More Than One Third Of U.S. Supplied Weapons To Afghanistan Unaccounted For
Bill Lindner
February 16, 2009
A recently released report (PDF) by Charles M. Johnson Jr., International Affairs and Trade Director of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlights the need to address serious accountability concerns about weapons provided to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) -- the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police -- due to the risk of loss and theft of weapons which is significant given the unstable security conditions in Afghanistan.
The United States spent $16.5 billion from 2002 through 2008 to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces in order to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan back to the Afghan government. The Department of Defense (DoD) through the U.S. Army and Navy, purchased over 242,000 small arms and light weapons at a cost of about $120 Million.
A GAO analysis of DoD data revealed that U.S. procured armaments shipped to Afghanistan included 117,163 rifles, 62,055 pistols, 35,778 Machine guns, 18,656 Grenade launchers, 6,704 Shotguns, 1,620 Rocket-propelled granade launchers and 227 Mortars and other weapons for a total of 242,203. The U.S. weapons shipments to Afghanistan for ANSF began in December 2004. More than a third of the above mentioned armaments are unaccounted for.
In addition to the U.S. weapons shipped, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reported that 21 other countries provided 135,000 weapons valued at about $103 million that were shipped for the ANSF between June 2002 and June 2008, bringing the total number of weapons the DoD reported obtaining for ANSF to over 375,000.
CTSC-A in Kabul, under the command and control of the DoD, is primarily responsible for equipping and training the ANSF. CSTC-A receives and stores weapons and distributes them to ANSF units. CTSC-A is also responsible for monitoring the use of the U.S. procured weapons and other sensitive equipment.
Weapons Weren't Fully Accounted For
The GAO report (PDF) says lapses in weapons accountability occurred all the way down the line, including when the weapons were obtained, transported to Afghanistan and stored at two central depots in Kabul.
DoD has accountability procedures for its own weapons, but they failed to provide clear guidance to U.S. personnel regarding how weapons obtained for the ANSF would be accounted for.
Complete records for an estimated 87,000 -- about 36 percent -- of the 242,000 weapons procured and shipped to Afghanistan by the DoD were not completely maintained.
The Army couldn't provide the GAO serial numbers to uniquely identify about 46,000 weapons. CSTC-A didn't have any records of the location or disposition of 41,000 weapons that did have serial numbers recorded.
CTSC-A didn't maintain reliable records, including serial numbers, for any of the 135,000 weapons it reported obtaining from international donors from June 2002 through June 2008.
The DoD had control and custody of the weapons until they were issued to ANSF units but accountability was compromised while the weapons were being transported by organizations who did not communicate adequately to ensure that accountability was maintained over weapons during transport.
Complete and accurate inventory records for weapons at the central storage depots in Kabul were not maintained by CSTC-A who allowed poor security to persist. Until July 2008, CSTC-A didn't track all weapons by serial number or conduct routine physical inventories.
Less than one month after completing its first full weapons inventory, CSTC-A officials were able to idenitify the theft of 47 pistols intended for the ANSF.
Procedures for tracking and inventorying weapons were implemented, but continued use of the new accountability procedures could not be guaranteed considering staffing constraints and other factors.
Supplied Weapons At Serious Risk Of Being Lost or Stolen
Weapons supplied to the ANSF are at serious risk of being lost or stolen.
Equipment was issued to Afghan National Police units before any accountability procedures were in place.
Hundreds of U.S. trainers and mentors were deployed by the DoD and U.S. State Department to, among other things, help the ANSF establish equipment accountability practices. The DoD reported to Congress in June 2008 that it was CSTC-A's policy not to issue equipment to ANSF without verifying that the appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place.
The CSTC-A established a system for assessing the logistics capacity of ANSF units, but it has not consistently assessed or verified ANSF's ability to properly account for weapons and other equipment.
Major ANSF accountability weaknesses have been reported by contractors serving as mentors. All units could not be comprehensively assessed but common problems relating to weapons accountability that were highlighted included; Lack of functioning property book operations, Illiteracy, Poor security, Unclear guidance, Corruption and Desertion.
More complete explanations of the highlighted common accountability problems are available in the report (PDF) from the GAO.
Serious Concerns About The Accountability of Weapons
DoD regulations call for intensive monitoring of the use of night vision devices, including tracking by serial number because they are considered dangerous to the public and to U.S. forces in the wrong hands.
In July 2007 the DoD began issuing night vision devices to the Afghan National Army. The CSTC-A didn't begin monitoring the use of night vision devices until October 2008 -- almost 15 months after issuing them. The limited monitoring was attributed to a number of factors including a shortage of security assistance staff and expertise at CSTC-A, exacerbated by frequent CSTC-A staff rotations.
After the GAO notified the CSTC-A about the problem, an inventory was conducted in December 2008 that found all but 10 of the 2,410 night vision devices issued had been accounted for.
As of December 2008, CSTC-A had only 64 percent of the nearly 6,700 personnel required to perform its overall mission, including only about half of 4,000 personnel needed to mentor ANSF units -- which served as the primary impediment to advancing the training of the ANSF in accountability practices.
The GAO expressed serious concerns about the accountability for weapons obtained by the DoD for the ANSF through U.S. procurements and international donations. More information and recommendations made to improve accountability can be found in the report (PDF) from the GAO.
The United States spent $16.5 billion from 2002 through 2008 to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces in order to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan back to the Afghan government. The Department of Defense (DoD) through the U.S. Army and Navy, purchased over 242,000 small arms and light weapons at a cost of about $120 Million.
A GAO analysis of DoD data revealed that U.S. procured armaments shipped to Afghanistan included 117,163 rifles, 62,055 pistols, 35,778 Machine guns, 18,656 Grenade launchers, 6,704 Shotguns, 1,620 Rocket-propelled granade launchers and 227 Mortars and other weapons for a total of 242,203. The U.S. weapons shipments to Afghanistan for ANSF began in December 2004. More than a third of the above mentioned armaments are unaccounted for.
In addition to the U.S. weapons shipped, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reported that 21 other countries provided 135,000 weapons valued at about $103 million that were shipped for the ANSF between June 2002 and June 2008, bringing the total number of weapons the DoD reported obtaining for ANSF to over 375,000.
CTSC-A in Kabul, under the command and control of the DoD, is primarily responsible for equipping and training the ANSF. CSTC-A receives and stores weapons and distributes them to ANSF units. CTSC-A is also responsible for monitoring the use of the U.S. procured weapons and other sensitive equipment.
Weapons Weren't Fully Accounted For
The GAO report (PDF) says lapses in weapons accountability occurred all the way down the line, including when the weapons were obtained, transported to Afghanistan and stored at two central depots in Kabul.
DoD has accountability procedures for its own weapons, but they failed to provide clear guidance to U.S. personnel regarding how weapons obtained for the ANSF would be accounted for.
Complete records for an estimated 87,000 -- about 36 percent -- of the 242,000 weapons procured and shipped to Afghanistan by the DoD were not completely maintained.
The Army couldn't provide the GAO serial numbers to uniquely identify about 46,000 weapons. CSTC-A didn't have any records of the location or disposition of 41,000 weapons that did have serial numbers recorded.
CTSC-A didn't maintain reliable records, including serial numbers, for any of the 135,000 weapons it reported obtaining from international donors from June 2002 through June 2008.
The DoD had control and custody of the weapons until they were issued to ANSF units but accountability was compromised while the weapons were being transported by organizations who did not communicate adequately to ensure that accountability was maintained over weapons during transport.
Complete and accurate inventory records for weapons at the central storage depots in Kabul were not maintained by CSTC-A who allowed poor security to persist. Until July 2008, CSTC-A didn't track all weapons by serial number or conduct routine physical inventories.
Less than one month after completing its first full weapons inventory, CSTC-A officials were able to idenitify the theft of 47 pistols intended for the ANSF.
Procedures for tracking and inventorying weapons were implemented, but continued use of the new accountability procedures could not be guaranteed considering staffing constraints and other factors.
Supplied Weapons At Serious Risk Of Being Lost or Stolen
Weapons supplied to the ANSF are at serious risk of being lost or stolen.
Equipment was issued to Afghan National Police units before any accountability procedures were in place.
Hundreds of U.S. trainers and mentors were deployed by the DoD and U.S. State Department to, among other things, help the ANSF establish equipment accountability practices. The DoD reported to Congress in June 2008 that it was CSTC-A's policy not to issue equipment to ANSF without verifying that the appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place.
The CSTC-A established a system for assessing the logistics capacity of ANSF units, but it has not consistently assessed or verified ANSF's ability to properly account for weapons and other equipment.
Major ANSF accountability weaknesses have been reported by contractors serving as mentors. All units could not be comprehensively assessed but common problems relating to weapons accountability that were highlighted included; Lack of functioning property book operations, Illiteracy, Poor security, Unclear guidance, Corruption and Desertion.
More complete explanations of the highlighted common accountability problems are available in the report (PDF) from the GAO.
Serious Concerns About The Accountability of Weapons
DoD regulations call for intensive monitoring of the use of night vision devices, including tracking by serial number because they are considered dangerous to the public and to U.S. forces in the wrong hands.
In July 2007 the DoD began issuing night vision devices to the Afghan National Army. The CSTC-A didn't begin monitoring the use of night vision devices until October 2008 -- almost 15 months after issuing them. The limited monitoring was attributed to a number of factors including a shortage of security assistance staff and expertise at CSTC-A, exacerbated by frequent CSTC-A staff rotations.
After the GAO notified the CSTC-A about the problem, an inventory was conducted in December 2008 that found all but 10 of the 2,410 night vision devices issued had been accounted for.
As of December 2008, CSTC-A had only 64 percent of the nearly 6,700 personnel required to perform its overall mission, including only about half of 4,000 personnel needed to mentor ANSF units -- which served as the primary impediment to advancing the training of the ANSF in accountability practices.
The GAO expressed serious concerns about the accountability for weapons obtained by the DoD for the ANSF through U.S. procurements and international donations. More information and recommendations made to improve accountability can be found in the report (PDF) from the GAO.