Lebanese Presidential Elections: Down to the Wire
Dr. Joseph Hitti
November 21, 2007
Boston, Massachusetts -- The stalemate in Lebanon’s presidential elections has come down to this: The opposition (Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the Marada Christians of the North and others) is insisting on fielding the exiled former Prime Minister, FPM leader, and head of the largest Christian Bloc in Parliament General Michel Aoun, as its sole candidate. On the other side, the loyalist March 14 Coalition, which is led by Sunni leader Saad Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, along with a significant representation of Christians, is fielding at least a half dozen candidates, none of which truly represents the Christian street.
The discrepancy between the number of candidates fielded by each side is reflective of one thing, and one thing only. It is not General Aoun’s mad pursuit and lust for power, as some in the loyalist camp like to say, nor is it that General Aoun is rejecting any compromise over a “consensus” president. That the March 14 coalition is willing to consider so many candidates and claims to be seeking a compromise (with the backing of the French, the Americans and the Arabs) proves that Hariri and Jumblatt are not serious about Christian representation (Why should they? Hariri is Sunni and Jumblatt is Druze) and are willing to accept any Maronite as long as he is beholden to them and is a weakling who could be manipulated into continuing the comatose form of governance that Lebanon has had for decades. Clearly, the fight is over whether Lebanon ought to have a “strong” or a “consensus” (i.e. weak) President, regardless of any other considerations.
It is noteworthy that the pro-March 14 coalition US analyst, Walid Phares, issued a statement yesterday in which he attacked the March 14 coalition for reneging on its pledges to deny Aoun the Presidency. This is somewhat surprising, though revealing of the lack of confidence that the March 14 leadership inspires to its own supporters. The statement says:
The Cedars Revolution [March 14 Coalition] is on the verge of a crushing political defeat over the next few days, and at the hands of its own politicians. Instead of electing a strong anti-terror president, the Lebanese members of parliament are trying to cut deals with Hezbollah, Syria and Iran to select a candidate who a) would not commit to disarming the terrorist organization, and b) would not side with the world campaign against terrorism.”
Many of us, including this writer, have forcefully spoken against Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah, and we have often said that Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah is his Achilles’ Heel because he is relying on an organization that is a proxy for the Iranian and Syrian regimes which ultimately harms Lebanon’s interests. However, a careful consideration of the respective discourses of Michel Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah clearly shows that they speak at different planes. While Nasrallah – understandably driven by his Syrian and Iranian allegiance – always speaks of such issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, resisting the Israeli occupation and defeating America, Aoun almost always speaks of domestic issues, such as reforming the administration, fighting corruption, cleaning up and holding those responsible for 30 years of fiascos to account for their crimes. In other words, the Aoun-Nasrallah alliance is tactical and not strategic, and ultimately the two paths are on a collision course.
Beyond the flashy slogans of sovereignty, independence and freedom that the March 14 Coalition boasts of supporting (notwithstanding these same people’s fornication with the Syrian occupation for at least 15 years of their political existence), the immediate question on the minds of many Lebanese is:
1- Do I support a weak consensus Maronite President who is beholden to the Sunni and Druze leaderships, who will manage the crisis instead of seriously attempting to solve it, who is likely to have no popular base and no real power, and who will in the end play the role of the effigy assigned by the Taif Agreement to the Maronite President, only to keep Hezbollah at bay without ever been able to defeat it or bring it to deal? Or,
2- Do I support a strong President who, while tactically beholden to Hezbollah for helping his push for the Presidency, is the only candidate to fix Lebanon’s chronic and structural problems, AND who also holds a key – uncertain and potentially treacherous to be sure, but still the only possible key – to get Hezbollah to drop its weapons, abandon the resistance-terrorism platform, and integrate Lebanese politics as an insider and not as an outsider serving Syria or Iran?
Since no one has been able to defeat Hezbollah by force or bring it to deal by the power of persuasion, I believe it is time to give Lebanon a strong President who at least has a chance to politically convince Hezbollah to come on board. Electing a weak consensus President is likely to continue the status quo and drive Lebanon further into stalemate and despair. At least with Aoun there is hope that, even if he fails to defeat Hezbollah, in which case the same status quo will continue, Aoun at least is the most likely to reform the administration, rejuvenate the country and give the Lebanese hope in their future. I don’t see hope in the likes of Boutros Harb or Michel Edde or Nassib Lahoud or any of the other compromise/ consensus candidates that the March 14 Coalition are pushing.
In summary, with a weak consensus President, the Lebanese are guaranteed six more years of troubles, uncertainty, economic decline, despair, and the 600-pound gorilla Hezbollah still squatting in the room. With a strong President, they are guaranteed the resurgence of a clean administration and the end of corruption, albeit with the 600-pound gorilla still in the room, but with a chance of taming it. The only other alternative is descent into violence and strife, of which Lebanon has been amply capable in the past.
The discrepancy between the number of candidates fielded by each side is reflective of one thing, and one thing only. It is not General Aoun’s mad pursuit and lust for power, as some in the loyalist camp like to say, nor is it that General Aoun is rejecting any compromise over a “consensus” president. That the March 14 coalition is willing to consider so many candidates and claims to be seeking a compromise (with the backing of the French, the Americans and the Arabs) proves that Hariri and Jumblatt are not serious about Christian representation (Why should they? Hariri is Sunni and Jumblatt is Druze) and are willing to accept any Maronite as long as he is beholden to them and is a weakling who could be manipulated into continuing the comatose form of governance that Lebanon has had for decades. Clearly, the fight is over whether Lebanon ought to have a “strong” or a “consensus” (i.e. weak) President, regardless of any other considerations.
It is noteworthy that the pro-March 14 coalition US analyst, Walid Phares, issued a statement yesterday in which he attacked the March 14 coalition for reneging on its pledges to deny Aoun the Presidency. This is somewhat surprising, though revealing of the lack of confidence that the March 14 leadership inspires to its own supporters. The statement says:
The Cedars Revolution [March 14 Coalition] is on the verge of a crushing political defeat over the next few days, and at the hands of its own politicians. Instead of electing a strong anti-terror president, the Lebanese members of parliament are trying to cut deals with Hezbollah, Syria and Iran to select a candidate who a) would not commit to disarming the terrorist organization, and b) would not side with the world campaign against terrorism.”
Many of us, including this writer, have forcefully spoken against Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah, and we have often said that Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah is his Achilles’ Heel because he is relying on an organization that is a proxy for the Iranian and Syrian regimes which ultimately harms Lebanon’s interests. However, a careful consideration of the respective discourses of Michel Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah clearly shows that they speak at different planes. While Nasrallah – understandably driven by his Syrian and Iranian allegiance – always speaks of such issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, resisting the Israeli occupation and defeating America, Aoun almost always speaks of domestic issues, such as reforming the administration, fighting corruption, cleaning up and holding those responsible for 30 years of fiascos to account for their crimes. In other words, the Aoun-Nasrallah alliance is tactical and not strategic, and ultimately the two paths are on a collision course.
Beyond the flashy slogans of sovereignty, independence and freedom that the March 14 Coalition boasts of supporting (notwithstanding these same people’s fornication with the Syrian occupation for at least 15 years of their political existence), the immediate question on the minds of many Lebanese is:
1- Do I support a weak consensus Maronite President who is beholden to the Sunni and Druze leaderships, who will manage the crisis instead of seriously attempting to solve it, who is likely to have no popular base and no real power, and who will in the end play the role of the effigy assigned by the Taif Agreement to the Maronite President, only to keep Hezbollah at bay without ever been able to defeat it or bring it to deal? Or,
2- Do I support a strong President who, while tactically beholden to Hezbollah for helping his push for the Presidency, is the only candidate to fix Lebanon’s chronic and structural problems, AND who also holds a key – uncertain and potentially treacherous to be sure, but still the only possible key – to get Hezbollah to drop its weapons, abandon the resistance-terrorism platform, and integrate Lebanese politics as an insider and not as an outsider serving Syria or Iran?
Since no one has been able to defeat Hezbollah by force or bring it to deal by the power of persuasion, I believe it is time to give Lebanon a strong President who at least has a chance to politically convince Hezbollah to come on board. Electing a weak consensus President is likely to continue the status quo and drive Lebanon further into stalemate and despair. At least with Aoun there is hope that, even if he fails to defeat Hezbollah, in which case the same status quo will continue, Aoun at least is the most likely to reform the administration, rejuvenate the country and give the Lebanese hope in their future. I don’t see hope in the likes of Boutros Harb or Michel Edde or Nassib Lahoud or any of the other compromise/ consensus candidates that the March 14 Coalition are pushing.
In summary, with a weak consensus President, the Lebanese are guaranteed six more years of troubles, uncertainty, economic decline, despair, and the 600-pound gorilla Hezbollah still squatting in the room. With a strong President, they are guaranteed the resurgence of a clean administration and the end of corruption, albeit with the 600-pound gorilla still in the room, but with a chance of taming it. The only other alternative is descent into violence and strife, of which Lebanon has been amply capable in the past.