Print ArticleThe differing views concerning the August 7 Georgian government attack on South Ossetia offer a great study of point-counterpoint claims by opposing sides.
The opinion that Russia created the disputes on former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) territory (Georgia proper, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) is typically presented with the image of an aggressively authoritarian Russia unjustly threatening democratic Georgia. Running counter to that view are the South Ossetians and Abkhaz, who prefer Russia over Georgia proper. A point which is not meant to find any one group to be completely at fault. Like other conflicts, the turmoil in the former Georgian SSR is not without blame on all sides.
The claim that Georgian government forces were "provoked" into attacking South Ossetia is subject to further review. It has been reported that prior to the August 7 Georgian attack, there were armed exchanges between South Ossetian and Georgian forces. For some time, such skirmishes have been periodic, with both sides blaming each other. At times, it can be difficult to conclusively determine who was the greater belligerent. The bottom line is that the Georgian government launched a substantial strike into South Ossetia.
The relatively quick response from the Russian military is used as a basis for believing that Russia planned an attack before August 7. Given the existing tense situation in the former Georgian SSR, it is not unreasonable for Russia to have contingency plans, which include a rapid reaction force to a sudden outbreak of violence.
A number of individuals calling the Russian counterattack "disproportionate" are generally not as prone to term the Georgian government's August 7 attack on South Ossetia as such. Russia clearly wants to ensure that there is not a reoccurrence of the Georgian government's attack. Russian forces appear to have concentrated on taking out legitimate military targets, as opposed to recklessly lobbing bombs en masse. Civilian deaths and injuries as well as non-military property damage are nevertheless evident. The reported tens of thousands of people displaced in Georgia proper and South Ossetia are of particular concern. For the moment, it seems too early to accurately state the full extent of damage in the two areas.
"Provocative manner" can reasonably describe the Georgian government increasing its military capability and rhetorically drum beating the desire to retake Abkhazia and South Ossetia - two regions that have no territorial claims (at least to my knowledge) on Georgia proper. The frequently stated "Russian aggression" from American mass media outlets is two faced. Consider how some not so distant American, Israeli and Turkish military actions have been termed on major American television networks like CNN.
How does the aftermath of the Georgian government's attack influence the length of Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency? Will a significant number of Georgians come to see Saakashvili as the leader who lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while imprudently provoking a major power (Russia) in the Caucasus region? What now of Georgia's desire to join NATO? Is there a mutually agreeable way to resolve the former Georgian SSR conflict, with Abkhazia and South Ossetia returning to Georgia as full autonomous units? There are several future possibilities. They include a Caucasus version of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Russia being alone or nearly alone in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states), a Kosovo scenario (where over time, a small but significant number of countries would formally recognize South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's separation from Georgia), South Ossetia and possibly Abkhazia getting incorporated into the Russian Federation and the ongoing status quo (Russian peacekeepers remaining in two territorial disputes, whose independence claims are not formally recognized).
The contrasting opinions on the former Georgian SSR conflict have made Russia-West relations more testy. It will be interesting to see how the differences will play out.
Lurking in the background is Ukraine and its next presidential election at the end of 2010. Recent developments in the Caucasus increase attention on how the key Ukrainian political figures articulate their foreign policy views (notably the ones regarding Russia and the West). Last weekend, the Ukrainian foreign ministry said that Russia's Crimean fleet might be blocked from returning if it is used against Georgia (whether that attempt can succeed is another story). Yesterday, the Ukrainian government expressed interest in cooperating with the West on missile defense matters. Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko is close to Saakashvili. The last Ukrainian parliamentary election in 2007 resulted in Yushchenko's party finishing a distant third to the parties of his current and former prime ministers Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych respectively. Yanukovych's party won that vote within five percentage points. Tymoshenko and Yushchenko proceeded to form a coalition to successfully replace Yanukovych as prime minister. Since then, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have been at some odds with each other. Of the three main Ukrainian politicians, Yushchenko is the most committed to having Ukraine join NATO. He appears inclined to see this happen by decree rather than by a referendum. Tymoshenko is on record for favoring a referendum. This is consistent with her populist image. Most Ukrainians oppose NATO membership for their country. Yanukovych's party is against Ukraine joining NATO.
The opinion that Russia created the disputes on former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) territory (Georgia proper, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) is typically presented with the image of an aggressively authoritarian Russia unjustly threatening democratic Georgia. Running counter to that view are the South Ossetians and Abkhaz, who prefer Russia over Georgia proper. A point which is not meant to find any one group to be completely at fault. Like other conflicts, the turmoil in the former Georgian SSR is not without blame on all sides.
The claim that Georgian government forces were "provoked" into attacking South Ossetia is subject to further review. It has been reported that prior to the August 7 Georgian attack, there were armed exchanges between South Ossetian and Georgian forces. For some time, such skirmishes have been periodic, with both sides blaming each other. At times, it can be difficult to conclusively determine who was the greater belligerent. The bottom line is that the Georgian government launched a substantial strike into South Ossetia.
The relatively quick response from the Russian military is used as a basis for believing that Russia planned an attack before August 7. Given the existing tense situation in the former Georgian SSR, it is not unreasonable for Russia to have contingency plans, which include a rapid reaction force to a sudden outbreak of violence.
A number of individuals calling the Russian counterattack "disproportionate" are generally not as prone to term the Georgian government's August 7 attack on South Ossetia as such. Russia clearly wants to ensure that there is not a reoccurrence of the Georgian government's attack. Russian forces appear to have concentrated on taking out legitimate military targets, as opposed to recklessly lobbing bombs en masse. Civilian deaths and injuries as well as non-military property damage are nevertheless evident. The reported tens of thousands of people displaced in Georgia proper and South Ossetia are of particular concern. For the moment, it seems too early to accurately state the full extent of damage in the two areas.
"Provocative manner" can reasonably describe the Georgian government increasing its military capability and rhetorically drum beating the desire to retake Abkhazia and South Ossetia - two regions that have no territorial claims (at least to my knowledge) on Georgia proper. The frequently stated "Russian aggression" from American mass media outlets is two faced. Consider how some not so distant American, Israeli and Turkish military actions have been termed on major American television networks like CNN.
How does the aftermath of the Georgian government's attack influence the length of Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency? Will a significant number of Georgians come to see Saakashvili as the leader who lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while imprudently provoking a major power (Russia) in the Caucasus region? What now of Georgia's desire to join NATO? Is there a mutually agreeable way to resolve the former Georgian SSR conflict, with Abkhazia and South Ossetia returning to Georgia as full autonomous units? There are several future possibilities. They include a Caucasus version of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Russia being alone or nearly alone in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states), a Kosovo scenario (where over time, a small but significant number of countries would formally recognize South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's separation from Georgia), South Ossetia and possibly Abkhazia getting incorporated into the Russian Federation and the ongoing status quo (Russian peacekeepers remaining in two territorial disputes, whose independence claims are not formally recognized).
The contrasting opinions on the former Georgian SSR conflict have made Russia-West relations more testy. It will be interesting to see how the differences will play out.
Lurking in the background is Ukraine and its next presidential election at the end of 2010. Recent developments in the Caucasus increase attention on how the key Ukrainian political figures articulate their foreign policy views (notably the ones regarding Russia and the West). Last weekend, the Ukrainian foreign ministry said that Russia's Crimean fleet might be blocked from returning if it is used against Georgia (whether that attempt can succeed is another story). Yesterday, the Ukrainian government expressed interest in cooperating with the West on missile defense matters. Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko is close to Saakashvili. The last Ukrainian parliamentary election in 2007 resulted in Yushchenko's party finishing a distant third to the parties of his current and former prime ministers Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych respectively. Yanukovych's party won that vote within five percentage points. Tymoshenko and Yushchenko proceeded to form a coalition to successfully replace Yanukovych as prime minister. Since then, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have been at some odds with each other. Of the three main Ukrainian politicians, Yushchenko is the most committed to having Ukraine join NATO. He appears inclined to see this happen by decree rather than by a referendum. Tymoshenko is on record for favoring a referendum. This is consistent with her populist image. Most Ukrainians oppose NATO membership for their country. Yanukovych's party is against Ukraine joining NATO.
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