My March 4 and 11 Counterpunch (http://www.counterpunch.org) articles received a considerable amount of global feedback. Much of it was positive. The few nay sayers were unconvincing in their claims. They include the kind of insults that have found their way at a purportedly academic oriented venue(a remark was made about vodka consumption relative to the stated analysis).

A Romanian with ties to Serbia's northern Vojvodina region said that Tomislav Nikolic's Radical Party has good relations with the ethnic Romanian community. The March 11 Counterpunch piece omitted that point, while acknowledging the Radical Party's good relations with the Slovak and Roma communities.

Regarding the March 4 essay, a reader questioned the cited religious background of the worldwide Albanian community. It was listed as 70% Muslim, 20% Orthodox Christian and 10% Catholic. A quick further review shows Wikipedia (without specific citation) putting the figure as 78% Muslim, 14% Orthodox Christian and 8% Roman Catholic. The March 4 article cited a figure that was stated from thirty years ago via Encyclopedia Britannica and American State Department material. The slight percentage differences are indicative of a reasonable change and-or margin of error projection over that period. Overall: years ago, not much was known of that part of the world. This was especially true of Albania.

American CSPAN aired a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty panel discussion which featured The Economist's Edward Lucas, who has been busily promoting his book "The New Cold War". On the topic of disputed former Communist bloc territories, Lucas said that Russia is apprehensive about granting recognition to the disputed former Communist bloc territories because it could encourage separatism in multi-ethnic Russia itself. Is not that arguably more true of others like the United Kingdom, where Scottish independence enthusiasts have been trumping up the matter of Kosovo? As for Russia, the disputed lands of Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester) and South Ossetia have expressed a desire to reunite with Russia. Separation from Russia is nowhere near as popular. The appeal of Chechen separatism has dwindled because of the increased turmoil when Chechnya had considerable autonomy on two different occasions during the last decade.



In a March 10 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) interview (http://www.cfr.org) with Bernard Gwertzman, Charles Kupchan expresses disappointment with the lack of nations that have so far recognized Kosovo's independence. Should he really be so surprised? The lengthy interview makes no mention of how "independent" Kosovo is being governed. It is essentially under the command of a Western civil/military force. Is that the basis of a truly independent state? Should not Kosovo first prove itself capable of self governance before even being given any kind of consideration for independence? Kupchan's CFR interview is akin to his March 12 Foreign Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.org) article on the subject (Foreign Affairs is affiliated with the CFR).

On a related note, there are two good reasons for Russia to oppose independence for any or all of the disputed former Soviet territories. The one mentioned in the March 11 Counterpunch commentary relates to Moscow having greater leverage with all of the parties as a more honest broker. Supporting independence would significantly downplay Moscow's relationship with the Moldovan, Georgian and Azeri authorities. Another reason has to do with the comparisons that will be made to the number of countries recognizing Kosovo's independence. Years of pro-Kosovo independence propaganda ensures that not as many nations would likely come close to recognizing the independence of the disputed former Soviet lands. The other factor pertains to Russia not being as geo-politically influential as the United States.

With reasoned consistency on its side, the current Russian position promotes a greater global following.