during the last decade serve as a reminder that change can also be achieved through the application of new strategies and novel approaches which can produce a significant shift in the way America conducts warfare. The attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 marked a significant turning point in modern warfare. The United States had not been struck by a conventional, military force for which America was well prepared, but a small group of non-state actors capable of mounting unconventional operations that were devastating in their results and global in reach.

The enemy the United States faces in this newly coined Overseas Contingency Operation has shifted the paradigm of warfare by essentially rendering ineffective the use of conventional military force through the use of unconventional tactics to counterbalance technological superiority. As explained in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, irregular threats employ unconventional methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. The Administration´s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released September 5, 2006, identifies the United States´ principal terrorist enemy as a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks and individuals and further explains that from the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas – a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology.

These terrorist groups, most notable among them Al Qaeda, are not easily identifiable military forces, do not employ conventional military tactics, and do not seek to attain the goals of a recognizable state that can be engaged through traditional diplomatic or political channels. Militarily, American forces have been able to kill or capture terrorist leaders, operatives, and supporters, yet these actions merely address one aspect of irregular warfare and do not get to the root of the problem, which rests in understanding the unconventional and irregular nature of our enemies.

While the United States military is currently deeply engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be difficult to predict where and against whom the United States will fight next. Yet regardless of future adversaries, perhaps by far the most important ingredient of America´s future Armed forces will be the training and education of adaptable leaders.

Both current and past senior civilian defense officials reportedly have grown increasingly frustrated with the conventional mindset of many strategic level military officers. In their view, too many senior leaders are overly cautious, lacking the fresh thinking, creativity, and ingenuity to engage in the "out-of-the-box" thinking required to fully understand the new asymmetric threats and challenges posed by the global war on terrorism.

One explanation lies in the professional military education provided to these senior military officers throughout their careers. Following the Vietnam War, where irregular warfare experiences were honed through several years of continuous unconventional fighting, the military education system seemingly discarded the lessons-learned in irregular warfare and opted for conventional Air-Land Battle doctrine. In doing so, irregular warfare lessons-learned were left to the special operations units and considered less important than waging large tank and infantry battles. According to Andy Messing, a noted Irregular Warfare expert, the main problem and the problem of the current Military establishment…is they think in conventional military terms in an irregular warfare environment…hobbyists & academics delight in trying to fit a size 13 foot into a size 7 shoe.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech delivered at National Defense University on January 31, 2002, made clear the future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances. General Richard Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also noted how Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters have made lots of adaptations to our tactics and we´ve got to continue to try to out-think them and to be faster at it. Future efforts in the long war against terrorist networks include many operations characterized by irregular warfare – operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state. America is engaged in a global conflict, and our efforts confronting the enemy must also be global in nature and focused on the irregular war environment.

If America plans to succeed, the long war effort must aggressively use all elements of America´s power, including diplomatic, informational, economic, intelligence, and law enforcement activities. Education is the key to understanding how war-fighters might apply these elements of national power to defeat irregular adversaries. War-fighters are shaping doctrine in irregular warfare and effective doctrine explains how the military expects to fight and operate based on past experience and a best guess of what lies ahead. Doctrine (a) provides the link between research, theory, history, experimentation, and practice, (b) encapsulates a body of knowledge and experience so it can be applied, (c) provides common understanding and a common language, which allows leaders to articulate clearly and succinctly what Army forces should accomplish.

The Department of Defense recently refined irregular warfare doctrine to encompass a holistic United States Government and partner nation approach to waging irregular warfare. No longer mutually exclusive to Army doctrine, the 2007 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept provides the guidelines for applying irregular warfare concepts across all military service branches and government agencies. No one can predict the future of irregular warfare, but those that will lead in the upcoming decades will be those institutions that can create the future---those that can create the desired changes and offer learners the knowledge and skills necessary for making a contribution and gaining prosperity.

The Department of Defense must provide enhanced opportunities for individuals and units to learn to deal with the asymmetric and irregular threats associated with the current national security environment. We cannot fail to recognize the value of experiences gained since 9/11 in the conduct of irregular warfare and the potential application such experiences might have in educating current and future war-fighters.

Our nation´s military is transforming to meet the requirements of the war against terrorists and our war-fighters are gaining invaluable experience and expertise in addressing irregular warfare. Adding to these ongoing challenges, new social technologies, and the ability to collectively gather, share and compare ideas and information creates new opportunities to build more relevant, engaging, collaborative knowledge-building environments. Yet, we must act now if we expect our future war-fighters to continue to win irregular wars.