Final Notes on the Discussion of "The Unpopular Prospect of World War III"
Dr. Andreas Umland
March 16, 2009
Final Notes on the Discussion of "The Unpopular Prospect of World War III: The 20th Century Is Not Over Yet" (http://www.americanchronicle.com/authors/view/2885 )
RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#21)/RE: Umland (JRL 2009-#19)/RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#12) -- see the APPENDIX below.
Dear Mr Ivanov
I have re-read the debate, in JRL, on your blog "The Ivanov Report" and on "Russia: Other Points of View," of my article "The Unpopular Prospect of World War III: The 20th Century Is Not Over Yet." This entire discussion is now documented in an Addendum to "The Russian Nationalism Bulletin", Vol. 3, No. 5(47), 16 March 2009, at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/russian_nationalism/messages/412?threaded=1&m=e&var=1&tidx=1
Five more notes that refer to your last text at JRL 2009-#21 (see the APPENDIX below) and partly repeat what I have written before:
1. Debating polling numbers is, with regard to foreign policy issues, such as Russian-American relations, only of limited relevance. Foreign affairs are usually conducted by a country's elite, and constitute one of those policy fields least influenced by the broad public. It is the Russian elite's obsession with speculating about the "real" purposes of this or that US policy in Europe or Asia (democracy promotion, missile defence, humanitarian intervention etc.) what constitutes the main problem, and, arguably, could become a threat to international security, in the case of an escalation, on the Caucasus, on Crimea, or in another region.
2. Whereas you had intimated, in your initial critique in JRL 2009-#12, that I am paranoid and a liar, in JRL 2009-#21 (see APPENDIX below), you are now refusing "to engage in a discussion" whether I am "a paranoid liar," and leave "such decisions" to me. You even count me among "[i]ntelligent people." Thanks.
3. Still, in JRL 2009-#21 (see APPENDIX below), you accuse me once more of "cherry-picking" polling data. You quote again the government-controlled VTsIOM agency, and state that "Pew pollsters" have found that only "37%" of Russians had a favourable view of the US "in 2000." I wish you had done neither to spare us the continuation of a bizarre pseudo-debate about, as you ask, whether or not I "have evidence that Pew pollsters were under the Kremlin's 'stricter control'." Was that necessary?
First, I was puzzled indeed because, in my article that you initially criticized, I had quoted the Levada Center's 69% of favourable views of the US by Russians in 2000. How could it be that two reputed polling agencies were reporting two starkly different numbers for Russian public opinion on the US in 2000: 69%, in the case of the Levada Center, and 37%, in the case of Pew?
The solution came only recently when I cared to check the source of your number. The 2000 data that you ascribe to "Pew pollsters" has, apparently, not been collected by Pew in 2000. It is taken from, as Pew's table says, "1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Deparment of State" (http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019).
What is important here is less the exact source of the data (I trust the State Department as much as Pew) than the question of when exactly it was collected. I could not find the poll that Pew refers to. But the idea suggests itself that these "37%" of the "1999/2000 survey trends" which you ascribed to the year 2000, is actually data from 1999. In that year, NATO bombed Serbia which, as all polling agencies reported, led to a steep drop of pro-Western feelings among Russians. What was remarkable about this episode in Russian-US relations, however, was not the drop in the first half of 1999, but the fast recovery of pro-Western positions among the Russian population at large, once the bombing had stopped. In distinction to this recovery among the general public of the RF, attitudes towards the US among the Russian elites never fully recovered from their decline in 1999. After several years, Russia's elite seems, by now, to have succeeded impregnating most ordinary Russians with an aversion towards the West, in general, and the US, in particular.
4. Since our debate in January-February 2009, among other articles corroborating my worries, the following analysis has appeared on "Open Democracy" at http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/russians-don-t-much-like-the-west .
Although I stand accused of being Russophobic and wanting to hinder a rapprochement between Moscow and Washington (http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/NATO-Russia_War:_A_Possible_Scenario ), I hope, as we all do, that the current détente between Russia and the US will last, and, perhaps, even lead to a new Russian-Western partnership. Yet, Obama and Medvedev are walking on thin ice. As both Russia's elite and population do not trust the US, even a minor incident could return us on the path towards a new Cold War.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
APPENDIX
Ivanov's rebuttal to my reply to his critique of my article
(see: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20584 , http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=CDI+Russia+Profile+List&articleid=a1232381631 , http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/88068 , http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/89320 )
RE: Umland (JRL 2009-#19)/RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#12)
From: Eugene Ivanov (eugene_ivanov@comcast.net)
Published in: Johnson's Russia List (JRL) 2009-#21, 30 January 2009
First of all, I'd like to thank Andreas Umland for his thorough comments on my blogpost.
At the core of Umland's response lies his explanation that due to indiscriminate cutting and editing, at the hands of TNI editors, his position has been severely distorted. To restore the truth, Umland has provided us with a fuller version of his article posted to the American Chronicle. He has also suggested that I should have first read this AC version before writing on my blog.
I disagree. I'm not a scholar studying Umland's writings and I'm not obliged to read everything he publishes. I came across the TNI article and commented on what I read there. If Umland believes that his views were misrepresented, he should blame the TNI editorial office, not me.
Besides, and that is a key point, although the AC version of the article is arguably a better piece of literature, both are conceptually similar in claiming that anti-Americanism is rising in Russia; both invoke the same polling data to support that claim. Speaking of polling data, I was somewhat surprised by Umland's confession that polling data were submitted to his TNI article "only after TNI's explicit request." What is that supposed to mean? That Umland originally claimed rising anti-Americanism in Russia without providing any data?
Now, having met "TNI's explicit request" to provide polling numbers and having shared with me a reference to a Levada poll, Umland seems to believe that his job is done. No, it's not. In the center of our discussion is Umland's assertion (articulated in both versions of his article) that "[w]ith the beginning of Vladimir Putin's rise in 1999…Russians' views of the United States were deteriorating continuously." Has Umland supplied us with any reliable data to support this assertion (except for his expert advice to watch, "for a week or two", Russian TV)?
The truth is that no such data exist. Tellingly, Umland dismisses a VCIOM study I mentioned in my post, which was directly contradicting to what he says. Sure, when Umland likes a polling number, he writes that the poll was conducted by "Russia's leading sociological survey agency." When he doesn't like a number, this number was obtained by an agency that "has been put under stricter governmental control." How convenient! (I could understand why VCIOM pollsters would feel pressured to inflate, say, Medvedev/Putin's rating numbers or to downgrade concerns about the economy. But why would they tamper with numbers on U.S. favorability in Russia? Beats me.)
And what about this Pew report (http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019), which I also mentioned in my post and which found that over the period of time Umland is talking about, favorable opinions of the United States have actually increased in Russia: from 37% in 2000 to 43% in 2006. Does Umland have any evidence that Pew pollsters were under the Kremlin's "stricter control"?
That's what I call "cherry-picking" polling data: present data that support your position and ignore those that don't.
Absent the data on U.S. favorability, what else does Umland have? Nothing. He frets over the fact that in mid-August 2008, 48% of Russians opined that "[t]he U.S. leadership wants to extend its influence on Russia's neighboring states." This is ridiculous. A political scientist, as he is, Umland must understand the difference between negative views of foreign policy of the Bush administration and negative views of the United States as a country. He's also concerned that many Russians believe that the cold war is still going on. So what? Has he ever heard about a guy named Edward Lucas? Lucas not only believes, too, that the cold war still continues; he's written a book about it. Will Umland accuse Lucas of rampant anti-Americanism?
I'm puzzled with the amount of attention Umland pays to the nature of my relations with Russia Profile. True, occasionally, I contribute to Vladimir Frolov's weekly expert panel, but I have never submitted anything directly to RP. I know that almost every piece of mine that appears in JRL is later re-published by RP. I guess this is because of some, unknown to me, agreement between JRL and RP. Yet I cannot have any responsibility for the format RP uses to reproduce my pieces (even if I cared).
The rest of Umland's comments are noise, a smokescreen aimed at hiding the fact that he has nothing to say on the substance of my critique. I'm obviously not going to discuss the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict: I didn't touch this subject. Nor am I going to engage in a discussion of who Umland should consider himself: a suicidal or a paranoid liar. Intelligent people, and I definitely count Umland as one, must make such decisions by themselves.
Oh, yes, there is one thing Umland and I completely agree upon: I'm indeed cautiously optimistic about the future of U.S.-Russia relations. And yes, I consider talks about a nuclear war between the two countries deliberately provocative.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
For further Russian and Ukrainian comments, see:
http://www.newsland.ru/News/Detail/id/343304/cat/42/
http://www.glavred.com/archive/2009/02/23/182544-1.html
http://blogs.korrespondent.net/celebrities/blog/forum2004/a8634
http://smi.liga.net/articles/IT091046.html
http://www.delfi.ua/news/exclusive/interview/article.php?id=349466&com=1
RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#21)/RE: Umland (JRL 2009-#19)/RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#12) -- see the APPENDIX below.
Dear Mr Ivanov
I have re-read the debate, in JRL, on your blog "The Ivanov Report" and on "Russia: Other Points of View," of my article "The Unpopular Prospect of World War III: The 20th Century Is Not Over Yet." This entire discussion is now documented in an Addendum to "The Russian Nationalism Bulletin", Vol. 3, No. 5(47), 16 March 2009, at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/russian_nationalism/messages/412?threaded=1&m=e&var=1&tidx=1
Five more notes that refer to your last text at JRL 2009-#21 (see the APPENDIX below) and partly repeat what I have written before:
1. Debating polling numbers is, with regard to foreign policy issues, such as Russian-American relations, only of limited relevance. Foreign affairs are usually conducted by a country's elite, and constitute one of those policy fields least influenced by the broad public. It is the Russian elite's obsession with speculating about the "real" purposes of this or that US policy in Europe or Asia (democracy promotion, missile defence, humanitarian intervention etc.) what constitutes the main problem, and, arguably, could become a threat to international security, in the case of an escalation, on the Caucasus, on Crimea, or in another region.
2. Whereas you had intimated, in your initial critique in JRL 2009-#12, that I am paranoid and a liar, in JRL 2009-#21 (see APPENDIX below), you are now refusing "to engage in a discussion" whether I am "a paranoid liar," and leave "such decisions" to me. You even count me among "[i]ntelligent people." Thanks.
3. Still, in JRL 2009-#21 (see APPENDIX below), you accuse me once more of "cherry-picking" polling data. You quote again the government-controlled VTsIOM agency, and state that "Pew pollsters" have found that only "37%" of Russians had a favourable view of the US "in 2000." I wish you had done neither to spare us the continuation of a bizarre pseudo-debate about, as you ask, whether or not I "have evidence that Pew pollsters were under the Kremlin's 'stricter control'." Was that necessary?
First, I was puzzled indeed because, in my article that you initially criticized, I had quoted the Levada Center's 69% of favourable views of the US by Russians in 2000. How could it be that two reputed polling agencies were reporting two starkly different numbers for Russian public opinion on the US in 2000: 69%, in the case of the Levada Center, and 37%, in the case of Pew?
The solution came only recently when I cared to check the source of your number. The 2000 data that you ascribe to "Pew pollsters" has, apparently, not been collected by Pew in 2000. It is taken from, as Pew's table says, "1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Deparment of State" (http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019).
What is important here is less the exact source of the data (I trust the State Department as much as Pew) than the question of when exactly it was collected. I could not find the poll that Pew refers to. But the idea suggests itself that these "37%" of the "1999/2000 survey trends" which you ascribed to the year 2000, is actually data from 1999. In that year, NATO bombed Serbia which, as all polling agencies reported, led to a steep drop of pro-Western feelings among Russians. What was remarkable about this episode in Russian-US relations, however, was not the drop in the first half of 1999, but the fast recovery of pro-Western positions among the Russian population at large, once the bombing had stopped. In distinction to this recovery among the general public of the RF, attitudes towards the US among the Russian elites never fully recovered from their decline in 1999. After several years, Russia's elite seems, by now, to have succeeded impregnating most ordinary Russians with an aversion towards the West, in general, and the US, in particular.
4. Since our debate in January-February 2009, among other articles corroborating my worries, the following analysis has appeared on "Open Democracy" at http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/russians-don-t-much-like-the-west .
Although I stand accused of being Russophobic and wanting to hinder a rapprochement between Moscow and Washington (http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/NATO-Russia_War:_A_Possible_Scenario ), I hope, as we all do, that the current détente between Russia and the US will last, and, perhaps, even lead to a new Russian-Western partnership. Yet, Obama and Medvedev are walking on thin ice. As both Russia's elite and population do not trust the US, even a minor incident could return us on the path towards a new Cold War.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
APPENDIX
Ivanov's rebuttal to my reply to his critique of my article
(see: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20584 , http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=CDI+Russia+Profile+List&articleid=a1232381631 , http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/88068 , http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/89320 )
RE: Umland (JRL 2009-#19)/RE: Ivanov (JRL 2009-#12)
From: Eugene Ivanov (eugene_ivanov@comcast.net)
Published in: Johnson's Russia List (JRL) 2009-#21, 30 January 2009
First of all, I'd like to thank Andreas Umland for his thorough comments on my blogpost.
At the core of Umland's response lies his explanation that due to indiscriminate cutting and editing, at the hands of TNI editors, his position has been severely distorted. To restore the truth, Umland has provided us with a fuller version of his article posted to the American Chronicle. He has also suggested that I should have first read this AC version before writing on my blog.
I disagree. I'm not a scholar studying Umland's writings and I'm not obliged to read everything he publishes. I came across the TNI article and commented on what I read there. If Umland believes that his views were misrepresented, he should blame the TNI editorial office, not me.
Besides, and that is a key point, although the AC version of the article is arguably a better piece of literature, both are conceptually similar in claiming that anti-Americanism is rising in Russia; both invoke the same polling data to support that claim. Speaking of polling data, I was somewhat surprised by Umland's confession that polling data were submitted to his TNI article "only after TNI's explicit request." What is that supposed to mean? That Umland originally claimed rising anti-Americanism in Russia without providing any data?
Now, having met "TNI's explicit request" to provide polling numbers and having shared with me a reference to a Levada poll, Umland seems to believe that his job is done. No, it's not. In the center of our discussion is Umland's assertion (articulated in both versions of his article) that "[w]ith the beginning of Vladimir Putin's rise in 1999…Russians' views of the United States were deteriorating continuously." Has Umland supplied us with any reliable data to support this assertion (except for his expert advice to watch, "for a week or two", Russian TV)?
The truth is that no such data exist. Tellingly, Umland dismisses a VCIOM study I mentioned in my post, which was directly contradicting to what he says. Sure, when Umland likes a polling number, he writes that the poll was conducted by "Russia's leading sociological survey agency." When he doesn't like a number, this number was obtained by an agency that "has been put under stricter governmental control." How convenient! (I could understand why VCIOM pollsters would feel pressured to inflate, say, Medvedev/Putin's rating numbers or to downgrade concerns about the economy. But why would they tamper with numbers on U.S. favorability in Russia? Beats me.)
And what about this Pew report (http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019), which I also mentioned in my post and which found that over the period of time Umland is talking about, favorable opinions of the United States have actually increased in Russia: from 37% in 2000 to 43% in 2006. Does Umland have any evidence that Pew pollsters were under the Kremlin's "stricter control"?
That's what I call "cherry-picking" polling data: present data that support your position and ignore those that don't.
Absent the data on U.S. favorability, what else does Umland have? Nothing. He frets over the fact that in mid-August 2008, 48% of Russians opined that "[t]he U.S. leadership wants to extend its influence on Russia's neighboring states." This is ridiculous. A political scientist, as he is, Umland must understand the difference between negative views of foreign policy of the Bush administration and negative views of the United States as a country. He's also concerned that many Russians believe that the cold war is still going on. So what? Has he ever heard about a guy named Edward Lucas? Lucas not only believes, too, that the cold war still continues; he's written a book about it. Will Umland accuse Lucas of rampant anti-Americanism?
I'm puzzled with the amount of attention Umland pays to the nature of my relations with Russia Profile. True, occasionally, I contribute to Vladimir Frolov's weekly expert panel, but I have never submitted anything directly to RP. I know that almost every piece of mine that appears in JRL is later re-published by RP. I guess this is because of some, unknown to me, agreement between JRL and RP. Yet I cannot have any responsibility for the format RP uses to reproduce my pieces (even if I cared).
The rest of Umland's comments are noise, a smokescreen aimed at hiding the fact that he has nothing to say on the substance of my critique. I'm obviously not going to discuss the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict: I didn't touch this subject. Nor am I going to engage in a discussion of who Umland should consider himself: a suicidal or a paranoid liar. Intelligent people, and I definitely count Umland as one, must make such decisions by themselves.
Oh, yes, there is one thing Umland and I completely agree upon: I'm indeed cautiously optimistic about the future of U.S.-Russia relations. And yes, I consider talks about a nuclear war between the two countries deliberately provocative.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
For further Russian and Ukrainian comments, see:
http://www.newsland.ru/News/Detail/id/343304/cat/42/
http://www.glavred.com/archive/2009/02/23/182544-1.html
http://blogs.korrespondent.net/celebrities/blog/forum2004/a8634
http://smi.liga.net/articles/IT091046.html
http://www.delfi.ua/news/exclusive/interview/article.php?id=349466&com=1