In the EU, an ongoing crisis of legitimacy
Dr. George Voskopoulos
June 20, 2008
There is a major difference between politicians and academics that could be described by the term proximity. Proximity theory meant to link the probability of a war be-tween neighboring states, suggesting that these countries are more likely to confront one another militarily because, among other things, geography makes it easier.
In the ongoing EU legitimacy crisis inaugurated in the summer of 2005 with the rejec-tion of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands proximity is the key word also describing the causational axis of the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in Ire-land. It is a term defining the difference between academics and politicians. Under a spectrum it is a quality that we dispose when we look at our students and teach about the merits of the long European integration process, integration theories and the po-litical system of the EU. Interaction and the ability to comprehend the younger gen-erations define almost by default our structural advantage within societies.
By contrast it is a quality politicians do not dispose or have lost in the process of set-ting an alien to Europeans bureaucratic mechanism unable to cope with everyday problems, great expectations and dreams particularly those of younger generations. The European integration process started as a conscious elite venture but remained an elite issue for too long, thus alienating European peoples from political leaderships. It has been a sacred cow not to be touched by anyone other than elites. As a result, the gap in strategy and policy preferences between elites and collectivities has grown up to the detriment of the European ideals we share and sternly support.
In the summer of 2005 while doing research at the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies I wrote a commentary at the daily The Luxembourgian. Then I underlined that "the EU is facing one of the most serious crises in its history. The double rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands re-sulted in the Treaty´s clinical death. The reasons are interpreted in different ways but what underlies the rejections is a substantial gap between people and political elites as far as goals, expectations and strategies are concerned. The negative response to the Treaty also raises the issue of how the state is going to operate in a globalised environment. Will it be a minimal or a maximal one? The first model (the minimal state) is founded on the concept of John Locke regarding un contrat social between elite and people and describes a state operating in a way that fully reflects the wishes of its constituent parts. In such an arrangement, there is an identification between the goals of the citizenry and those of the state as expressed by its political leadership. According to the second model (the maximal state), the state, via its bureaucracy, expresses interests that do not count for the total of the wishes of its citizens or interests different from those of the majority of people. In this case, a state may not reflect the genuine wishes of the majority, since it primarily aims at advancing its own goals. As a result, choices on the political, economic and social level override people´s interests. Eventually the way the state acts does not justify its raison d´être, which is to cater for the needs of the majority operating in a consensual basis. This results in a conflict of interests between the political elite itself and the citizens as shown by the French and Dutch reactions. For many years, decisions in the EU were taken mainly, if not exclusively, by political elites without any clear consent of national electorates. For as long as the EU managed to operate successfully, this gap did not pose major obstacles to the integration process. However, a number of issues changed the mood of many people in Europe. First, after the introduction of the EURO, prices skyrocketed in most countries of the Eurozone. Second, unsuccessful policies failed to live up to the people´s expectations. With unemployment rising across the Eurozone it is no mystery why social problems prevailed over the institutional need to formalize what has been agreed through treaties. Third, growth has been dramatically slow in Europe, while the strong EURO has affected European exports. At the same time, the impact of globalization on the EU operational mode has caused European economies not to be competitive and this dictated the adoption of new strategies at the Lisbon Summit in 2000. The new agenda set priorities widely welcome by Europeans (boost-ing employment, enhancing competitiveness) but what was not clear to all sides was the means with which these would be achieved. To the eyes of a number of techno-crats, the adoption of extreme neo-liberal policies emerged as the only solution, how-ever, flexible terms in employment, the deconstruction of the welfare state and limited rights for the working class was not an acceptable strategy by European standards. The message from the referenda is that the EU needs re-orientation, on a "maximal" basis that will be widely accepted by European peoples. On the other hand, with hind-sight, it is clear that the attempt to proceed with a Constitution was by far too great a leap forward under the circumstances. In a way, the political elite expected radical structural changes to be accepted by the social partners in a short time through the adoption of unpopular strategies. Practically few people expected too much from too many in a short notice without consent».
Sadly enough the above approach to the 2005 crisis over the rejection of the Constitu-tional Treaty might as well describe the current situation after the Irish referendum. The then explanation given by a great number of European leaders focused on the lack of a communication strategy on the part of the EU. This was a naïve approach to a long twofold problem characterizing the operational pattern of the EU: democratic deficit and inability to tackle a number of issues that affect the quality of people´s lives.
The Lisbon Treaty was rejected in Ireland only, but this was the only country that held a referendum. After the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty political elites limited dramatically the ability of the European electorates to interfere with the adopted proc-ess and endorse political choices through participation. National parliaments meant to be the only means of endorsing decisions taken at elite level. This heralded and ex-posed the gap between elites and peoples while delegitimizing the process in the eyes of many.
Had referenda been held in other EU countries there would be additional rejections and this is something political leaderships wanted to avoid at any cost. High commodity and fuel prices, flexicurity (flexibility plus security) and an ever-increasing num-ber of those who live under the poverty line across Europe were just the tip of the iceberg of the EU crisis. It appears that this is not just a middle-life crisis as estimated in 2005. It is a crisis in substance, a crisis that unites pro-Europeanists and Eurosceptics.
Brussels appears to be too far from European capitals, at least in terms of sensing people´s worries and actual problems. The inadequacies of the adopted managerial policies have been evaluated as an effort by Eurosceptics to derail the integration process. This exposes an inherent inability to decode the real meaning of the rejec-tions and the loud messages sent by Europeans. It constitutes today the greatest threat to our European institutional edifice and the painstaking efforts made by elites and peoples to cement the old continent against inter-European conflicts.
In the past German Chancellor H. Kohl rightly defined the European integration proc-ess as a matter of choosing between war and peace. However, today Europe has come a long way and idealism is not the only criterion used by Europeans to evaluate the merits of the integration process. Efficiency, democracy and participation constitute black holes of the EU system of governance, features of a noble and practical process that needs to be endorsed collectively.
The European integration process has been a Herculean task for the last five decades [1]. It has led to the qualitative reformulation of intra-European relations and cemented institutionally the psychological healing process amongst former foes. The EU constitutes a unique institutional edifice, a phenomenon in itself that started as an attempt for regional integration. It was an answer to deal with what D. Mitrany, acknowledged father of functionalism, termed the root of the evil, meaning the division of the world into "detached and competing political units".
Yet, people tend to formulate evaluative judgments on the basis of results and their institutional ability to influence outcomes. In essence the latter constitutes a definition of power, simply put, peoples´ power to endorse or reject policies. European political elites have taken every possible measure to limit this democratic prerogative of Euro-pean constituencies and as a result alienation forms a solid barrier between elites and peoples.
The EU is facing today one of the most serious crises in the course of European inte-gration. It is a crisis related to the very basic elements of Europe´s strategic orienta-tion, its raison d´ être and role in world politics, its social, economic and operational norm as well as the legitimacy of its institutional structure.
In a survey conducted by the French Le Monde on June 17, 2004, following the rejec-tion of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, the French gave a number of answers that sent clear messages to the political elite. "We said no to an EU where poverty prevails", "we said no to a Union constructed without us", "we re-jected massively all these aspects that threaten our social privileges", "it was a rejec-tion of the high prices of consumer goods brought about with the introduction of the Euro", "we rejected the whole system", "it was a rejection of neo-liberal practices, not a support of nationalism and xenophobia" were some indicative only but revealing answers of those who participated in the survey [2]. The same applies today but still political elites ignore these messages and operate cut-off from those who have given them the power to make decisions on their part.
The reason the EU finds itself in the current deadlock is related to the EU´s inefficient policies, its centralized apparatus and the gradually declining legitimacy of the politi-cal and bureaucratic elite´s choices. Efficiency and legitimacy are key words for suc-cessful policies not just procedural issues. Establishing institutional or ad hoc mecha-nisms to immunize the integration process from European peoples´ interference might be the assumed prerogative of European leaders but it is bound to lead to a head-on collision.
1] For the descriptive and prescriptive elements of the process see George Voskopoulos, Transatlantic Relations and European Integration, realities and dilemmas, ICFAI University Press, Hyderabad, 2006. Also George Voskopoulos, The Construction of Europe, peace, reconciliation, cooperation, integration, Piotita pubs, Athens, 2008 (in Greek).
2] See "A Marseille, le non observe sa diversité", Le Monde, 17-6-2005.
In the ongoing EU legitimacy crisis inaugurated in the summer of 2005 with the rejec-tion of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands proximity is the key word also describing the causational axis of the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in Ire-land. It is a term defining the difference between academics and politicians. Under a spectrum it is a quality that we dispose when we look at our students and teach about the merits of the long European integration process, integration theories and the po-litical system of the EU. Interaction and the ability to comprehend the younger gen-erations define almost by default our structural advantage within societies.
By contrast it is a quality politicians do not dispose or have lost in the process of set-ting an alien to Europeans bureaucratic mechanism unable to cope with everyday problems, great expectations and dreams particularly those of younger generations. The European integration process started as a conscious elite venture but remained an elite issue for too long, thus alienating European peoples from political leaderships. It has been a sacred cow not to be touched by anyone other than elites. As a result, the gap in strategy and policy preferences between elites and collectivities has grown up to the detriment of the European ideals we share and sternly support.
In the summer of 2005 while doing research at the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies I wrote a commentary at the daily The Luxembourgian. Then I underlined that "the EU is facing one of the most serious crises in its history. The double rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands re-sulted in the Treaty´s clinical death. The reasons are interpreted in different ways but what underlies the rejections is a substantial gap between people and political elites as far as goals, expectations and strategies are concerned. The negative response to the Treaty also raises the issue of how the state is going to operate in a globalised environment. Will it be a minimal or a maximal one? The first model (the minimal state) is founded on the concept of John Locke regarding un contrat social between elite and people and describes a state operating in a way that fully reflects the wishes of its constituent parts. In such an arrangement, there is an identification between the goals of the citizenry and those of the state as expressed by its political leadership. According to the second model (the maximal state), the state, via its bureaucracy, expresses interests that do not count for the total of the wishes of its citizens or interests different from those of the majority of people. In this case, a state may not reflect the genuine wishes of the majority, since it primarily aims at advancing its own goals. As a result, choices on the political, economic and social level override people´s interests. Eventually the way the state acts does not justify its raison d´être, which is to cater for the needs of the majority operating in a consensual basis. This results in a conflict of interests between the political elite itself and the citizens as shown by the French and Dutch reactions. For many years, decisions in the EU were taken mainly, if not exclusively, by political elites without any clear consent of national electorates. For as long as the EU managed to operate successfully, this gap did not pose major obstacles to the integration process. However, a number of issues changed the mood of many people in Europe. First, after the introduction of the EURO, prices skyrocketed in most countries of the Eurozone. Second, unsuccessful policies failed to live up to the people´s expectations. With unemployment rising across the Eurozone it is no mystery why social problems prevailed over the institutional need to formalize what has been agreed through treaties. Third, growth has been dramatically slow in Europe, while the strong EURO has affected European exports. At the same time, the impact of globalization on the EU operational mode has caused European economies not to be competitive and this dictated the adoption of new strategies at the Lisbon Summit in 2000. The new agenda set priorities widely welcome by Europeans (boost-ing employment, enhancing competitiveness) but what was not clear to all sides was the means with which these would be achieved. To the eyes of a number of techno-crats, the adoption of extreme neo-liberal policies emerged as the only solution, how-ever, flexible terms in employment, the deconstruction of the welfare state and limited rights for the working class was not an acceptable strategy by European standards. The message from the referenda is that the EU needs re-orientation, on a "maximal" basis that will be widely accepted by European peoples. On the other hand, with hind-sight, it is clear that the attempt to proceed with a Constitution was by far too great a leap forward under the circumstances. In a way, the political elite expected radical structural changes to be accepted by the social partners in a short time through the adoption of unpopular strategies. Practically few people expected too much from too many in a short notice without consent».
Sadly enough the above approach to the 2005 crisis over the rejection of the Constitu-tional Treaty might as well describe the current situation after the Irish referendum. The then explanation given by a great number of European leaders focused on the lack of a communication strategy on the part of the EU. This was a naïve approach to a long twofold problem characterizing the operational pattern of the EU: democratic deficit and inability to tackle a number of issues that affect the quality of people´s lives.
The Lisbon Treaty was rejected in Ireland only, but this was the only country that held a referendum. After the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty political elites limited dramatically the ability of the European electorates to interfere with the adopted proc-ess and endorse political choices through participation. National parliaments meant to be the only means of endorsing decisions taken at elite level. This heralded and ex-posed the gap between elites and peoples while delegitimizing the process in the eyes of many.
Had referenda been held in other EU countries there would be additional rejections and this is something political leaderships wanted to avoid at any cost. High commodity and fuel prices, flexicurity (flexibility plus security) and an ever-increasing num-ber of those who live under the poverty line across Europe were just the tip of the iceberg of the EU crisis. It appears that this is not just a middle-life crisis as estimated in 2005. It is a crisis in substance, a crisis that unites pro-Europeanists and Eurosceptics.
Brussels appears to be too far from European capitals, at least in terms of sensing people´s worries and actual problems. The inadequacies of the adopted managerial policies have been evaluated as an effort by Eurosceptics to derail the integration process. This exposes an inherent inability to decode the real meaning of the rejec-tions and the loud messages sent by Europeans. It constitutes today the greatest threat to our European institutional edifice and the painstaking efforts made by elites and peoples to cement the old continent against inter-European conflicts.
In the past German Chancellor H. Kohl rightly defined the European integration proc-ess as a matter of choosing between war and peace. However, today Europe has come a long way and idealism is not the only criterion used by Europeans to evaluate the merits of the integration process. Efficiency, democracy and participation constitute black holes of the EU system of governance, features of a noble and practical process that needs to be endorsed collectively.
The European integration process has been a Herculean task for the last five decades [1]. It has led to the qualitative reformulation of intra-European relations and cemented institutionally the psychological healing process amongst former foes. The EU constitutes a unique institutional edifice, a phenomenon in itself that started as an attempt for regional integration. It was an answer to deal with what D. Mitrany, acknowledged father of functionalism, termed the root of the evil, meaning the division of the world into "detached and competing political units".
Yet, people tend to formulate evaluative judgments on the basis of results and their institutional ability to influence outcomes. In essence the latter constitutes a definition of power, simply put, peoples´ power to endorse or reject policies. European political elites have taken every possible measure to limit this democratic prerogative of Euro-pean constituencies and as a result alienation forms a solid barrier between elites and peoples.
The EU is facing today one of the most serious crises in the course of European inte-gration. It is a crisis related to the very basic elements of Europe´s strategic orienta-tion, its raison d´ être and role in world politics, its social, economic and operational norm as well as the legitimacy of its institutional structure.
In a survey conducted by the French Le Monde on June 17, 2004, following the rejec-tion of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, the French gave a number of answers that sent clear messages to the political elite. "We said no to an EU where poverty prevails", "we said no to a Union constructed without us", "we re-jected massively all these aspects that threaten our social privileges", "it was a rejec-tion of the high prices of consumer goods brought about with the introduction of the Euro", "we rejected the whole system", "it was a rejection of neo-liberal practices, not a support of nationalism and xenophobia" were some indicative only but revealing answers of those who participated in the survey [2]. The same applies today but still political elites ignore these messages and operate cut-off from those who have given them the power to make decisions on their part.
The reason the EU finds itself in the current deadlock is related to the EU´s inefficient policies, its centralized apparatus and the gradually declining legitimacy of the politi-cal and bureaucratic elite´s choices. Efficiency and legitimacy are key words for suc-cessful policies not just procedural issues. Establishing institutional or ad hoc mecha-nisms to immunize the integration process from European peoples´ interference might be the assumed prerogative of European leaders but it is bound to lead to a head-on collision.
1] For the descriptive and prescriptive elements of the process see George Voskopoulos, Transatlantic Relations and European Integration, realities and dilemmas, ICFAI University Press, Hyderabad, 2006. Also George Voskopoulos, The Construction of Europe, peace, reconciliation, cooperation, integration, Piotita pubs, Athens, 2008 (in Greek).
2] See "A Marseille, le non observe sa diversité", Le Monde, 17-6-2005.