THE "REAL STATUS" OF THE US IN IRAQ TODAY
Gary Ater
January 01, 2009
The "Surge" has shown an improvement in lowering the violence in Iraq, but the mayhem is far from over. And bringing home all of the US troops is still a big question.
Even though the economy will be "Job One" for President Obama from day one, the #1.5 issue will be to implement the goal of getting as many US troops as possible out of Iraq and to re-focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan.
And regarding that issue, although no country in history has ever successfully occupied Afghanistan, perhaps Obama can help their situation by focusing on helping and supporting the people of Afghanistan. That is, instead of just trying to make positive changes through America´s "military might".
Military force and occupation hasn´t worked before in Afghanistan and isn´t expected to work this time either. And to prove the point, the Soviet Union tried that, and they ended up both broke and defeated, and that defeat also became a key for finishing off the whole concept of the Soviet´s communist way of life.
But what about the "real status" of Iraq today and where will it fit in with American interests in the future?
I had been a supporter against any pre-emptive war in the Middle East from the start. However, since President Bush and his "Puppet Master", Vice President Cheney, made the "gut" decision to have a pre-emptive war with Saddam, we now have no choice but to determine what the best way is to proceed from here.
And seriously, what "is" the real status in Iraq? Did the surge really work? And if it did, why did it work? We had previously increased the US troops in Iraq. And if it didn´t work back then, why does it appear to have worked this time?
The answer to that questions is yet to be fully determined, but there does appear to be some lessons to be learned that could also apply to dealing with other Muslim countries and regions in the future.
First, Bush´s "surge" seems to have worked, somewhat at least, into the current "semi-peace" status because of the "population-protection" strategy initiated by the Commanding General; David Petraeus. There has been a very different approach with this "surge", when compared to the earlier military strategies of SecDef; Donald Rumsfeld and General George M. Casey.
Even though American force numbers in Iraq have returned to near pre-surge levels, the initial US military leaders in Iraq had at the time, totally ignored the idea of bringing the protection of the Iraqi population into the new government equation. They had missed the concept that has been applied over the last two years where US troops, in conjunction with the Iraqi security forces, focused on emphasizing the protection of the Iraqi population.
They had also ignored a simultaneous effort for bringing the Sunni volunteers, the so-called "Sons of Iraq", into the counterinsurgency program. These points have now become crucial for today´s successes and also for fashioning future US / Iraq policy.
Unfortunately, while Iraqi security forces have shown huge improvement, other government institutions have continued to flounder.
Inflation is now in check and the economy is slowly growing, but the quality of life for most Iraqis has improved only modestly.
Basic services for providing running water, electricity and sewer and garbage management in some areas are still marginal at best. But, on the whole, the Iraqi government has appeared to have met 7 of the 11 "Iraq index" benchmarks laid out by the US. This includes steps like establishing provincial election laws, reaching an initial accord on sharing oil revenue and enacting pension and amnesty laws.
However, for all the progress in Iraqi politics, including approving the status of the military forces agreement with the United States that takes effect on Jan. 1, there are still big challenges. Those include: agreements on how to share the oil revenues among all sectarian groups and the provinces; determining the future status of the city of Kirkuk and other areas currently contested by Kurds and Arabs.
And most importantly, the final resettlement of four million Iraqi people.
WILL THE US TROOPS REALLY BE COMING HOME?
Now, for all the talk of withdrawal and timetables, nothing like that is really likely to happen in the near term.
It is true that, as a result of the mostly successful surge, tens of thousands of American troops will begin to exit Iraq in the next three years. But American and Iraqi military and diplomatic officials insist that a "residual US force of considerable size" is likely to remain for the long term, as will the current US bases in Iraq. (Democrats have insisted the US Bases must not be permanent, but in the end, that probably will not happen.)
A good picture of America's future presence in Iraq can possibly be found in a recent memo sent by retired US General Barry McCaffrey to a department head at West Point, a Colonel Michael Meese.
The "after action report" was written following a tour of Iraq that McCaffrey took in October, during which he met with Iraqi and US political and military leaders. McCaffrey has been a reliable weathervane of military thinking throughout the Iraq war. He has also been a reliable surrogate for the thinking of General Petraeus, who understandably has tried to steer clear of the internal US politics of the Iraq war.
In the report, McCaffrey writes, "We should assume that the Iraqi government will eventually ask us to stay beyond 2011 with a residual force of trainers, counterterrorist capabilities, logistics, and air power. (My estimate--perhaps a force of 20,000 to 40,000 troops)." This estimate of what a training and support mission would require was echoed in confidential interviews with a US State Department official and two US Pentagon military sources, when asked what kind of American presence they foresaw in Iraq following 2011.
McCaffrey's reasoning rests in part on his view of the Iraqi military, an institution he says has vastly improved yet still needs; mentoring, equipment, and support from Americans on the ground. In his report, McCaffrey writes that Iraq's border-control service is "anemic" and that the Iraqi army cannot currently conduct military operations without US support and equipment. "The confidence of the Iraqi combat force is still dependant on US mentoring and backup," he writes. "Their officers are very explicit on this point in stating that they do NOT want the US combat units to leave, yet."
And the agreement recently ratified on America´s Thanksgiving Day by the Iraqi parliament would seem to lay out a road map for just the kind of withdrawal Obama has promised.
It demands that all U.S. combat forces, return to their bases by the end of June 2009, and that they exit the country by the last calendar day of 2011. What's more, it mandates that the unsightly international zone (The Green Zone) in the center of Iraq's capital be dismantled.
It also requires the explicit approval of Iraq's government for any U.S. military actions against Iraq's neighbors or within Iraq. For those inclined to call America's presence in Iraq an "occupation", this Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, as it is referred to at the US Pentagon, appears to end it.
All of this has left the impression that American soldiers will be out of Iraq by the time Obama begins his campaign for reelection. Or, as Senator Claire McCaskill told Fox News: "The important part about that SOFA agreement is it embraces the kind of timetable that Barack Obama made a foundation of his campaign."
It will be interesting as to what the final course becomes. But based on the on-going US involvements after prior wars involving Germany, South Korea and Japan, we may still be in Iraq for a long, long time.
Copyright G.Ater 2009