Follow-up on the Former Moldavian SSR Commentary
Michael Averko
May 20, 2009
Last month's parliamentary election and political demonstration in Moldova led to greater attention focused on that country. A few relatively high placed articles on the subject have been followed up on.
Appearing shortly before the vote and protest, Vlad Spanu's March 20 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) commentary "Backroom Deals Can't Solve Transdniester Dispute" acknowledges the popularity of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev in Moldova, where they have respectively run 1-2 in popularity among politicians worldwide. This point relates to the simultaneous desires of wanting good relations with the West, without being so against Russia and its leadership.
Concerning the disputed territory of Pridnestrovie (Transdniester), Spanu suggests that its government is a Russian creation with no legitimacy. Therefore, he wants Pridnestrovie's government to be excluded from settlement talks. There are some valid points running counter to this stance.
In Pridnestrovie, there is no evidence of a noticeable pro-Moldovan government/anti-Pridnestrovian government movement. For whatever its shortcomings, the disputed territory is not a North Korea like totalitarian society, where outside contact is extremely limited. The 1,200 or so Russian troops in Pridnestrovie are not enough to intimidate pro-Moldovan government/anti-Pridnestrovian government activity. Note how the foreign troop deployments in Iraq (by the current forces stationed there), Afghanistan (during the Soviet occupation period and that of others) and South Vietnam (by the United States) have/were unable to eliminate a noticeable opposition to their presence.
The Moldovan government's decision to openly interact with Pridnestrovie's government is an acknowledgement of reality, as opposed to pursuing an unrealistic expectation. There is little if any reason to doubt that Pridnestrovie's government is more popular in Pridnestrovie than Moldova's.
As a natural border, the Dniester River (separating much of Pridnestrovie and Moldova) has played a profound role in shaping the contrasting historical experiences and developed differences between Moldova and Pridnestrovie. In conjunction to this geographic matter are Moldova's land border with Romania, with Pridnestrovie bordering Ukraine and being closer to (when compared to Moldova) Russia.
Peter Lavelle's April 10 RFE/RL commentary "Unrest in Georgia, Moldova Reflects Precedent Set By Kosovo" states: "Many in breakaway Transdniester are watching the recent events in Moldova with satisfaction, in that the unrest and violence only serve as a further reason why they should not agree, in the wake of Kosovo's independence, to once again become a part of Moldova." For clarity sake, the territory of Pridnestrovie was never part of an independent Moldova. The two were together during periods of the Russian Empire (1812-1917) and Soviet Union (1940-1991), as part of a greater national entity. (Pridnestrovie declared its independence in 1990, within the year prior to the Soviet breakup.) In the instance of Kosovo, it was part of Serbia in Yugoslav and pre-Yugoslav times. Kosovo was never part of an independent Albania, or an independent entity unto itself. When Moldova had its own independent principality from 1359-1538, followed by becoming a part of the Ottoman Empire until 1812 - Pridnestrovie's territory had different affiliations, with Halych-Volhynia (part of the former Rus state), the Tatar Khanate, Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Kingdom of Poland and Russian Empire - the latter beginning in 1792 (whereas Moldova became part of the Russian Empire in 1812). Between 1918-1940, Moldova was part of Romania, unlike Pridnestrovie, which had an autonomous status as part of the Ukrainian SSR.
In Moldova, there is currently a noteworthy minority seeking unification with Romania. The degree of this sentiment is not present in Pridnestrovie - where becoming part of Russia is popular in a way that is not evident in Moldova.
Melik Kaylin's April 21 Forbes.com article "Moscow, Leave Moldova Alone" makes a series of questionable generalizations that downplays valid counterpoints. His comments about Pridnestrovie, South Ossetia and Abkhazia suggestively deny any credibility of their claims, by portraying an exclusively Russian inspired production of mischief making. If Russia is so bad, these disputed former Soviet territories should not be showing such a preference for Moscow, in comparison to those claiming them.
Drifting away from the title of Kaylin's article, this excerpt overlooks some related aspects: "So why not regress to the protective womb of a Moscow-orchestrated past-with-no-future? If the sins are equal on both sides, what distinguishes one side from the other? In recent days, for example, Azerbaijan has held talks with Russia to revive their relationship because Turkey is making moves to befriend Armenia. Azerbaijan threatens to reroute its oil and gas supplies to Europe through Russia rather than Turkey."
The stated Azeri displeasure with Armenian-Turkish talks has waned. Turkey's attempt at improving its relationship with Armenia was not initiated to change the Turkish view on the Armenian-Azeri dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh (one that sympathizes with the Azeri territorial claim). Turkey having good relations with Yerevan and Baku provides Ankara with the potential of increasing its diplomatic clout in Nagorno-Karabakh settlement talks. There is another factor to consider. Some European Union nations seem to be looking for a reason to exclude Turkey from that organization. Turkish authorities remain steadfast in not wanting to call what happened to the Armenians at the end of World War I a genocide. Instead, the Turkish government seems to be looking for another way to mend its relationship with the Armenian community - with the apparent hope that such a move will focus attention away from petitioning Turkey to recognize the past action against the Armenians as a genocide.
As was recently noted, Azerbaijan is motivated to consider a fossil fuel transit route deal with Russia out of the increased instability caused by the Georgian government's strike of this past summer on South Ossetia. (Georgian territory has been considered as a transit route for Azeri oil). In addition, like Moldova, Azerbaijan seeks territory that it does not control. With the Kremlin in a strong big power negotiating position, good relations with Russia serve to increase the likelihood of Moldovan and Azeri goals. This opinion is enhanced by how the manner of the Georgian government (its attack on South Ossetia) contributed to Russia's recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence.
Among others, a good number of American foreign policy realists will probably find irony with Kaylin's closing comments: "Dear old Russkies, you have given the world so much in the way of consolation for the human condition, Chekhov and Bulgakov and Pushkin and Rachmaninov and so much else, it's time to let go of Europe. Forget the U.S. threat, forget NATO and the E.U. and equivalency--all those excuses for playing the path of barbarism. Nobody is out to destroy you. As a political and strategic force you have wrought nothing but misery. Let the Moldovans go." Since the Cold War's end, what is the size and geographical range of Russian troop deployments in comparison to their American counterparts? Characterizing Russian troop deployments as non-altruistic unlike Western ones deemphasizes two points. Some non-Russian Federation areas of the former Soviet Union are not opposed to the Russian military presence beyond Russia's borders. At the same time, one can reasonably second guess certain attributes regarding some of the Western forces stationed abroad.
Appearing in The Weekly Standard on April 21, Stephen Schwartz's article "Why Moldova?" is noteworthy for several reasons. His commentary frequently appears at this leading neoconservative leaning venue. When discussing Russia, his often flippant use of terms like "Russian imperialism," "harsh realties of Slavic rule," "Russian expansionism" and "Russian propaganda" are rhetorically excessive.
Schwartz's piece starts off with an incorrect statement about Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin's ethnicity (Schwartz refers to him as an ethnic Russian). Contrary to what he states, Voronin is an ethnic Moldovan (upon initially seeing Voronin's name awhile back, I erred as well).
Schwartz stresses the similarity between Moldovans and Romanians in a way that sympathizes with the idea of Moldova becoming a part of Romania again. He makes no mention about how the majority of Moldovans do not presently appear to favor this merger.
Schwartz finds Moldova's incorporation into the Soviet Union as analogous to what happened to Estonia and Latvia during the same period. Overlooked in his presentation, is Pridnestrovie's history up to that point. (Specifically, its not having ever been part of an independent Moldova or Romania, as it was arbitrarily put into the 1940 established Moldavian SSR.)
In Schwartz's article, Kosovo's independence claim is treated as legitimate unlike Pridnestrovie's. Putting aside the big power geopolitics influencing the determination of independence claims, Pridnestrovie has a better historic and human rights claim to statehood than Kosovo.
The appearance of his article at a high profile neoconservative leaning venue is a good indicator of how geopolitically tilted the commentary can get. In this sense, it is worth reading.
In closing, I want to again thank the organizers of the recently completed World Russia Forum (in Washington DC) for inviting me to express my views and answer questions related to Russia-West relations, vis-à-vis the disputed former Communist bloc territories. At this event, it was a pleasure making new acquaintances, as well as seeing people I already know and others who I have known from a distance.
Related Sources:
>> American Chronicle (http://www.americanchronicle.com) "Settling the Dispute Over Nagorno-Karabakh," March 31 and updated on April 4. With hyperlinks, this article of mine appeared at Russia Blog (http://www.russiablog.org) on April 6 under the title "At the Crossroads of Strategic Pipeline Corridors: Settling the Dispute Over Nagorno-Karabakh." This piece was an update to the one that originally appeared at Global Research (http://www.globalresearch.ca) and Eurasian Home (http://www.eurasianhome.org) on April 1. In addition to the referenced venues, I thank the other venues which picked it up. MMA
>> Sunday's Zaman (http://www.sunday.zaman.com) "Cornered Between Yerevan and Baku, Turkey Tries to Comfort Azerbaijan," May 17
>> The New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com) "As East and West Pull on Moldova, Loyalties and Division Run Deep," April 14
Appearing shortly before the vote and protest, Vlad Spanu's March 20 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) commentary "Backroom Deals Can't Solve Transdniester Dispute" acknowledges the popularity of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev in Moldova, where they have respectively run 1-2 in popularity among politicians worldwide. This point relates to the simultaneous desires of wanting good relations with the West, without being so against Russia and its leadership.
Concerning the disputed territory of Pridnestrovie (Transdniester), Spanu suggests that its government is a Russian creation with no legitimacy. Therefore, he wants Pridnestrovie's government to be excluded from settlement talks. There are some valid points running counter to this stance.
In Pridnestrovie, there is no evidence of a noticeable pro-Moldovan government/anti-Pridnestrovian government movement. For whatever its shortcomings, the disputed territory is not a North Korea like totalitarian society, where outside contact is extremely limited. The 1,200 or so Russian troops in Pridnestrovie are not enough to intimidate pro-Moldovan government/anti-Pridnestrovian government activity. Note how the foreign troop deployments in Iraq (by the current forces stationed there), Afghanistan (during the Soviet occupation period and that of others) and South Vietnam (by the United States) have/were unable to eliminate a noticeable opposition to their presence.
The Moldovan government's decision to openly interact with Pridnestrovie's government is an acknowledgement of reality, as opposed to pursuing an unrealistic expectation. There is little if any reason to doubt that Pridnestrovie's government is more popular in Pridnestrovie than Moldova's.
As a natural border, the Dniester River (separating much of Pridnestrovie and Moldova) has played a profound role in shaping the contrasting historical experiences and developed differences between Moldova and Pridnestrovie. In conjunction to this geographic matter are Moldova's land border with Romania, with Pridnestrovie bordering Ukraine and being closer to (when compared to Moldova) Russia.
Peter Lavelle's April 10 RFE/RL commentary "Unrest in Georgia, Moldova Reflects Precedent Set By Kosovo" states: "Many in breakaway Transdniester are watching the recent events in Moldova with satisfaction, in that the unrest and violence only serve as a further reason why they should not agree, in the wake of Kosovo's independence, to once again become a part of Moldova." For clarity sake, the territory of Pridnestrovie was never part of an independent Moldova. The two were together during periods of the Russian Empire (1812-1917) and Soviet Union (1940-1991), as part of a greater national entity. (Pridnestrovie declared its independence in 1990, within the year prior to the Soviet breakup.) In the instance of Kosovo, it was part of Serbia in Yugoslav and pre-Yugoslav times. Kosovo was never part of an independent Albania, or an independent entity unto itself. When Moldova had its own independent principality from 1359-1538, followed by becoming a part of the Ottoman Empire until 1812 - Pridnestrovie's territory had different affiliations, with Halych-Volhynia (part of the former Rus state), the Tatar Khanate, Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Kingdom of Poland and Russian Empire - the latter beginning in 1792 (whereas Moldova became part of the Russian Empire in 1812). Between 1918-1940, Moldova was part of Romania, unlike Pridnestrovie, which had an autonomous status as part of the Ukrainian SSR.
In Moldova, there is currently a noteworthy minority seeking unification with Romania. The degree of this sentiment is not present in Pridnestrovie - where becoming part of Russia is popular in a way that is not evident in Moldova.
Melik Kaylin's April 21 Forbes.com article "Moscow, Leave Moldova Alone" makes a series of questionable generalizations that downplays valid counterpoints. His comments about Pridnestrovie, South Ossetia and Abkhazia suggestively deny any credibility of their claims, by portraying an exclusively Russian inspired production of mischief making. If Russia is so bad, these disputed former Soviet territories should not be showing such a preference for Moscow, in comparison to those claiming them.
Drifting away from the title of Kaylin's article, this excerpt overlooks some related aspects: "So why not regress to the protective womb of a Moscow-orchestrated past-with-no-future? If the sins are equal on both sides, what distinguishes one side from the other? In recent days, for example, Azerbaijan has held talks with Russia to revive their relationship because Turkey is making moves to befriend Armenia. Azerbaijan threatens to reroute its oil and gas supplies to Europe through Russia rather than Turkey."
The stated Azeri displeasure with Armenian-Turkish talks has waned. Turkey's attempt at improving its relationship with Armenia was not initiated to change the Turkish view on the Armenian-Azeri dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh (one that sympathizes with the Azeri territorial claim). Turkey having good relations with Yerevan and Baku provides Ankara with the potential of increasing its diplomatic clout in Nagorno-Karabakh settlement talks. There is another factor to consider. Some European Union nations seem to be looking for a reason to exclude Turkey from that organization. Turkish authorities remain steadfast in not wanting to call what happened to the Armenians at the end of World War I a genocide. Instead, the Turkish government seems to be looking for another way to mend its relationship with the Armenian community - with the apparent hope that such a move will focus attention away from petitioning Turkey to recognize the past action against the Armenians as a genocide.
As was recently noted, Azerbaijan is motivated to consider a fossil fuel transit route deal with Russia out of the increased instability caused by the Georgian government's strike of this past summer on South Ossetia. (Georgian territory has been considered as a transit route for Azeri oil). In addition, like Moldova, Azerbaijan seeks territory that it does not control. With the Kremlin in a strong big power negotiating position, good relations with Russia serve to increase the likelihood of Moldovan and Azeri goals. This opinion is enhanced by how the manner of the Georgian government (its attack on South Ossetia) contributed to Russia's recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence.
Among others, a good number of American foreign policy realists will probably find irony with Kaylin's closing comments: "Dear old Russkies, you have given the world so much in the way of consolation for the human condition, Chekhov and Bulgakov and Pushkin and Rachmaninov and so much else, it's time to let go of Europe. Forget the U.S. threat, forget NATO and the E.U. and equivalency--all those excuses for playing the path of barbarism. Nobody is out to destroy you. As a political and strategic force you have wrought nothing but misery. Let the Moldovans go." Since the Cold War's end, what is the size and geographical range of Russian troop deployments in comparison to their American counterparts? Characterizing Russian troop deployments as non-altruistic unlike Western ones deemphasizes two points. Some non-Russian Federation areas of the former Soviet Union are not opposed to the Russian military presence beyond Russia's borders. At the same time, one can reasonably second guess certain attributes regarding some of the Western forces stationed abroad.
Appearing in The Weekly Standard on April 21, Stephen Schwartz's article "Why Moldova?" is noteworthy for several reasons. His commentary frequently appears at this leading neoconservative leaning venue. When discussing Russia, his often flippant use of terms like "Russian imperialism," "harsh realties of Slavic rule," "Russian expansionism" and "Russian propaganda" are rhetorically excessive.
Schwartz's piece starts off with an incorrect statement about Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin's ethnicity (Schwartz refers to him as an ethnic Russian). Contrary to what he states, Voronin is an ethnic Moldovan (upon initially seeing Voronin's name awhile back, I erred as well).
Schwartz stresses the similarity between Moldovans and Romanians in a way that sympathizes with the idea of Moldova becoming a part of Romania again. He makes no mention about how the majority of Moldovans do not presently appear to favor this merger.
Schwartz finds Moldova's incorporation into the Soviet Union as analogous to what happened to Estonia and Latvia during the same period. Overlooked in his presentation, is Pridnestrovie's history up to that point. (Specifically, its not having ever been part of an independent Moldova or Romania, as it was arbitrarily put into the 1940 established Moldavian SSR.)
In Schwartz's article, Kosovo's independence claim is treated as legitimate unlike Pridnestrovie's. Putting aside the big power geopolitics influencing the determination of independence claims, Pridnestrovie has a better historic and human rights claim to statehood than Kosovo.
The appearance of his article at a high profile neoconservative leaning venue is a good indicator of how geopolitically tilted the commentary can get. In this sense, it is worth reading.
In closing, I want to again thank the organizers of the recently completed World Russia Forum (in Washington DC) for inviting me to express my views and answer questions related to Russia-West relations, vis-à-vis the disputed former Communist bloc territories. At this event, it was a pleasure making new acquaintances, as well as seeing people I already know and others who I have known from a distance.
Related Sources:
>> American Chronicle (http://www.americanchronicle.com) "Settling the Dispute Over Nagorno-Karabakh," March 31 and updated on April 4. With hyperlinks, this article of mine appeared at Russia Blog (http://www.russiablog.org) on April 6 under the title "At the Crossroads of Strategic Pipeline Corridors: Settling the Dispute Over Nagorno-Karabakh." This piece was an update to the one that originally appeared at Global Research (http://www.globalresearch.ca) and Eurasian Home (http://www.eurasianhome.org) on April 1. In addition to the referenced venues, I thank the other venues which picked it up. MMA
>> Sunday's Zaman (http://www.sunday.zaman.com) "Cornered Between Yerevan and Baku, Turkey Tries to Comfort Azerbaijan," May 17
>> The New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com) "As East and West Pull on Moldova, Loyalties and Division Run Deep," April 14
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