Is Pakistan Serious Against Terrorism?
Abdulhadi Hairan
July 10, 2009
To answer this serious and important question, we need to thoroughly review the facts and myths that surround the existence of terrorist safe havens in the tribal areas, their strong presence and the run-amok style activities in the settled areas and the way the government of Pakistan has been handling the situation.
Since their first appearance in the tribal areas, then in small groups and in a vulnerable position, the militants were given a free hand, even, according to reliable sources and the eye witnesses, were encouraged and supported by the government authorities and secret agencies. The agencies secretly let, encouraged, and supported the militants to carry out their operations while the government publicly accused the Afghan refugees of doing all the pandemonium. A good example was the Bajaur and Waziristan tribal areas where camps of Afghan refugees were closed down and the inhabitants were forced out. But, they were hardly out of the area that the militants seized the opportunity and established their own training camps. The government did not act to stop them. Later, the militants and the government entered into an agreement which gave the militants ample opportunity to reorganize their commanders and recruit armies of their own.
A less similar course of action was adopted in Swat and Dir where the militants aggressively used FM radio channels to recruit and train hordes of youths without any trouble from the government or its army and secret agencies. The officials publicly issued statements advocating for the rights of the militant forces fighting in Afghanistan and thought that their activities in Pakistan were of no importance. President Pervez Musharraf and the then governor of Pashtunkhwa (N.W.F.P.) province continued to try convincing the international community that the Waziristan deal will work and peace will be restored.
The deal did not work and peace was not restored in Waziristan, instead, the militants reached Islamabad, where a bloody and violent operation had to be launched against them in the Red Mosque, resulting in the killing of one of the two in charge brothers, who were confidants of the army and many government officials since the days of former president Zia ul Haq. The other was arrested while fleeing in burqa. In Swat, the militant army of Mullah Fazlullah, numbered in several thousands and armed with sophisticated weapons, had threatened to carry out a jihad against the government if the operation was not stopped. But the burqa episode made them to back off of their jihad. The government still did not realize the immensity of the threat and the militants eventually waged their war.
Result? Fierce fight started, thousands of innocent people killed, millions others displaced, the scenic valley of Swat turned into ruins, and the militant leaders are still at large.
And, as the government and all its stakeholders are still not in a state of willingness to completely eliminate the threat, I think it is not serious against terrorism. Till this day, the government of Pakistan lacks a clear policy and definite strategy in this war. It is confused about losing of its 'strategic assets.' It has no consensus on the threat. Its media, its generals, and its ulema still want the Taliban to be stable and unwavering in Afghanistan, while some times issue fatwas against those active in their own country. They condemn the drone attacks that kill foreign militants in Waziristan and Bannu. Finally, the government of Pakistan is not serious against terrorism. As long as it receives dollars in millions, it will keep the war continued. The day the flow of dollars stopped, the 'strategic assets' will be back in the government, in the army, and everywhere.
Since their first appearance in the tribal areas, then in small groups and in a vulnerable position, the militants were given a free hand, even, according to reliable sources and the eye witnesses, were encouraged and supported by the government authorities and secret agencies. The agencies secretly let, encouraged, and supported the militants to carry out their operations while the government publicly accused the Afghan refugees of doing all the pandemonium. A good example was the Bajaur and Waziristan tribal areas where camps of Afghan refugees were closed down and the inhabitants were forced out. But, they were hardly out of the area that the militants seized the opportunity and established their own training camps. The government did not act to stop them. Later, the militants and the government entered into an agreement which gave the militants ample opportunity to reorganize their commanders and recruit armies of their own.
A less similar course of action was adopted in Swat and Dir where the militants aggressively used FM radio channels to recruit and train hordes of youths without any trouble from the government or its army and secret agencies. The officials publicly issued statements advocating for the rights of the militant forces fighting in Afghanistan and thought that their activities in Pakistan were of no importance. President Pervez Musharraf and the then governor of Pashtunkhwa (N.W.F.P.) province continued to try convincing the international community that the Waziristan deal will work and peace will be restored.
The deal did not work and peace was not restored in Waziristan, instead, the militants reached Islamabad, where a bloody and violent operation had to be launched against them in the Red Mosque, resulting in the killing of one of the two in charge brothers, who were confidants of the army and many government officials since the days of former president Zia ul Haq. The other was arrested while fleeing in burqa. In Swat, the militant army of Mullah Fazlullah, numbered in several thousands and armed with sophisticated weapons, had threatened to carry out a jihad against the government if the operation was not stopped. But the burqa episode made them to back off of their jihad. The government still did not realize the immensity of the threat and the militants eventually waged their war.
Result? Fierce fight started, thousands of innocent people killed, millions others displaced, the scenic valley of Swat turned into ruins, and the militant leaders are still at large.
And, as the government and all its stakeholders are still not in a state of willingness to completely eliminate the threat, I think it is not serious against terrorism. Till this day, the government of Pakistan lacks a clear policy and definite strategy in this war. It is confused about losing of its 'strategic assets.' It has no consensus on the threat. Its media, its generals, and its ulema still want the Taliban to be stable and unwavering in Afghanistan, while some times issue fatwas against those active in their own country. They condemn the drone attacks that kill foreign militants in Waziristan and Bannu. Finally, the government of Pakistan is not serious against terrorism. As long as it receives dollars in millions, it will keep the war continued. The day the flow of dollars stopped, the 'strategic assets' will be back in the government, in the army, and everywhere.
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