Alexander I of Macedon and the "Quote" at Plataea
Gandeto
April 27, 2009
The litmus test for greekness
(Hdt. 9.44, 9.45)
What prompted me to revisit King Alexander I of Macedon and his famous quote—used by today´s Greeks to prove the alleged "Greekness" of the ancient Macedonians—was the following passage found on p. 371 in "Ancient Greece" written by Sarah B. Pomeroy, Stanley M. Burnstein and Walter Donlan. Two revealing aspects within this short passage generate much needed light for those who still wander in the dark.
(a)
"It was not surprising when the threat of foreign conquest returned a little over a century later. What was surprising was the source of the threat: not the mighty Persian Empire feared by the Greeks for almost two centuries, but the hitherto insignificant kingdom of Macedon located north of Greece in southern Europe." (p. 371)
This is an excellent staging junction from which I can launch an attack at the ridiculously weak Greek assertions about the alleged "greekness" of the ancient Macedonians. The task is elementary and the proof self evident for it is obvious—in the eyes of these authors—that Macedon was not regarded as part of Greece. This needs no further elaboration.
(b)
"The success of Macedon in conquering the Greek states was due in part to the internal division and economic strains that inhibited the evolution of a consistent policy in Athens…" (ibid).
This second point reaffirms what we have already stated before that Philip never united the Greeks but conquered and subjugated them. There was no unification.
Whence, in one very short passage two very important points are being highlighted and reaffirmed: (1) Macedonia was never a part of Greece and (2) Macedonians did not unite the Greek city-states but conquered and enslaved them.
However, I would not like to belabor the obvious; Greeks can dwell into their own "imagined fairy-tale world" keeping a veil of silent ignorance over the presented evidence as well as the truth. What I would like to do instead is focus your attention to another episode—often used by the Greeks as proof that ancient Macedonians were Greeks—Alexander I´s quote at Plataea.
(A brief summery of the situation before Plataea is in order:
Plataea is the earliest known engagement of Macedonian troops in Greece (Hdt. 9.31.2). Alexander I, as a Persian satrap, personally led the Macedonian contingents against the Greeks. After 480/79, with the defeat and the departure of the Persians, Alexander I, knowing quite well that he had to deal with the Greeks—his neighbors to the south—encouraged the spread of propaganda testifying to his covert support for the Greek cause).
Alexander´s speech delivered to the Athenians at Plataea emerges as a decisive point in the battle between today´s Greeks who would like to see ancient Macedonians classed as Greeks, on one hand, and the ethnic Macedonians who see the ancient Macedonian kings as "wanting" to be seen as friends of the Greeks. The Greeks desperately hold to the words, allegedly, spoken by Alexander I, where he "proclaims" that he is a Greek by descent. This admission is sufficient enough to be taken by the Greeks as "proof" that ancient Macedonians were Greeks.
The Macedonians are equally steadfast in rejecting the argument on the very essence of the proclamation itself. The counter argument raised stakes its defense on the very same premise that when a person is of a given ethnicity/nationality or race, he does not need to proclaim it to others, especially when he was not even asked.
I find the whole episode with Alexander rather too clumsily constructed and devoid of substantive verifiable constructs to affirm its veracity. There are too many small lacunas interspersed within its fabric, which allow doubts to set in. In other words, to use a layman´s term to describe it, it sounds very fishy indeed. Let us look at the physical surroundings at Plataea first.
Herodotus tells us (9.45) that both armies stayed at their position and ready to fight for 11 straight days. He puts the number of Greek troops at 110,000 men (9.30), not counting the support personnel, and the Persian army to well over 300,000 infantry alone (9. 32). The cavalry units were separate. If we add, at least 3-4 support personnel, a very conservative estimate (each Spartan was attended by 7 helots Hdt. 9.10; 9.29), we will reach a figure of over one million people alone, let alone the number of transport animals that go with it. Curtius in 3.3.8-25 tells us that an enormous baggage train of animals, equipment and carts followed the Persian armies. We are also informed in Herodotus 9.39 that a train of five hundred mules bringing food for the allied Greek army was intercepted together with an untold number of Greeks who were streaming down to join the ranks of the allied Greek army. In other words, the place was, to put it mildly, heavily congested with animals, civilians and soldiers.
Now, at the end of the eleventh day, as soon as ´darkness fell and the watches were out, and silence had descended upon the two armies and the men all seemed to be asleep, Alexander I, rode up to the Athenian guard-posts. He asks to speak with the officers in charge "whose names he mentioned" (Hdt. 9.45).
"Men of Athens... Had I not greatly at heart the common welfare of Greece I should not have come to tell you; but I am myself Greek by descent, and I would not willingly see Greece exchange freedom for slavery.... If you prosper in this war, forget not to do something for my freedom; consider the risk I have run, out of zeal for the Greek cause, to acquaint you with what Mardonius intends, and to save you from being surprised by the barbarians. I am Alexander of Macedon" (Hdt. 9.45).
Several key arguments clumsily throw their weight around and prevent unimpeded flow of narration:
First, it is inconceivable to imagine that a king of a strong nation would sneak out in the depths of night (presumably unnoticed, even though we are talking about over a million people around), ride through a very hostile territory, and expose himself to a grave danger with catastrophic consequences, just to deliver a message that could have been sent by a soldier.
The late Greek author—whose explanation about this episode the Greeks have swallowed hook, line and sinker in—Daskalakis rejects the idea that it would have been much safer to send a soldier to deliver the message to the Athenians. He states:
"As for the argument that if he wished to inform the Athenians he could have used a trustworthy person to send to the Athenian camp, it is forgotten that if this person had been captured and his treachery had been disclosed to the barbarians, the Macedonians would run an even greater risk."
Similarly, and in a comparatively much less dangerous situation at Tempe in 480, we have Alexander dispatching a soldier to inform the Greeks of a potential danger awaiting them if they remained at the same position at Tempe.
Describing the events at Tempe, Daskalakis gives the following rebuttal against the historians who felt that Alexander would not have exposed himself to such a great danger by sending a messenger to the opposite forces while he was in the midst of the Persian Army with his Macedonians. (They regard the episode as an invented piece of legend).
He writes:
"We have not the slightest doubt that had Alexander wished, he could have gotten in touch with the Greek forces through trusty Macedonians without either the Persians, or other troops with them or even the rest of the Macedonian forces getting to know of it, apart from some persons in his immediate entourage."
A quick look at his ´counter arguments´ reveals an obvious contradiction; at Tempe he argues against the historians´ position that sending a messenger is a dangerous proposition. He says that a "trustworthy Macedonian messenger will do." At Plateae he argues against the historians´ position that a messenger would have been a much safer alternative. His position is that "a messenger is a very risky choice".]
At any rate, the bottom line is still the same: why would Alexander undertake such an enormously dangerous risk? Since when does a life of a king equal that of a common soldier?
It reminds me of a conversation Philip V once had with the Roman commander Flamininus (Pol. XVII.1). Flamininus and those that had accompanied him stood on the shore at Nicea. Philip V arrived and brought the ship close to the shore but he did not disembark. Flamininus asked Philip to come ashore but Philip stayed put and refused to go on land.
"Flamininus again addressed him, this time to ask what he was afraid of, to which Philip retorted that he was afraid of nothing except the gods, but that he distrusted the majority of those who were present and above all the Aetolians. When the Roman general showed his surprise and remarked that the same danger applied to all those present and that the odds were equal, Philip answered that he was mistaken, for if anything were to happen to Phaeneas (the Aetolian in charge), there were plenty of men to take command of the Aetolians, but if Philip were to lose his life there was no one at that moment to succeed him on the throne of Macedonia."
Philip V´s remarkable foresight is delightful, it is a sign of a mature and experienced leader befitting the Argeads kings, and we have no reason to accept anything less of Alexander I.]
And, furthermore, instead of dealing with their eminent commanders, he will reveal his secret in front of the officers and the guards. Common sense dictates that, a king would have not undertaken such a move, when there were a number of much safer alternatives available to him. Alexander I was, as described by Daskalakis, ´a ruler of great intelligence and political acumen´, and one would have expected of a king of his stature, to had used much greater prudence.
Second, Alexander I must have had his commanding quarters guarded by his private bodyguards (this must be a normal protocol of a king), who would have seen him depart or at least assist him in his endeavors to sneak out unnoticed. Around Alexander, as a commanding officer under Xerxes, we expect to find several other soldiers whose job would have been to assist the king in his daily activities or simply to tend to his person. Thus, the number of people who would have known about his mission increases significantly.
Next, the fact that Alexander begins his speech with "Men of Athens" instead of addressing the commanders personally, since he already asked for them by names, signifies inconsistent behavior on his part. Problematic is his phrase:
"I am myself a Greek by descent" and a strong suspect his departing assertion, "I am Alexander of Macedon". Why do we find the last two statements problematic and slightly provident?
If we take into account that this episode occurs after the Olympic games (following Daskalakis´ estimation that he entered the 71st Olimpiad in 496 B.C., Badian feels that 476 is the more suitable Olympiad), in which Alexander was an Olympic winner, we must expect that an Olympic athlete "known throughout Hellas as an Olympic victor", (as per Daskalakis´ claim), with all the fame and glory he had received "announcing his glorious Greek ancestry", (italics mine) would have been still recognized by the guards and the commanders in the Athenian camp he spoke with. I see no need for this "main point" of the speech "the Greek descent" to be pronounced repeatedly. Besides, why should the Athenians believe his message if they could not recognize him in the first place?
The whole story is wrapped with cumbersome appendages that make it look very insecure. And insecure it is, invented by Alexander himself, or someone in his court in charge of "publicity-damage-control department. Alexander I, was a shrewd politician indeed; he must have said to himself: the Persians would be gone from here, and the business was going great while it lasted, now, it´s time to mend the fences with your neighbors who would always be here.
It is evident that these apparent stories about Alexander I´s services rendered to the Greeks were given to Herodotus to be disseminated in Greece. Credit must be given to Alexander I if he, indeed, benefited from the scheme at all. The gold statue of himself dedicated to Delphi and at Olympia as the first fruit from the spoils from the Persians (Hdt.7.121.1), indicates how insecure he felt about his ´Hellenic bond´ with the Greeks to the south.
For him to make so many attempts to confirm his Greekness is either a case where he was not readily accepted as Greek, or that he was readily rejected as one.
If Alexander of Macedon was indeed "Greek", haw come he was dubbed "philhellene", a public friend of the Greeks? Isn't it kind of odd to call a "Greek" a friend of Greeks? The appellation "philhellene", in modern debates, resembles an oil stain on the driveway; those who want to use it to prove that ancient Macedonians were Greeks, cherish the idea that the stain will reappear with time and those who oppose and claim that ancient Macedonians were not Greeks bring forth new evidence—stain removal—to debunk/clean up the mass and move on.
We are not very convinced with Daskalakis´ posit (The Hellenism of the ancient Macedonians n.91) that the word "philhellene" ´was used for Greeks dedicated to the good of their nation´. The original usage of that word should be found somewhere in the late 4th century B.C..]
At any rate, the persistent questions still remain, if Alexander I was a Greek by descent, why does he feel constrained to prove his Greekness? And more importantly, why is this "ticket" reserved for the Macedonians only? We may rightly ask, when was the last time that any of the Athenian, Spartan, Theban, or Argives´ commanders have proclaimed their Greekness? When did Memnon, Harpalus, Cimon, Demosthenes, Demades, Charidemes, Agis, or anyone else for that matter, asserted their Greekness? Herodotus 7. 130 speaks of the Thessallians as being the first Greeks to fall under Persian rule in 480/79 B.C.. Evidence shows that the Persian armies entered Macedonian soil in 492 B.C. (Hdt. 6. 42-45). This puts the Persian armies in Macedonia for 12 long years before they entered Greece. Here, was Herodotus´ excellent chance, as was his vont, to introduce King Alexander I as a Greek by descent, who governed over non-Greek people. Why wait for Plateae?
And, once again, we came to this often visited intersection; there are some very progressive Greeks who do not subscribe to this middle-age Greek thinking and who see the people in the Balkans living in peace and harmony—these are the true Greeks and then, there are newly created Greeks, those whose heritage has been wiped out and replaced with the newly "morphed" ethnicity "Greek-Macedonian". Since they—in this Greek created problem—stand to lose the most, they are the "true" Greek soldiers in the forefront fighting the battle.
I am sure they wouldn´t dare dig deeper into their past because they will inevitably find "skeletons" which have another story to tell: their grandfathers did not even speak Greek nor did they share in these "megali" Greek dream. What they dreamed the most and with a heavy heart longed for, were their abandoned homes, forsaken culture and their way of life in their Asia Minor communities.
Sooner than later all these Greek lies and fabrications will run their course and Europe will have no choice but to put an end to this Greek farce.
Until next time…
(Hdt. 9.44, 9.45)
What prompted me to revisit King Alexander I of Macedon and his famous quote—used by today´s Greeks to prove the alleged "Greekness" of the ancient Macedonians—was the following passage found on p. 371 in "Ancient Greece" written by Sarah B. Pomeroy, Stanley M. Burnstein and Walter Donlan. Two revealing aspects within this short passage generate much needed light for those who still wander in the dark.
(a)
"It was not surprising when the threat of foreign conquest returned a little over a century later. What was surprising was the source of the threat: not the mighty Persian Empire feared by the Greeks for almost two centuries, but the hitherto insignificant kingdom of Macedon located north of Greece in southern Europe." (p. 371)
This is an excellent staging junction from which I can launch an attack at the ridiculously weak Greek assertions about the alleged "greekness" of the ancient Macedonians. The task is elementary and the proof self evident for it is obvious—in the eyes of these authors—that Macedon was not regarded as part of Greece. This needs no further elaboration.
(b)
"The success of Macedon in conquering the Greek states was due in part to the internal division and economic strains that inhibited the evolution of a consistent policy in Athens…" (ibid).
This second point reaffirms what we have already stated before that Philip never united the Greeks but conquered and subjugated them. There was no unification.
Whence, in one very short passage two very important points are being highlighted and reaffirmed: (1) Macedonia was never a part of Greece and (2) Macedonians did not unite the Greek city-states but conquered and enslaved them.
However, I would not like to belabor the obvious; Greeks can dwell into their own "imagined fairy-tale world" keeping a veil of silent ignorance over the presented evidence as well as the truth. What I would like to do instead is focus your attention to another episode—often used by the Greeks as proof that ancient Macedonians were Greeks—Alexander I´s quote at Plataea.
(A brief summery of the situation before Plataea is in order:
Plataea is the earliest known engagement of Macedonian troops in Greece (Hdt. 9.31.2). Alexander I, as a Persian satrap, personally led the Macedonian contingents against the Greeks. After 480/79, with the defeat and the departure of the Persians, Alexander I, knowing quite well that he had to deal with the Greeks—his neighbors to the south—encouraged the spread of propaganda testifying to his covert support for the Greek cause).
Alexander´s speech delivered to the Athenians at Plataea emerges as a decisive point in the battle between today´s Greeks who would like to see ancient Macedonians classed as Greeks, on one hand, and the ethnic Macedonians who see the ancient Macedonian kings as "wanting" to be seen as friends of the Greeks. The Greeks desperately hold to the words, allegedly, spoken by Alexander I, where he "proclaims" that he is a Greek by descent. This admission is sufficient enough to be taken by the Greeks as "proof" that ancient Macedonians were Greeks.
The Macedonians are equally steadfast in rejecting the argument on the very essence of the proclamation itself. The counter argument raised stakes its defense on the very same premise that when a person is of a given ethnicity/nationality or race, he does not need to proclaim it to others, especially when he was not even asked.
I find the whole episode with Alexander rather too clumsily constructed and devoid of substantive verifiable constructs to affirm its veracity. There are too many small lacunas interspersed within its fabric, which allow doubts to set in. In other words, to use a layman´s term to describe it, it sounds very fishy indeed. Let us look at the physical surroundings at Plataea first.
Herodotus tells us (9.45) that both armies stayed at their position and ready to fight for 11 straight days. He puts the number of Greek troops at 110,000 men (9.30), not counting the support personnel, and the Persian army to well over 300,000 infantry alone (9. 32). The cavalry units were separate. If we add, at least 3-4 support personnel, a very conservative estimate (each Spartan was attended by 7 helots Hdt. 9.10; 9.29), we will reach a figure of over one million people alone, let alone the number of transport animals that go with it. Curtius in 3.3.8-25 tells us that an enormous baggage train of animals, equipment and carts followed the Persian armies. We are also informed in Herodotus 9.39 that a train of five hundred mules bringing food for the allied Greek army was intercepted together with an untold number of Greeks who were streaming down to join the ranks of the allied Greek army. In other words, the place was, to put it mildly, heavily congested with animals, civilians and soldiers.
Now, at the end of the eleventh day, as soon as ´darkness fell and the watches were out, and silence had descended upon the two armies and the men all seemed to be asleep, Alexander I, rode up to the Athenian guard-posts. He asks to speak with the officers in charge "whose names he mentioned" (Hdt. 9.45).
"Men of Athens... Had I not greatly at heart the common welfare of Greece I should not have come to tell you; but I am myself Greek by descent, and I would not willingly see Greece exchange freedom for slavery.... If you prosper in this war, forget not to do something for my freedom; consider the risk I have run, out of zeal for the Greek cause, to acquaint you with what Mardonius intends, and to save you from being surprised by the barbarians. I am Alexander of Macedon" (Hdt. 9.45).
Several key arguments clumsily throw their weight around and prevent unimpeded flow of narration:
First, it is inconceivable to imagine that a king of a strong nation would sneak out in the depths of night (presumably unnoticed, even though we are talking about over a million people around), ride through a very hostile territory, and expose himself to a grave danger with catastrophic consequences, just to deliver a message that could have been sent by a soldier.
The late Greek author—whose explanation about this episode the Greeks have swallowed hook, line and sinker in—Daskalakis rejects the idea that it would have been much safer to send a soldier to deliver the message to the Athenians. He states:
"As for the argument that if he wished to inform the Athenians he could have used a trustworthy person to send to the Athenian camp, it is forgotten that if this person had been captured and his treachery had been disclosed to the barbarians, the Macedonians would run an even greater risk."
Similarly, and in a comparatively much less dangerous situation at Tempe in 480, we have Alexander dispatching a soldier to inform the Greeks of a potential danger awaiting them if they remained at the same position at Tempe.
Describing the events at Tempe, Daskalakis gives the following rebuttal against the historians who felt that Alexander would not have exposed himself to such a great danger by sending a messenger to the opposite forces while he was in the midst of the Persian Army with his Macedonians. (They regard the episode as an invented piece of legend).
He writes:
"We have not the slightest doubt that had Alexander wished, he could have gotten in touch with the Greek forces through trusty Macedonians without either the Persians, or other troops with them or even the rest of the Macedonian forces getting to know of it, apart from some persons in his immediate entourage."
A quick look at his ´counter arguments´ reveals an obvious contradiction; at Tempe he argues against the historians´ position that sending a messenger is a dangerous proposition. He says that a "trustworthy Macedonian messenger will do." At Plateae he argues against the historians´ position that a messenger would have been a much safer alternative. His position is that "a messenger is a very risky choice".]
At any rate, the bottom line is still the same: why would Alexander undertake such an enormously dangerous risk? Since when does a life of a king equal that of a common soldier?
It reminds me of a conversation Philip V once had with the Roman commander Flamininus (Pol. XVII.1). Flamininus and those that had accompanied him stood on the shore at Nicea. Philip V arrived and brought the ship close to the shore but he did not disembark. Flamininus asked Philip to come ashore but Philip stayed put and refused to go on land.
"Flamininus again addressed him, this time to ask what he was afraid of, to which Philip retorted that he was afraid of nothing except the gods, but that he distrusted the majority of those who were present and above all the Aetolians. When the Roman general showed his surprise and remarked that the same danger applied to all those present and that the odds were equal, Philip answered that he was mistaken, for if anything were to happen to Phaeneas (the Aetolian in charge), there were plenty of men to take command of the Aetolians, but if Philip were to lose his life there was no one at that moment to succeed him on the throne of Macedonia."
Philip V´s remarkable foresight is delightful, it is a sign of a mature and experienced leader befitting the Argeads kings, and we have no reason to accept anything less of Alexander I.]
And, furthermore, instead of dealing with their eminent commanders, he will reveal his secret in front of the officers and the guards. Common sense dictates that, a king would have not undertaken such a move, when there were a number of much safer alternatives available to him. Alexander I was, as described by Daskalakis, ´a ruler of great intelligence and political acumen´, and one would have expected of a king of his stature, to had used much greater prudence.
Second, Alexander I must have had his commanding quarters guarded by his private bodyguards (this must be a normal protocol of a king), who would have seen him depart or at least assist him in his endeavors to sneak out unnoticed. Around Alexander, as a commanding officer under Xerxes, we expect to find several other soldiers whose job would have been to assist the king in his daily activities or simply to tend to his person. Thus, the number of people who would have known about his mission increases significantly.
Next, the fact that Alexander begins his speech with "Men of Athens" instead of addressing the commanders personally, since he already asked for them by names, signifies inconsistent behavior on his part. Problematic is his phrase:
"I am myself a Greek by descent" and a strong suspect his departing assertion, "I am Alexander of Macedon". Why do we find the last two statements problematic and slightly provident?
If we take into account that this episode occurs after the Olympic games (following Daskalakis´ estimation that he entered the 71st Olimpiad in 496 B.C., Badian feels that 476 is the more suitable Olympiad), in which Alexander was an Olympic winner, we must expect that an Olympic athlete "known throughout Hellas as an Olympic victor", (as per Daskalakis´ claim), with all the fame and glory he had received "announcing his glorious Greek ancestry", (italics mine) would have been still recognized by the guards and the commanders in the Athenian camp he spoke with. I see no need for this "main point" of the speech "the Greek descent" to be pronounced repeatedly. Besides, why should the Athenians believe his message if they could not recognize him in the first place?
The whole story is wrapped with cumbersome appendages that make it look very insecure. And insecure it is, invented by Alexander himself, or someone in his court in charge of "publicity-damage-control department. Alexander I, was a shrewd politician indeed; he must have said to himself: the Persians would be gone from here, and the business was going great while it lasted, now, it´s time to mend the fences with your neighbors who would always be here.
It is evident that these apparent stories about Alexander I´s services rendered to the Greeks were given to Herodotus to be disseminated in Greece. Credit must be given to Alexander I if he, indeed, benefited from the scheme at all. The gold statue of himself dedicated to Delphi and at Olympia as the first fruit from the spoils from the Persians (Hdt.7.121.1), indicates how insecure he felt about his ´Hellenic bond´ with the Greeks to the south.
For him to make so many attempts to confirm his Greekness is either a case where he was not readily accepted as Greek, or that he was readily rejected as one.
If Alexander of Macedon was indeed "Greek", haw come he was dubbed "philhellene", a public friend of the Greeks? Isn't it kind of odd to call a "Greek" a friend of Greeks? The appellation "philhellene", in modern debates, resembles an oil stain on the driveway; those who want to use it to prove that ancient Macedonians were Greeks, cherish the idea that the stain will reappear with time and those who oppose and claim that ancient Macedonians were not Greeks bring forth new evidence—stain removal—to debunk/clean up the mass and move on.
We are not very convinced with Daskalakis´ posit (The Hellenism of the ancient Macedonians n.91) that the word "philhellene" ´was used for Greeks dedicated to the good of their nation´. The original usage of that word should be found somewhere in the late 4th century B.C..]
At any rate, the persistent questions still remain, if Alexander I was a Greek by descent, why does he feel constrained to prove his Greekness? And more importantly, why is this "ticket" reserved for the Macedonians only? We may rightly ask, when was the last time that any of the Athenian, Spartan, Theban, or Argives´ commanders have proclaimed their Greekness? When did Memnon, Harpalus, Cimon, Demosthenes, Demades, Charidemes, Agis, or anyone else for that matter, asserted their Greekness? Herodotus 7. 130 speaks of the Thessallians as being the first Greeks to fall under Persian rule in 480/79 B.C.. Evidence shows that the Persian armies entered Macedonian soil in 492 B.C. (Hdt. 6. 42-45). This puts the Persian armies in Macedonia for 12 long years before they entered Greece. Here, was Herodotus´ excellent chance, as was his vont, to introduce King Alexander I as a Greek by descent, who governed over non-Greek people. Why wait for Plateae?
And, once again, we came to this often visited intersection; there are some very progressive Greeks who do not subscribe to this middle-age Greek thinking and who see the people in the Balkans living in peace and harmony—these are the true Greeks and then, there are newly created Greeks, those whose heritage has been wiped out and replaced with the newly "morphed" ethnicity "Greek-Macedonian". Since they—in this Greek created problem—stand to lose the most, they are the "true" Greek soldiers in the forefront fighting the battle.
I am sure they wouldn´t dare dig deeper into their past because they will inevitably find "skeletons" which have another story to tell: their grandfathers did not even speak Greek nor did they share in these "megali" Greek dream. What they dreamed the most and with a heavy heart longed for, were their abandoned homes, forsaken culture and their way of life in their Asia Minor communities.
Sooner than later all these Greek lies and fabrications will run their course and Europe will have no choice but to put an end to this Greek farce.
Until next time…
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